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Abstract
The Other Copts: Between Sectarianism, Nationalism and Catholic Coptic
Activism in Minya
Ana Carol Torres Gutiérrez
Under the supervision of Dr. Sandrine Gamblin

The partnership between the Coptic Orthodox Church and the Egyptian
State has been a political technique that has left little space for religious diversity
and has overshadowed other Egyptian minorities. Eschewing this dichotomous
illusion and blowing the dust off of Missionary Studies that has left Catholic Copts
in the past, this ethnographic study gives an account of the life of a Catholic
Coptic NGO, the Jesuit Brothers Association for Development (JBAD), within the
context of the uncontested capital of sectarian violence in Egypt: Minya. Using
participant observation, focus groups, and interviews, this study intends to shed a
light on the ways through which sectarian boundaries and identity politics have
affected Catholic Copts engaging in activism in the post-2011 era. Particularly,
this study explores how three sectarian lines are negotiated in the everyday life
of this Catholic Coptic NGO. It explores the convenience and sponsorship that
being part of a transnational Catholic Church gives Catholic Coptic institutions
such as the JBAD yet its ritualistic remoteness from other types of Catholicism;
the negotiation of its common roots with the Coptic Orthodox vis-à-vis their
perplexity of their historic rivalry; and the ways in which Catholic Copts relate with
the Muslim majority and the Egyptian State that vacillate between spiritual
service and sectarian violence. This thesis questions how still today Catholic
Copts are perceived as a foreign or fabricated minority while they are actually
industrious and even nationalist citizens. Although this research subscribes to the
literature that addresses the transitions from Mission to NGO’s that took place at
the end of WWII, in the particular case of Catholic Copts, it proposes a change of
scholar discourse from Missionary Studies into those of nationalism and
citizenship.
iii

To all those who have been persecuted or martyrized for the sake of their
faith. . .
In particular to the post-revolutionary Egyptian context, from Maspero to
bloody Palm Sunday 2017, I dedicate this study to all those (Coptic or not)
victims of sectarian violence.
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1. Introduction: The Association of God or Dissociation of God?

When the French campaign came to Egypt
(1799-1801), the Catholic missions started to be more active
and entered Egypt among many foreigners. They never left
after the French did; still, they were privileged by the
protection of France. When Mohamed Ali Pasha started to
rule Egypt (1805-1847), he used them in many interests.
The Latin missions of Franciscans, Frères and Jesuits
continued but never succeed.
The efforts of both the Catholic missions and the
Governor led to the conversion of Master Ghali, his son
Bacillus and his brother, Francis, to Catholicism along with
their families and supporters. Thus, they proved themselves
in the country and they are what are known as Coptic
Catholics that submit to the Pope of Rome. In the 19 th of
June 1899, the first Coptic Catholic Pope was Anba Cyril
Macarius. He tried to attract the Copts to his church but
couldn't achieve it. At the end he realized that it was a
mistake leaving his original Orthodox doctrine and
announced that in front of many people. 4

This journey starts with a story of failure. Perhaps failure is not the
ultimate mind-set when one wishes to commence a project, yet it is the perfect

4

Antony, Antonious, Fr. Wataniyya, el Kinisa el Qiptiyya wa Tarikhha
(Citizenship, The Coptic Church and its History). Cairo: Shirkat Ettaba'a El Masriyya:
2004. Translation by: Nahla Atef Khalili from the original Arabic:
م) نشطت الرساليات الكاثوليكية و دخلت بدخول كثير من1801-1798( "و لما جاءت الحملة الفرنسية إلى مصر
1847-1805( الفرنج و لم يتركوها بعد خروج الفرنساويين بل لبثوا يتمتعون بحماية فرنسا و لما تولى محمد على باشا مصر
م) إستخدم من هؤالء كثيرين في مصالح عديدة تتابعت اإلرساليات اللتينية من فرنسيسكان و فرير و جزويت لبث المذهب
[sic] .الرومانى و لكنهم لم ينجحوا
و تمخضت مساعى كل من الكاثوليك والوالى على إعتناق المعلم غالى و إبنه باسيليوس و أخيه فرنسيس للمذهب
الكاثوليكى مع عائالتهم و أنصارهم و هكذا وضع الكاثوليك أقدامهم في مصر فوجد ما يعرف باالقبط الكاثوليك التابعون لبابا
 فحاول أن يستميل األقباط إلى1899  يونيو سنة19 روما و كان أول بابا كاثوليك قبطى هو األنبا كيرلس مقار الذى رسم في
" و أخيرا أدرك أنه أخطأ في ترك عقيدة آبائه األرثوذكسية و جاهر بذلك أمام الكثيرين,كنيسته فلم ينجح

1

center of inquiry and study as it poses issues of perplexity between goals, risks,
illusion and disappointment.
Before setting out to meet with the community that is focus of this study
and riding the train from Cairo to the South of the country, a simple glance at the
neighborhood in front of the station - the neighborhood of Daher- arouses
controversy when opposed to this quote. Peeking at the life of all the missionary
schools that are still running there today arouses curiosity and doubt that will
haunt me to my destination 250 km later.
One cannot help but wonder what this Coptic Orthodox monk means by
“never succeed”. Does he mean that Catholic missionaries “never succeeded” in
converting the Muslim majority in the country? That they “never succeeded” in
bringing the See of Alexandria in communion with the See of Rome and having a
single Pope for all Christianity? As evident as that may be today, the survival of
Catholic institutions in Egypt suggests that there must be shades of gray in
between. What was it of the children that were born out of the putative sinful
marriage between Rome and Egypt? Was this a fatal and conclusive story that
ended two centuries ago? Are there alternative narratives to this one of failure? If
there are, who is telling them or why are they not being told? If the missionaries
did indeed fail, why have they not left?
Five hours and many more questions later, these worries are superseded
by the need to get down off the train before it continues its path to Aswan. Ten
minutes later, the swaying and bouncing of the taxi over the rocky, unpaved
street announces that we have arrived to our destination and all this
contemplation shall be adjourned.
Just like its function in society, The Jesuits’ and Brothers’ Association for
Development (JBAD) is situated in the boundaries of moderate Minya and the
home of some of the most influential Islamist groups. Yet visitors should not be
fooled by the cross on the top of the main building, or by the word “Jesuit” on its
sign. Although the 1880’s building was disguised so it would not look like a
2

church and the spire looks surprisingly like a minaret of a mosque, the complex
which includes a school, a monastery, a cultural center, a development center
and the offices of the association, are not a place to pray, but a social center.
Arriving at 4 am from the train station, as I did the first day to my subject of
study, might seem rude and inconvenient anywhere except here. Whether it is
the youth preparing to leave for a conference or the scouts making a fire, the
“Madrasat El Aba'a'” ("School of the Fathers"; the common name for the
complete Jesuit circuit that includes the Association), as I learned from day one,
is an ever-active social and cultural center that does not seem to sleep.
Between health, arts and culture, education programs, and private
developmental initiatives, the JBAD has been working on the ground for more
than half a century to empower the poor and underprivileged in rural and urban
areas around it. It also takes interest in qualifying its staff and beneficiaries so
that they may spread the benefits to the communities around.
It seems at this moment as though the historical heirs of the institution that
came to Egypt to either try to convert Muslims, join Orient with the See of Rome,
(or whatever other intentions the original missionaries had), have developed into
a more modern and industrious institution. It is now an NGO that serves Minyians
regardless of their religious inclination. Thus, it acts, through its different limbs,
as a bridge for interreligious cooperation while serving social development at the
same time.
This initial encounter with the JBAD hints that perhaps there are variants
to fatalist narratives such as those that authors like Abouna5 Antonious Anthony
offer (in the opening quote) regarding the outcome of Catholic missions in Egypt.

5

"Abouna" is the Arabic version of the title “father”; when referring to priests. As it
has been the main appellative that I have used to address most of my informants during
my research, and as it is more coherent and it harmonizes best with my experience in
the field, I will preserve the Arabic version through the text to refer to those priests of an
Oriental background or those who have worked in the Middle East. Western priests,
however, will conserve the traditional “Fr.” as a title thought this text.

3

More importantly, the writing itself of the Catholic Coptic Church as a project that
is dependent on missionary work and his snub to their history and present reveal
the need for updated studies regarding Catholic Copts..
Consequently, this thesis will claim that modern Coptic studies that portray
Catholic Copts as a fabricated minority and do not complicate the term "Copt"
through internal sectarian lines are liable for portraying Catholic Copts in a
manner that is inconsistent with post-revolutionary Egypt. This will be further
supported by exploring the identity politics of the Coptic Orthodox Church that
has complicated the notion of citizenship and representation of Egyptian
minorities excluded from the historical Church-State partnership.

The

negotiations that take place in the JBAD across sectarian lines will reveal that
Catholic Copts need not of supra-structures to excise their citizenship, but rather
exercise it by praxis, through activism.
The first chapter will serve to lay out a historical, theoretical and
methodological background surrounding this study. Scattered through different
cities and villages - mainly in Upper Egypt- and with a relatively modest
diaspora6, the apparent social political invisibility and even scholar snub of
Catholic Copts can initially be understood by their numeric paucity.7 In this line,
with an uninterrupted Catholic presence that can be traced back to the Council of

6

Their diaspora includes the churches of: St. Mary Coptic Catholic Church (Los
Angeles, CA), Resurrection Coptic Catholic Chapel (Brooklyn, NY), Coptic Catholic
Community of Nashville (Nashville, TN), Coptic Catholic Community of Boston (Boston,
MA) See Roberson, Ronald (2013). "The Coptic Catholic Church. CNEWA, Available at:
http://www.cnewa.org/default.aspx?ID=63&pagetypeID=9&sitecode=hq&pageno=1
7

According to the Catholic Coptic Patriarchies in both Cairo and Minya, their
population reaches 200,000 followers, less than 1% of the country's population.
Additionally, Egypt hosts 6 other Catholic patriarchs of the 24 Eastern Rites, namely,
Armenian Catholic, Chaldean Catholic , Greek-Melkite Catholic , Maronite Catholic ,
Roman Catholic, Syrian Catholic (Annuario Pontificio, 2014).
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Chalcedon (451 a.C.),8 and three hundred years after the consolidation of
Catholic groups in Egypt into a national rite, I seek to narrate in the first section
how modern Catholic Copts have been presented in scholarship as a mere
accident of missionary work. After analyzing relevant related literature, I will
explain the methodological circumstances of this research.
Chapter Three will begin the discussion by exploring the less restricted
sectarian line defining Coptic Catholics; its relation and separation from the larger
Roman Catholic Church. After exploring the philosophy and methodology that led
to the founding of this Jesuit organization in Minya, this section will explore the
ways in which Catholicism, as a transnational church, influences Coptic Catholic
activism. There are particular circumstances and traits, however, which draw a
line separate from the transnational Catholic Church. The ritualistic remoteness
from other types of Catholicism and the pride that this produces in JBAD
beneficiaries is an outcome of one of the strategies deployed by Rome since
Vatican Council II that allows the Catholic Coptic rite to be unique and
independent from the larger Catholic Church.
Paul Sedra has identified two strands of thought within Coptic society, the
“national unity strand” and the “persecution strand” (Sedra 1999: 219). The latter
will be addressed in the Chapter 6 when addressing the situation of all Egyptian
Christians before the Muslim-oriented Egyptian state. The former, positions
“Copts as so fully and harmoniously integrated into Egyptian society as to be
indistinguishable from Muslims” (Sedra 1999: 221).
In this discourse, Copts and Muslims have been historically united,
particularly against foreign (i.e. Western) invaders such as the Byzantine Empire,
the Crusaders, the French, the British and the Israelis. However, the political
partnership between the Coptic Orthodox Church and the Egyptian State has
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Subscribing to the Coptic Catholic narrative that recognizes Chalcedonian
Melikites as proof of un-interrupted Catholic presence in Egypt since Mark the Apostle
(q.v. Chapter 2.1.2)
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been a political technique that has left little space for religious diversity and has
overshadowed

other Egyptian

minorities.

Either through

its millet-style

partnership or under the banner of the so-called "national unity", the Egyptian
state has had an important role in defining modern Coptic identity by recognizing
the Coptic Orthodox Church as the central authority to minister all Egyptian
Christians - both inside and outside the community.
Most importantly, the Coptic Orthodox Church has been accountable for
preserving sectarian lines and constructing Coptic identity. Threatened by the
notion of democracy, where Egyptian nationalism failed to unite Egyptians, Pope
Shenouda's nationalist model Coptic nationalism succeeded in monopolizing the
delimiting of Coptic identity and by extension, the voice of Egyptian minorities.
The political pact between the Egyptian State and the Coptic Orthodox
Church has a major flaw: it promotes national unity while assuming church
unity…something that is still a far cry from being a reality. Although, there are
several developments that are worth considering regarding Church (dis)unity,
Chapter Five recalls the many ecumenical efforts that have been carried out in
the last century. These larger conversations, blurred between dialogue and
division, undoubtedly inform interactions among Orthodox and Catholics on the
ground but in the form of identity politics rather than theological dialogue.
Whereas these divisions were constructed in a superimposed manner, and, they
are cognitive constructions that have barely any objective markers, they have
been useful tools to promote and maintain boundaries between local groups.
Boundaries play a determining role in the sustainability of politics of
belonging to this community. The same chapter explores how these divisions
operate on the ground. Outside the JBAD, being a "Copt" is constructed, defined
and contested along sectarian lines and boundaries. Ironically, the nearly
identical way in which both Catholic and Orthodox Copts approach their heritage
further stresses the weakness of Coptiness as an ethnic category. The term in
social anthropology refers to groups considering themselves culturally as well as
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racially distinctive (Smith: 57). Yet, Catholic Copts claim the same exact cultural
heritage making these claims void.
Finally, Chapter 6 explores the third most radical sectarian line that
Catholic Copts engaging in activism face. This section explores the ways in
which Catholic Copts relate with the Muslim majority and the Egyptian State. In
this area, the signature humanist approach of the Jesuits and the particular
configuration of the Egyptian body of law regulating civil society and personal
status have made of the JBAD a highly secular atmosphere.

In a broader

manner, this section argues that legal frames for social society activities such as
the Egyptian push us to reconsider dual classifications of religious and nonreligious activism.
By searching for forms of social participation such as their NGO's,
schools, hospitals and social development programs particularly throughout the
country -or as is the focus of this study- Minya, this last chapter shows how
Catholic Copts contribute to social development not only to Catholics, but to
Egyptian society indiscriminately and as a whole. Nevertheless, instances of
sectarian violence that directly affected the JBAD in during the 2013 show
expose how brittle and vulnerable this system can be.
While describing the activities of the Coptic branch of the Jesuit Brothers
Association and its derived associations and development programs, I will
attempt to give a fair hearing to how this Catholic Coptic community has
responded to Coptic Catholic Patriarch Ibrahim Isaac Sedrak’s exhortation to
work across sectarian lines to restore lost confidence among the Egyptians and
“not having to wait for a disaster before coming together" (Martone 2013).

7

2. Research context and framework
2.1

Justification

Six years before completing this study (and two years before the gestation of
this project), the chant “EsShaab, yurid, isqat enNizam!" ("the people want the fall of
the regime!”) roared through the valley of the Nile. With the fall of the regime, the
model of the "civil state" (dawla madaniyyah) occupied a central place in the public
debate over the character of Egypt following the Revolution of 2011. The demand to
establish a civil state was ostensibly shared by almost all the political currents in
Egypt but it soon became clear that they were far from a consensus (Lavie 2016: 2325).
In aftermath of the 2011 and 2013 uprisings, this study ambitiously hopes to
shed light to the collateral victims of the flaws of the legacy that was adopted by the
new regime regarding sectarian relationships. From the nucleus of the JBAD in
Minya, this study seeks to question how the archaic discourse of a "Coptic Question"
(cf. an "Egyptian Question" in Chapter 7.4) has been among the many factors that
have been counter-productive to the establishment of a democratic civil state. The
favoring of internal nationalisms and identity politics by both the Coptic Orthodox
Church and the State has left little space for other Egyptian minorities to materialize
in politics as in academia.
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2.2

Catholic Copts in Scholarship

The state of the art regarding Catholic Copts in and of itself is quite silent,
even inside its own Arabophone theological circle. Therefore, this study requires a
complex variety of themes that are deeply interwoven in interdisciplinary lines such
as those of Anthropology, Missiology, Ecumenical Studies and Church History.
Despite the paucity of specialized scholarship on the subject, this study is a
reaction to four main trends that I have identified regarding literature that either
addresses Catholic Copts or fails to acknowledge their existence. Namely: the
reductionist representation of Catholic Copts as a foreign product that is incumbent
to historic Missiology only, their absence in modern Missiology, and the scholar
disdain of Catholic Copts prompted by Anglocentrism and Coptic Orthodoxcentricism.

2.2.1 The Coptic Catholic exodus from Missionary History

The power relationships expressed through sectarian lines that will be studied
in this thesis are not only entrenched in the everyday lives of stakeholders at the
JBAD, but are also manifested in the way Catholic Copts and their history have been
portrayed in academia. This section will explore how Western and Arabophone
Coptic Orthodox literature have imposed a narrative on Catholic Coptic history that
Coptic Catholic scholarship resents as reductionist and misleading (Awad, 2005:2).
Dominant narratives in both Western (Meinardus 2010, Walkin 1962) and
Arab-speaking literature (like the opening quote of this thesis) claim that Catholicism
is available in Egypt only since the French occupation (Antony, 2004) and announce
their flight after the overthrow of King Farouk.9 Studies that are more comprehensive

9

Ironically, Egypt’s Queen Nazli favoritism of Christianity added to the reasons that
cost her son the throne. The “Queen Mother”, who used to have Ramses Street named after
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will trace Catholic presence in Egypt to 1219 when, in the midst of the Fifth Crusade,
St. Francis of Assisi crossed enemy lines to gain an audience with al-Kamel, hoping
to bring about peace by converting the sultan to Christianity (Masters 2001:102).10
Yet Catholic Coptic scholarship deems these narrative as deceitful (Awad,
2005:2) as they portray Catholic presence as something foreign, constructed and
imported. Catholic Coptic narratives such as that of Awad (2005) argue that situating
Catholicism in Egypt until such late stages “attempts to diminish the value of the
Catholic Church”, teaching Egyptian Christians to look at the Catholic Church “in a
negative way” and not allowing “the historical truth to rise above the situation” (Awad,
2005:4).
Historical accounts that place the appearance of Catholicism in Egypt until the
13th or even 19th century recount a Chalcedon11 where the See of Alexandria now

her, was great-granddaughter of the Catholic French-born Joseph Anthelme Seve (17881860) a.k.a. Soliman Fransawi Pasha who converted to Islam in the 19th century. See “Nazli
FOuad, Former Queen” Daytona Beach Morning Journal, 22 June 1978. In 1950, against
the palace’s wishes, she consented the marriage of her daughter Fatihya to a Copt. She also
converted to Christianity, as did her daughter, and renamed herself Mary Elisabeth. The
conversion did not sit well with the Egyptian palace or public. See “King Farouk Opposes
Wedding of Princess” Canberra Times, Monday, 15 May 1950
10

From the time of the Crusades in the thirteenth century, Franciscans had guarded
sacred sites in the Holy Land and also conducted missionary activities. In 1219, St. Francis
of Assisi himself wanted to visit at least a part of the Province of the Holy Land. On his way,
his encounter in Damietta with the Sultan of Egypt, Malik al-Kamel - nephew of Saladin the
Great- is well documented (Tolan, 2009). It is recorded that St. Francis of Assisi signed an
understanding with the Sultan through which many privileges in the sultanate were given to
the Roman Catholic priests. Those privileges would be honored and renewed routinely by
the Ayyubid successors, the Mamluks and the Ottomans (Armanios 2011:82).
11

The First Council of Nicaea (a. D. 325 ) , declared that Jesus Christ is God
(that is to say, "consubstantial" with the Father); the First Council of Ephesus (a. D. 431) that
Jesus, though divine as well as human, is only one being, or person (hypostasis). Twenty
years after Ephesus, the Council of Chalcedon declared that Jesus is one person in two
complete natures, one human and one divine. Those who opposed Chalcedon likened its
doctrine to the Nestorian heresy (condemned at the Council of Ephesus) that Christ was two
distinct beings, one divine (the Logos) and one human (Jesus) (Ehler and Morrall, 1967:27).
In Chalcedon, the emperor deposed Dioscorus, Patriarch of Alexandria in 444 AD, for
supporting Eutyches (who defended the formula of one nature –monophysis- against the
formula of dyophysis- two natures).
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Oriental Orthodox Churches,12

were labeled as Monophysite heretic (Meinardus

2010:74) and resulted in the schism between the Coptic Church and the rest of
Christendom. What these accounts frequently tend to blur out is that not everyone in
Egypt rejected Chalcedon (Awad, 2005: 17).
Catholic Coptic authors such as Awad (2005), on the other hand, will be keen
to elaborate on the results of Chalcedon (however bloody)13 to claim lineage. They
will emphasize how the Church of Alexandria was divided into two (and not one)
branches (Awad, 2005:10). The larger part was Monophysite (later Jacobitesafter Jacob Baradaeus, and later Coptic Orthodox Church) and the other part was
Chaledonian Catholic. It was linked to the Apostolic See, accepted the decisions of
the Council and the authority of the emperor so their members were referred to as
the “king’s Men” or Melkites.14

12

Despite the potentially confusing nomenclature (the word "Oriental" being
synonymous with "Eastern"), Oriental Orthodox churches are distinct from those that are
collectively referred to as the Eastern Orthodox Church (who didn’t-t separate until the 1054
schism). The Oriental Orthodox communion comprises six churches: the Coptic, Ethiopian,
Eritrean, Syriac, Armenian Apostolic and Malankara churches. These churches are in
communion with one another and are hierarchically independent.
13

Proterius (who had been designated by the Chalcedonians to substitute Dioscorus)
held a synod in Alexandria to reconcile with the Monophysites, but without positive results.
After Dioscorus, the Monophysites in Alexandria ignited the flames of revolt and killed
Proterius during prayers in 457 (Meinardus 2010:76). They chose as their bishop the monk
Timothy Aelurus and the new emperor, Leo (457-474), accepted him desiring peace and
calm.
14

The generally-provincial Christians who opposed the decrees rejecting
Chalcedon were pejoratively referred to by those city-dwelling Christians loyal to the
Emperor as “King’s men,”malko” in Syriac. “Imperislist” could be a more modern translation.
It was from this term that the Chalcedonian Christians of Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem
became known as “Melkites”. When the Church of Antioch restored full communion with
Rome in 1729, it retained the name “Melkite,” whereas those Antiochean Orthodox
Christians who did not embrace the communion dropped the term.
In Arabic, the official language of the church, it is called ar-Rūm al-Kathūlīk ( الرروم
الكاثوليرك). The Arabic word "Rūm" means Greek from the Greek word "Romioi" by which the
Byzantine Greeks identified themselves, deriving from the name of their land which they
called Romania (meaning "the land of the Romans", Greek: Ρωμανία). The name literally
means "Roman Catholic", but this refers to the Byzantine Greek heritage associated with the
city of "New Rome" (Latin: Nova Roma Greek: Νέα Ρώμη), i.e. Constantinople. See Thomas
Noble and Julia Smith. The Cambridge History of Christianity, 3: Early Medieval
Christianities, c. 600 - c. 1100. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
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Thus, the See of Alexandria became two rival patriarchies: Jacobite Copts
were said to count for about 6 million compared with 200,000 Melkites at beginning
of the 7th century (Awad, 2005:17). However reduced in number, virtually invisible
and even persecuted,15 the Catholic Coptic narrative emphasizes that even despite
the Chalcedonian rupture, Egypt has had an uninterrupted communion with the See
of Peter. It appeals that Catholicism is present in Egypt from the inception of
Christianity by the staff of St. Mark (when all Christians lived in communion with each
other) until today, particularly through its Melikite/ Greek Catholic population.
Catholic Coptic narratives like those of Awad 2005 will also highlight that
efforts to strengthen the already existing Catholic community in Egypt should be
linked to attempts for reunion took place since the thirteenth century. 16 With the
Protestant Reformation threatening the "true faith" on the European continent
(Fortescue, 2001:40), Rome began to expand efforts to convince the hierarchies of
the Eastern Orthodox Churches to enter into communion with the Vatican. Since the
reconciliatory efforts of the Catholic See to unite the so-called “schismatics” had not
been efficient (Alberigo, 1989: 12), Rome promoted “Uniatism,”17 or the
establishment of separate Eastern Churches united with Rome (Alberigo, 1989: 10).

15

Regarding the effect of the Arab conquest of Egypt a celebrated account depicts
the Miapysites receiving the Muslims as liberators, as rescuers from the Byzantine yoke
(Müller,1981:330). From this standing, the Arab-Islamic conquest sided with the Miapysite
majority (Awad, 2005:17) until the 17th century where economic convenience pushed the
Ottoman regime to allow foreign support and that would later lead to their classification in the
millet system (Masters 2001: 107-111).
16

The Second Council of Lyons in 1274 (Fairweather and Hardy, 1962: 129). and
the Council of Ferrara-Florence in 1438-1439 are normally cited as effort where East, West
and Orient formally met to discuss their differences in the hope of finding reconciliation. This
last one was actually able to produce a decree to reunite the Coptic Church with the other
churches.
A formal union between the Catholic and Coptic Orthodox churches took place under
the octagonal dome of Santa Maria del Fiore in Florence on 4 February 1442. The Coptic
Orthodox delegation signed the "Cantate Domino", a document for the formal union with the
Catholic Church and the bishop of Rome. The act was rejected in Egypt, however,
particularly among the monks, who wielded tremendous power and influence among the
Coptic Orthodox people (Armanios 2011:90).
17

After yielding to the idea that their evangelical efforts among Muslims would be
inefficient if it would compromise their life or security (Heyberger 1989:37), Roman Catholic
clerics began to pour into the Near East. They began to proselytize in the 17th century,
sometimes with the support of Catholic governments, yet not among Muslims, but rather
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In Egypt, Catholic pastoral activity commenced in earnest with the foundation
of a Capuchin mission in Cairo in 1630 by Franciscans of the Holy Land, who visited
Egypt several times a year. They opened centers in Upper Egypt, Nubia and
Ethiopia (based in Akhmim) and the Reformed Franciscans would follow in 1687 with
the purpose was to penetrate the Coptic desert monasteries (Meinardus 2010: 123).
In 1675, priests of the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) seconded the Franciscans and
established a house in Cairo (Campbell 2013: 113).
A century after systematic missionary activity had been directed towards the
Copts, the first native leadership was established. In 1741 the Coptic bishop of
Jerusalem (1725-66), Anba18 Athanasius, pledged fidelity to the bishop of Rome and
abjured the “heresies” of the Coptic Orthodox Church (Estefanous 2001:44).
Thereupon, Pope Benedict XIV appointed him the first apostolic vicar for the small
community of Coptic Catholics, which at that time numbered no more than 2,000.
Anastasius continued in Jerusalem, however, he appointed a priest named Yustus
Maraglic as vicar in Egypt (Estefanous 2001:49).
Although, as the quote at the very beginning of this study claims (q.v. Chapter
1), Anba Athanasius did indeed eventually return to the Coptic Orthodox Church, this
was not the abortive beginning nor the end of the Catholic Coptic as the author
claimed. The communities that had converted did not instantly disappear. A line of
Catholic Apostolic Vicars continued after him somewhat longer than 75 years until it
was then elevated to be a patriarchate in 1824. The community remained small and
poor in both Upper Egypt and a minority included families of peasant origin in Cairo’s
Faggala quarter. (Estefanous 2001:58).
I would now like to take a pause from this narrative and stress the
following: recapitulating from the last paragraph, the first Coptic Catholic leadership
and community was established in 1741. This means that, from a Catholic Coptic

among the already Christian Orthodox. Hence, the majority of Orthodox and Eastern
independent churches characterize the result of this intrusion with the derogatory of “Uniate”
churches; Catholic Copts included.
18

As priests are traditionally referred to as "Abouna", Coptic bishops are usually
addressed with the title "Anba" (also meaning “Father”) or the appellative "Syedna" (roughly
translated as "our lord" or "master").
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perspective, the establishment of their own rite is the culmination and achievement
of eighteen centuries of Catholic history in Egypt.

However, many authors,

particularly Coptic Orthodox clergy writing in Arabic (Antonious 2004) or Westernized
(Armanios 2011, Estefanous 2001) scholars from a Coptic Orthodox origin,
depict the origin of the Coptic Catholic Church as a sinful French

will

intrusion, a

modernizing caprice of Mohamed Ali to sympathize with his European comrades
and a craze of a number of Coptic xenophiles.
Some narratives begin the story of Catholic Copts directly with
Mohammad Ali's endeavor to force the Coptic Orthodox Church into a union with
Rome, as the Franks (al-Afrang) would find this a good deed and a favor him
(Antony 2004: 240). When informed about this initiative, Muallim Ghali, General
Steward of Egypt, pointed out to Mohammad Ali that there was no way the Coptic
patriarch would accept such compulsion towards Rome. Instead, he suggested to
set up a separate Coptic Catholic hierarchy which would, by its prominence,
influence all the Copts towards Rome. He and his family would converted to
Catholicism in January 1822 to make the Khedive appear successful in the eyes of
his French allies (Elyas, 2012:12).
Meinardus writes (as though religions where born in some kind of
spontaneous generation) that this family “formed the beginning of the Coptic Catholic
Church” (Meinardus 2006: 84). I want to believe that it is a symptom of the postmortem printing of his book, but somehow, with this inaugurative phrase the German
Coptologist, pastor and AUC professor forgot all the efforts of the Franciscans in
Upper Egypt before that had been evangelizing in Egypt since 1630. He forgot Anba
Athanasius had already founded the Coptic Catholic church in 1741 and he forcedly
disappeared the communities that had followed him. Somehow, when turning to
page 84 he, like many other authors that crown Muallim Ghali as the founder of
Catholic Copts, Meinardus forgot the own story he had written on page 83 about that
the founding of the Catholic Coptic Church.
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Despite the tragic ending to his life and service,19 the scandalous story
of the Khadive’s devote steward was not the end (nor the beginning, for that matter)
of the Coptic Catholic Church and the Church outlived this incident.
It is needless to say that Coptic Catholic scholarship (mainly clergymen,
which, at least from my sample, are the only community members somehow
acquainted with their history) resents these depictions and claim that it does “not
allow for the chance of the historical truth to rise above the situation” (Awad
2005:22). The literature on the matter will denounce that depositing their foundation
on the figure of Muallim Ghali represents their faith as an interventionist project, a
fabrication to curry favor to foreign powers that was so corrupt in its nature that it
was destined to failure and even death from its origins (Antony, 2004: 239). Thus,
they uphold that pushing their establishment eight decades in history deprives them
from personal agency and diminishes the intensions of native converts (Estefanous
2001: iv).
In any regard, it is not in the interest of this study to reinforce debates of
indigeneity as, bluntly speaking, all major religious discourses that persist in Egypt
(i.e Islam and Christianity) are imports to Egypt. Its aim is rather to contest the
assumption that Catholicism in Egypt is only a foreign reality to keep Catholic Copts
attached to Missionary History. With a Church that has more than 200,000 followers,
in 7 epicharchies, schools and even engages in social development and activism
(Annuario 2014), the goal of this study is to overcome the historic pretext that
scholarship in the field has deployed to avoid Catholic Copts from entering other
more updated and vibrant fields such as Sociology, Anthropology or even Politics.

19

Either because of false accusations or because of Ghali's truthful report on the
financial state of Egypt, Mohammad Ali issued an order for his assassination. On July 1 of
that same year, Mohammad Ali's oldest son- Ibrahim Pasha - executed Muallim Ghali in Zifta
(Goldschmidt, 2000: 308), together with the arrest of his brother Francis and his personal
treasurer Mu'allim Sim'an. The treasurer, Sim'an, was also beaten to death (p. 309).
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2.2.2 Post-January Revolution Missiology?

The bulk of literature dealing with Catholicism in Egypt springs from the
different missionary projects that aimed the Middle East.

Among studies on

Christian Missions in the Middle East, Eleanor H. Tejirian and Reeva Spector Simon
provide a comprehensive history of missions in the region that includes Protestant,
Catholic, and Orthodox activities and addresses relations between Eastern and
Western churches. “ Conflict, Conquest, and Conversion: Two Thousand Years of
Christian Missions in the Middle East” (2012) embarks on the elephantine task of
narrating Christianity’s odyssey in the Middle East from Jesus’s Great Commission
up to the present day. Although the book considers the impact of missions upon
religious conversion and upon social and political transformations in the Middle East,
it’s most noticeable donation to the field is the well documented historical context
and use of secondary sources.
Yet to the particular interest of this study Otto Meinardus’s postmortem “Christians in Egypt” (Meinardus 2005) is one of the rare pieces that directly,
however briefly, explains the arrival of Catholicism to Egypt and through its
missionary work, how it lead to the sinful birth of a new minority through mission and
politics: Catholic Copts (Meinardus 2005: 84). The final part of his trilogy on Egyptian
Christians (following “Two Thousand Years of Coptic Christianity” [1999] and Coptic
Saints and Pilgrimages [2002]) surveys the history of Catholic Egypt.
Works as those of Tejirian and Reeva and Meinadurs are all valuable
contributions to the field, however, in their drive for covering large historic periods for
very diverse groups of Christians, they have produced historic surveys or catalogs
that do little to deconstruct the different Christian realities in the Middle East. As
Tejirian and Simon (2012) explain by themselves is that the aspiration of their survey
is “to provide a benchmark narrative that tells the story of Christian missions to the
Middle East from the beginning of Christianity to the present” (Tejirian and Simon
2012: x–xi). Indeed, the authors manage to provide an overarching historical and
religious context of the region, yet only by understating the structures from above
and ignoring the agency of native converts.
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Meinadrus (2006) on his side, recognizes the role the Roman Catholic Church
has held in Egypt, describing it as a "modest and spiritually orientated institution" but
his account also ignores the efforts of the locals (Meinadrus 2006:132). Thus this
historical format presents an image of Catholic Copts as an institutional and
historical entity that does not fit into the modern reality of this group. In contrast,
although this thesis is centered on a single Eastern Christian group (i.e. Catholic
Copts), it aims to enter into the everyday life of one of these communities to present
a more intimate image that complicates their portrayal and allows inquiring that goes
beyond historical description.
Roland Loffler hints the necessity of projects in the line I propose when in his
essay on a German orphanage in Jerusalem, Loffler reflects:

“I would like to see mission history integrated into the
newly developed discipline of Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte (Modern
Church History), which tries to combine methods and theories
of theology as well as of social and cultural history in order to
interpret the making of religion in modernity” (Loffler 2010: 153).

In this regard, by integrating a series of social-anthropological methodologies
(q.v. Chapter 2.4 Methodology) with Mission History, I adhere to Loffler's longing for
the transformation of Missionary Studies and seek to contest the way in which the
embryonic literature that deals with Catholic Copts have treated this group as a sole
product of missionary and colonial products that is outdated. By describing aspects
of the life in the post- January Revolution environment of an Egyptian faith-based
NGO that (although founded by a missionary order) has little attachment to foreign
missionary groups, I hope to go beyond the “and they lived happily ever after” (or as
Fr. Antonious’s quote on the introduction reads “they never succeeded”) and portray
some of the negotiations and challenges of this group vis-a-vis the Modern Egyptian
State and society in general.
At the root of the family tree of this thesis, the closest scholar relatives to my
project (and resonating with Loffler's longing for an updating of Modern Church
History) are those that deal with the post-World War II period, when local Christians
17

gradually gained control of mission institutions. Mainline churches decreased their
mission budgets and turned toward more “secular” pursuits, while FBOs emerged to
oversee

socio-economic

development

programs.

At

the

same

time,

the

establishment of the state of Israel spurred missionary activity by newer evangelical
churches, which remain active in the region today (Tejirian and Simon 2012).
Recently, as a follow-up of the study of missionary activities in the nineteenth
century, welfare and relief activities proved a fertile field for such research. Partly,
this interest originates in the transformation of missionary institutes into welfare
organizations influenced by changing political circumstances and theological
motivations. Crawling away from History and Missionary Studies and into the realm
of Modern Church History and Anthropology, studies like Nefissa Naguib and Inger
Marie Okkenhaug “Interpreting Welfare and Relief in the Middle East “ (2009) bring
together a number of case studies that address a wide range of different contexts
from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. The cases range from emergency
relief during the First World War to long-term humanitarian assistance in Gaza; from
completely western- and missionary-sponsored maternity care to locally organized
Islamic zakat; from Yemen to Armenia, to Egypt, Gaza, Palestine and Jordan.
In the same line as Naguib and Okkenhaug, writing in "Faith of Our Fathers:
Missionaries and NGOs, The Transition," Eleanor H. Tejirian documents the
transition from religious to secular, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in
providing social services in the Middle East. In the same manner as the Egyptian
legal corpus has framed the activities of the JBAD to be in line with those of other
Egyptian NGOs, her essay also draws clear parallels between early religious efforts
and their later secular counterparts but in different settings.
The role of religion in FBOs is of particular interest of this thesis as the JBAD
is exposed to a challenging sectarian configuration where religious disputes may
even lead to sectarian violence (q.v. "Chapter 6 Egypt is Islamic"?). In this regard, in
all the mentioned essays religion plays a role, not solely due to their foundational
motives but because many of the activists and their donors were driven by strong
religious motivations. However, while above mentioned studies address the role of
religion in the construction of welfare and relief activities, none of them tackle religion
as a challenge or a sectarian burden. In contrast, the present study aims to give an
18

account on how religious identity can be an advantage but also a liability in a Coptic
scenario.

2.2.3 Anglocentrism in Missiology

Assuming that one accepts to continue studying Catholic Copts within the
frame of Missionary History, a newcomer to the field will find her/himself with an
additional challenge: the literature regarding missionary history in Egypt is dominated
by texts that focus or only offer an Anglocentric (Protestant) perspective.
More than Catholic missions, a complete sub-genre of Anglo-American
missions has been widely documented (Tejirian and Simon, Meinardus 2005, Sedra
2006, Barrett 2012, to name a few) that can initially be explained due to their longer
and more recent connection to power and colonialism compared to that of the
French. The several Protestant missionary movements from the late eighteenth
century until the eve of World War I were prompted by religious revivals on both
sides of the Atlantic. Protestant missionary societies set out to convert Jews and
Muslims and revitalize Christianity in the Middle East that had lost traction from
Catholic missions (Doğan 2014). A series of mid-nineteenth-century Ottoman
reforms opened the way for the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign
Missions (ABCFM), the British Church Missionary Society (CMS), and other
Protestant mission boards to expand their evangelistic and educational activities in
Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, Anatolia, and across the Persian frontier.
Of course, these missions did not arrive to a vacuum. Backed by their national
governments, French Catholic and Russian Orthodox missionaries continued as
rivals to Protestants in the region. They capitalized on ties with Middle Eastern
Catholic and Orthodox churches to build their own networks of schools. Tejirian and
Simon in particular explain the connection between missionary impact and power. As
the French presence in North Africa facilitated the entrance of Catholic priests and
nuns, British ascendency in the Gulf did the same for CMS and American reformed
church missions (Tejirian and Simon 23-38).
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Protestant missions also arrived with competing educational offers that
fomented nationalist movements and instilled western ideas into their students. Texts
such as Paul Sedra's From Mission to Modernity: Evangelicals, Reformers and
Education in Nineteenth-Century Egypt (2011) present how the activities of
nineteenth-century Anglican missionaries served as means of reformation and
“cultural conversion” which presented Copts with educational opportunities beyond
the Orthodox or Catholic ones (Sedra 2011:11).
As a final observation, beyond the impact of colonial power in the production
of mission-related knowledge, the recurrence of studies focused on Protestant
missions in Egypt- is also understandable due to a more practical factor: the lingua
franca of most Catholic missions until the last century has been French. Therefore,
the few historical accounts on Catholic missionary work and Coptic Catholic
developments have been documented by predominantly Italian speaking (Colombo
1953) and francophone clergy (Ayzout 1992, Macaire 1894, Muyser 1951 to mention
a few).
In this regard, this project is a small contribution to English-speaking literature
addressing not only Catholic Copts but also Catholic missions in Egypt in general.

2.2.4 Orthodox-centrism: the monopoly of the political Copt

Literature regarding Copts is clear in stressing that they are not an ordinary
minority. Assimilationist practices to co-opt and survive with the Muslim majority and
even clientelism (Barker, 2006) have been some of the tools that have allowed the
Orthodox Coptic Church in particular, to become a dual contractor that overshadows
other minorities (even those that were also part of the original dhimmi contract, i.e.
Jews, see Ayad 2012).
Conflicts of modernity in Egypt, manifested through its conflict with
nationalism (Jankowski 1990; Tadros, 2013), and the process of nation building are
challenges that are frequently discussed when addressing minorities in Egypt
(Faraha, 2012; Tadros, 2009). Nonetheless, the bulk of pieces that preaches on the
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matter turn down the lights when arriving to the borders of additional religious groups
beyond the traditional Egyptian dichotomy (e.i. Muslim + Coptic Orthodox).
Though clear that the modern Coptic Orthodox Church has become an
institution whose affairs are administered in a strictly hierarchical fashion, and bears
a strong resemblance to the Egyptian state (Sedra 2014), all in all, the way in which
Copts are discussed, both scholar work and the media, seems stuck in the
nineteenth century in that it still relies on the conventional wisdoms of the millet
paradigm. As I will elaborate in Chapter 7 ("Coptic Means Egyptian"), this particular
way of theorizing impedes any meaningful conversation about citizenship in the
political arena.
However, this is not only a political or demographic reality. Scholarship in the
field has also played a significant role in closing the milla (q.v. Chapter 4.1) more
strongly. Since the early 60s Wakin (1963) had criticized Coptic scholarship as "selfcentered and chauvinistic" (Wakin 1963:6) and, though it's not the objective of this
study to second such descriptions, it does seek to point out that the recent influx in
interdisciplinary scholarship on Coptic affairs has not created an academia that
complicates the concept beyond economic or intra-communal lines (Iskander 2013,
Sedra 1999 and 2014, Tadros S. 2010, Tadros M. 2009). Ethnographic studies by
Ghada Botros or Anthony Shenouda; research on Coptic relations with the Egyptian
state in the early twentieth century by Vivian Ibrahim, Elizabeth Iskander, Paul
Sedra, Samuel Tadros; Marize Tadros and historical accounts as that of Febe
Anthanasious are part of the school of diasporic (some second generation) Copts
who have created a literature that portrays the so-called "Coptic question" as one
that includes Orthodox Copts only.
As understandable as it is that they concentrate on what seems to be the
dominant political and numerical question, their backing by non-Coptic Western
scholarship (Walkin, Meinardus) have reaffirmed the modern exclusivity of term
"Copt" to the Coptic Orthodox Church and dismissed other actors as irrelevant. Only
recently, as a reflection of the questions that the uprisings of this decade awoke,
have alternative research projects by both recognized scholars (Sharkey 2008 and
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2013) and students20 started to complicate the question to include Non-Orthodox
actors. This thesis situates itself in the genre that problematizes Egypt beyond
binaries.

2.3 Theoretical Framework and New Transitions
2.3.1 Sectarianism and Nationalism

Waves of anti-Coptic violence, hate crimes and sectarian clashes during the
past half century (strengthen by Sadat’s promotion of Islam in public life, the rise of
Islamist militancy in Egypt since the 1970s, Morsi’s twelve-month tenure and even
the 2013 coup) have cornered Copts in the intersection of religious discourse and
authoritarian control. Remembering the army’s massacre of civilians at Maspero in
October 2011; the siege on St. Mark’s Cathedral in April 2013 near the end of
Mohamed Morsi’s presidency; the looting and arson of churches and Christian
properties after General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi took power in the summer of 2013; and,
more recently, the terrorist attack on the Coptic Orthodox Cathedral in El Abaseya in
December 2016 and bloody Palm Sunday 2017 does not make it hard to see why
literature addressing Copts is eager to highlight Egyptian sectarianism and insist that
Copts remain one of Egyptian society’s most vulnerable and persecuted
communities (Tadros, 2013).
For the purposes of this study, I will adhere to Gareth Higgins and John
Brewer’s (2003) discussion of the meaning of sectarianism, referring to it as “the
determination of actions, attitudes and practices about religious difference, which
results in them invoked as the boundary marker to represent social stratification and
conflict” (Brewer: 109). Thus, sectarianism will not be limited to addressing sectarian
strife, but rather a whole cluster of ideas, beliefs, myths and demonology about
religious difference which are used to make religion a social marker. This study
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For instance: Dowell, Anne (2014). “The church in the square: negotiations of
religion and revolution at an evangelical church in Cairo” or Hazel Haddon, Hazel (2012).
"Gender and Identity in Contemporary Coptic Society", both available at
http://dar.aucegypt.edu/
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understands sectarianism as more than a set of prejudiced attitudes but also
behaviors, policies and types of treatment that are informed by religious difference.
This study will also approach sectarianism or ta’ifiyya as a neologism that was
born in the age of nationalism or wataniyya to signify the antithesis of nation;
predicated on and constructed against a territorially bounded liberal nation-state
(Gyanendra 1992). In other words, it considers how the territorialization and
pluralization of religion placed religion, in Benedict Anderson's phrase, “in a
competitive, comparative field” to nationalism (Anderson 1991: 17).
For this study, in addition to Anderson’s (1983) explanation to how
nationalism led to the creation of nations, or "imagined communities" (See Chapter
4.4.2), Anthony Smith’s (1986) understanding of nationalism will be adopted to
contrast it with sectarianism. Smith refers to nationalism as a modern (developed in
the end of the 18th century) ideological movement based on common myths and
memories among people to attain solidarity and define themselves as a nation
(Smith: 13). He asserts that nationalism is a modern ideology which is created by
conversion of ethnic or religious loyalties to national ones (Smith: 15).
Not surprisingly, the nationalist discourse supported by Copts has led to a
paradox of Egyptian national unity where Copts claim to be persecuted but not
necessarily marginalized. While lethal attacks on Egyptian Christians from the
northern Sinai to Upper Egypt have besieged churches and slain Coptic clergy and
laypersons, moments of inter-communal harmony are romanticized to claim that
Copts are essential to the fabric of the Egyptian nation and construct Copts and
Muslims in Egypt as, although different, mainly the same as each other (Paulsen:
45).
Works addressing on the so-called “Coptic Question” based on both of these
paradigms – e.i sectarianism/ Coptic persecution (Walkin 2001, Tadros 2013) and
nationalism/ national unity discourse (Iskander 2014)- are in no short supply.
However, while several studies have claimed to provide innovative ways to grasp the
area's complex polities by dismissing the monolithic portrayal of Copts,21 I argue that
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Ibrahim (2013) proposes an alternative interpretation of Coptic agency; Sedra
(1999) proposes a focus on class and Paulsen (2012) analyses formations of sameness and
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without considering internal sectarian lines within the different Christian sects in
Egypt, such attempts to deconstruct the shortfalls of Egyptian citizenship (what I will
refer to as the “Egyptian question”) are blind and inefficient.
Neither of these two narratives is completely useful for the standing point of
the study I propose as they fail to address the elephant in the room: that there are
more religious discourses in Egypt beyond those controlled by el Azhar or the See in
Abassiyya. They are founded on the dichotomous myth in which all Egyptians who
are not Muslim claim ipso facto loyalty to the Coptic Orthodox Church. Nevertheless,
Orthodox Copts are not the only persecuted minority in Egypt and failing to include
other Egyptians that do not claim loyalty to the tenants preached any of these two
religious entities, such as Bahaiis, Shias, atheists, (even) non-observant Orthodox
Copts or –as in the case of this study- Catholics, makes the idea of national unity
based on a dual sectarian division a surreal claim.
Asef Bayat (2013) has hinted towards the position where I situate my study
when mentioning that Coptic immigration “has cemented a strong identity politics
among the vocal Coptic community in exile and to a lesser degree among Copts
living in Egypt” (Bayat: 158). At a basic level, this study adheres to the mantra “all
politics is identity politics” as the term refers to any politics that seeks to represent
and/or advance the claims of a particular social group (Parker 2005: 54). However,
this study will pay particular attention to the way dominant groups may use identity
politics as means of limiting the representation of others subordinate groups. It will
look at identity politics as the “premise that all members of the group have more in
common than the members have with anyone outside the group; that they are
oppressed in the same way, and therefore, that they all belong on the same road to
justice’’ (Anner 1996: 24). For the purposes of this study, Orthodox Copts will not be
framed as a dominant minority. However, this thesis will present a critique to how
Coptic identity politics, through the embracing of Coptic nationalism and even
clientelism with the Egyptian State, has in fact hampered the notion of Egyptian

difference Orthodox Christian practices in Egypt take shape under the influence of
hegemonic narratives of sameness and difference.
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citizenship, served to write out other religious minorities in Egypt and even
challenged the sense of community inside the JBAD.
As a caveat, the intention of this study is not to deny the persecution of Copts
nor undermine the afflictions of those who claim loyalty to the Coptic Orthodox
Church. Nancy Fraser warned back in 1998 that “identity politics”, can be used
largely as a derogatory term for categories such as feminism, anti-racism and antiheterosexism; the implication being that they are flimsy, superficial and, to use Judith
Butler’s memorable phrase, “merely cultural” categories (Butler 1997:26). Neither is it
to promote the naturalization of dominant politics (in the case of Egypt, Islam
oriented) as universal. The goal of this study is to rather to deconstruct a category
(See Chapter 4.4 Constructing Copticness)

that has been kidnapped by identity

politics to render, in a way that is more faithful to everyday life, the reality of the
JBAD in Minya and, simultaneously, highlight and counter academic snub towards
Catholic Copts.

2.3.2 Activism, voluntarianism, and citizenship

Caught between authoritarian regimes, militant Islam and Coptic identity
politics, one would be tempted to depict other (non-Coptic Orthodox) Egyptian
minorities through the lens of victimhood and marginalization. In a quest for
alternative formulations which highlight the many shifting ways in which one of these
minorities experiences, negotiates, and contests hegemonic systems of power, this
study will pay special attention to bottom-top dynamics which have drawn sectarian
lines among the different actors at the JBAD in their day-to-day lives. It is through a
myriad of daily struggles by variegated actors that I aim to deconstruct Copticness
using a range of illustrative cases to argue for alternative, context-specific
conceptualizations of Coptic agency and politics.
In this chain of thought, the setting of the community on which this thesis
focuses is based in a grassroots institution that under Egyptian Law, is considered a
non-for profit organization. Chapter 6 will engage with the particular question of
whether or not the JBAD can be classified as a faith-based organization (FBO) or a
NGO when considering the threat that any insinuations of proselytism among its
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Muslim beneficiaries could represent to its staff and the organization itself. However,
as the activities of the JBAD are far encompassing and I counted with the advantage
that my informants were eager to open and expose to me activities outside the walls
of the JBDA, this study will look at different forms of participation and adopt a broad
understanding of what activism means.
In the volunteerism literature, activism is argued to be a form of volunteering
(Wilson, 2000; Musick & Wilson, 2008). Musick and Wilson (2008) suggest that
activism differs from volunteering by collective action for a collective good; activists
therefore work collectively for change. Research further supports the conventional
wisdom that activists are oriented towards politics and social change whereas
volunteers are oriented towards providing services. That is to say, volunteers
distance themselves from the political connotations of activism (e.g., Eliasoph, 1988;
Wuthnow, 1991).
Certainly, the line between activism and volunteerism is blurred: activists often
do volunteer work and volunteers become activists. Therefore, in unison John Wilson
(2000) who argues that volunteerism and activism are the same activity, no
distinction will be made between informants who engage in any of the two - whether
in an individual or collective action- as long as they are oriented towards in local
conditions—the local conditions as the collective good.
Rather, it is in the interest of this study to understand how volunteers, staff
and beneficiaries at the JBAD negotiate sectarian boundaries in relation to these
activities. How are Coptic actors (Orthodox and Catholic) framing their claims for
copticness; or Muslim participants avoid such claims and how do they articulate
their religious identity when involved in “altruistic” (Giugni and Passy, 2001) or
“moral” activism (Reynaud, 1980) is of greater inherent interest to this study.
This focus does not imply, however, that the activism and volunteerism that
takes place at the JBAD does not have a political connotation. The fact that Catholic
Copts have been marginalized from academia (q.v. section 2.3.1) and politics (q.v.
section 2.1.1) does not mean that they have been marginalized from their
membership, interaction and contribution to the nation-state that they belong to. The
cases that will be presented in this study bear witness of the existence of alternative
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sites of struggle that affect how Catholic Coptic subjectivities enact the conception of
the political.
In order to make sense of the implications of such developments for
citizenship in Egypt, especially considering the political convulsions and challenges
facing the country since 2011, we require new approaches to old categories.
Debates about whether citizenship is status or practice have moved this concept in
the direction of socio-cultural reconceptualization and turned citizenship into a civiccultural phenomenon (Paine, 2006; Putnam, 2002; Lie, 2009). This thesis will thus
adhere to the trend that has sought for a new vocabulary of citizenship that goes
beyond the traditional sites of citizenship contestation such as voting and military
obligation (Jacobson, 1996; Torpey, 2000; Benhabib, 2004). Instead, this thesis
sides with studies that emphasize citizenship in terms of practice and typically focus
on integration, cohesion, multiculturalism, nationalism and transnationalism (BodyGendrot and Martiniello, 2000; Ferrera, 2003; Penninx, 2004).
In particular to the efforts of JBAD staff and beneficiaries, Tully (2008)’s
rendering of praxis-based citizenship will serve to understand how citizenship can be
fundamentally defined by praxis or engagement in local and diverse forms of civic
practices, rather than by a legal status tied to the nation-state. In Tully's terms, all
activists at the JBAD become citizens in regard to the agent‘s active and on-going
engagement with other people; by developing their own civic practices and civic
skills (Tully 2008:29).
While the Egyptian State has granted a quasi- monopolistic representation of
minority rights to the Coptic Orthodox Church and Coptic nationalism has excluded
Catholic Copts from this political equation (q.v. Chapter 4), this thesis will argue that
citizenship for Catholic Copts should be understood in relation to their engagement
in local and diverse forms of civic practices. In other words, citizenship for Catholic
Copts is a subjectivity that enacts the political by transforming themselves and others
and by articulating, materializing and expanding social rights.
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2.4 Methodology

In anthropology, Roger Sanjek reminds us that the term “ethnography” has
two meanings: ethnography understood as product and ethnography as a process,
as a method (Sanjek 2010: 244). As a product, it most often means ethnographic
monograph taking the form of ethnographic documents or articles (Bălan 2011:67).
For the interest of this study, however, I borrow entry point to ethnography from
Davies (1999) saying ethnography is a “research process based on fieldwork using a
variety of (mainly qualitative) research techniques but including engagement in the
lives of those being studied over an extended period of time” (Davies 1999: 4-5).
In this regard, I sometimes believe that I did not choose the subject of this
study as much as it chose me. The networks inside different Christian communities
in Egypt that I began engaging with since the summer of 2013 simply drove me to
the subject, as it was my subjects themselves who suggested, provided sources and
provided their support to facilitate my fieldwork. According to Metcalf (2005) the
anthropologist engaged in ethnographic field research must keep in mind three main
requirements: to integrate into society studied for a long time, to become proficient
enough in the local language (as to have a direct dialogue with the members of the
studied society) and to engage in participant observation (Metcalf 2005: 9-11). All of
these three conditions were in some extent supported by my informants.
Wolcott (1995) defines fieldwork as a form of inquiry that requires a
researcher to be immersed personally in the ongoing social activities of some
individual or group carrying out the research. I was enthusiastically offered
assistance and even accommodation in monasteries/ church houses in the
Patriarchates of Sohag, Luxor and Minya for this purpose. Particularly in Minya, I
began participating and observing their activities during the winter of 2015 until
February 2016 when my main interlocutor was reassigned to a different country.
Before these dates (and due to its proximity with Cairo, where I had been based for
three years) I had made intermittent visits to Minya.
In the gaps between my trips, I accessed academic and archival material in
Cairo (particularly in Franciscan and Combonian headquarters). I was additionally
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provided extensive access and assistance in the Catholic Coptic Seminary in Maadi,
Cairo to analyze secondary data.
I performed several interviews to priests, social leaders, NGO workers,
missionaries, parishioners, people benefited by these programs and their
families. As the JBAD is such an active organization (with at least 21 on-going
programs at the time I researched and participants are quite diverse), I employed
focal groups for understanding their interactions according to the activity that they
would benefit from and their leaders.
I also conducted individual interviews with eleven priests (two Coptic
Orthodox, four Roman Catholic, one Greek Catholic and four Coptic Catholic), the
Catholic Coptic patriarch of the time (Sayedna22 Ibrahim Isaac Sidrak), eight nuns
(four Roman Catholic, four Coptic Catholic), eleven lay leaders in the Association
and even two Egyptian Evangelical pastors to contrast views. I conducted interviews
and focus groups with seventeen youth (between 16 to 25 years old), twenty two
adults (above that age) and seven parents or tutors (when addressing underage
beneficiaries or beneficiaries with mental disabilities). These beneficiaries were all
regular attendees and most were referred to me by leaders of the Association.
Semi-structured interviews were chosen for both practical and theoretical
reasons. Considering some people had a time limit for the interview, each
conversation had to be approached differently. In order to maintain rapport, the
questions were changed to suit each interview as the situation and individual
dictated, allowing to maintain a natural atmosphere of conversation compared to a
rigid set of questions. It is important to point out that in order to maintain the privacy
and confidentially of my interlocutors all names used are pseudonyms.
Despite the above mentioned methods, the ethnographic method that proved
itself most revealing was participant observation. This method was chosen because
it emphasizes observations of natural behavior and it captures social life as the
participants experienced it (Richardson 2000:253). This method also allowed a
richer, more intimate view of the social world than could have been achieved using
structured methods (Schutt 2006: 320). Due to this last point and the variety of
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participants, I additionally engaged in participant observation in classes, ceremonies,
trips, festivals, family gathering and general activities.
While my fieldwork had a very particular territorial delimitation and the focus of
my study was based on the JBAD, the conclusions that I arrive to would in no way be
complete without considering my complete experience with various religious
institutions around the country during my fieldwork as well as those that led to it. This
research was informed by several Youth Missions and trips to Catholic villages near
Beni Suef, Sohag, Aswan and villages surrounding the JBAD in which I participated
during the summers and Holly Week breaks of 2014 and 2015. It was further
enriched with observations I gathered from volunteer work with the Missionaries of
Charity (the congregation for nuns founded by Mother Theresa) in Shoubra and
Mokkattam (respectively); a year of studies in the Cairo-based branch of the
Pontifical Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies (PISAI- Combonian Mission);
participating in several Coptic Orthodox youth groups that meet in St Mark’s church
in Heliopolis and Friday meetings with Evangelical Egyptians in Kasr Doubara during
the summer of 2015; a year of participation in AUC's Coptic Orthodox clubs such as
the resurrected CDC (Coptic Discovery Club) and regular attendance to Sunday
masses with Catholic Coptic communities in Cairo even once fieldwork at the JBAD
was no longer an option. Without such exposure, this project would have never been
conceived and its results would be near-sighted and out of context. Most importantly,
without such exposure, I would have never met the Jesuit priest who, optimistic
about the role of Catholicism in the Egyptian development scene, not only
encouraged me to pursue this study, but also offered me access and support inside
their community.
Furthermore, my professional experience as a project designer and
fundraising manager in a grassroots NGO in Cairo during the year and a half while I
drafted this study (after my opportunity to perform fieldwork in Minya was over) has
given me a privileged insight to the opinions some of the employees at the JBAD had
shared with me, and whose professional challenges are now my own.
Although at the beginning of my collective process I obtained a Baccalaureate
in Modern Standard Arabic, Islamology and Interreligious Dialogues from the PISAICombonian Mission in Cairo, my initial challenge in interviews regarded language
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skills. Interviews with clergymen (and women) were all in a blend of Arabic, and
facilitated by their command of English, French or Italian (in which my levels of
proficiency also vary). Interviews with community leaders were held in Arabic with
the assistance of my intermediary to translate when needed. As for the rest of my
interviews and participant observation, I relied in a first instance on my own Arabic
skills. However, due the fact that most of my interviewees were mostly from a rural,
working class from Upper Egypt (and their pronunciation and slang varies notably
from the Modern Standard Arabic I had been studying three years behind), my
research was ultimately possible due to the translation and patience of my main
intermediary and other bilingual staff.
Beyond language and the lack of availability of my main interlocutor (in the
final stages of my fieldwork), being a foreigner and being a female one was a far cry
from being a liability. The community is very friendly and hospitable towards
foreigners and being female facilitated receiving offers from my subjects to even be
hosted and sleep in their homes. In several instance, I had participants offering me
lifts and meals, receiving follow-up calls from participants to make sure I made it
home safely and even offering me to share a bedroom with their children when I was
not sure where I'd spend the night. . . something I believe that may have been harder
to achieve if I had been a male researcher. Even within clergymen that live only
among men (particularly the Jesuits is a male-only order) rapport was easy as
priests are trained to serve communities regardless of their gender.
Finally, a disclosure should be made regarding my status as an outsider:
although I do not fit in the strict sense of and “insider” (Kanuha, 2000) as I do not
share a common “language and experiential base with the study participants”
(Asselin, 2003), I do share a partial common identity with some of my subjects as I
confess myself as a practicing Roman Catholic. Asselin (2003) has suggested that it
is best for the insider researcher to gather data with her or his “eyes open” but
assuming that she or he knows nothing about the phenomenon being studied. As I
had never been exposed to any Eastern Catholic rites (or any type of Orthodoxy, for
that matter) before leaving my homeland (in 2013), I did not have to fake or assume
that I "knew nothing" about the phenomenon being studied. Even with a strong
Catholic education (which I assumed I had), the Coptic rite can seem too foreign to
people from other Catholic rites so I genuinely had to learn to be Coptic from scratch.
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Perhaps my conundrum will be fully understood in Chapter 3.3 ("A Church of Many
Nations") when a Roman Catholic seminarian that studied Arabic with me in Cairo
voiced out the main ritualistic and legal differences between the Coptic and Roman
Catholic rites.
Nevertheless, presenting this membership as a transnational co-religionist
certainly provided me with a certain amount of legitimacy, not to mention more rapid
and more complete acceptance and openness to access data and participate
intimately in the community. Ethnographers know that achieving emic validity does
not mean so-called objectivity in positivist paradigms of the so-called objective
neutral investigator, but rather accepting and analyzing our own human subjectivity
in this process (Whitehead 2005: 7). Under this logic, while all ethnographic research
is indeed a constructivist product of the inter-subjectivity between the researcher and
the researched, I strived to adopt a reflexive approach to allow the multiple
narratives that are bound to arise from the inquiry speak for themselves and avoid
imposing a larger, single narrative on them.
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3. Sons of a transnational church: Coptic Catholics and their
international affinity

The strident zaghrota (ululation) announced the arrival of the bride and
groom. The brothers of el arousa (the bride) searched for a table for Abouna (the
priest) to sign the engagement contract and officiate the ceremony. Crowded in the
living room of the apartment of a Coptic Catholic family in the capital city of Minya,
aunts and cousins of the couple pushed through chairs and sofas to get the closest
they could get to them and take pictures of this scene. My attention here like in that
wedding, however, was consecrated to different pictures. As this Catholic Coptic
family was sending off their eldest daughter to married life, three frames hung
proudly in the middle of the living room, decorating and framing the center of this
family's life.
The grammar of these three images was explained to me the next morning by
Mr. Emad,23 my host and father of the bride (who I had met during the literacy
program of the JBAD and insisted I attend her wedding). The semiotics of the picture
in the center, an icon of Mary Girgis (Saint George), will be understood in chapters 4
and 5 where I explain the importance of Coptic heritage and identity to Catholic
Copts and their ties and contention with the Coptic Orthodox Church.
In this chapter, I intend to justify the apparition and relevance of the frames
that were on both sides:

the 266th Pope of the Roman Catholic Church, His

Holiness Pope Francis I and His Grace Anba Ibrahim Sidrak (current Catholic Coptic
Patriarch of Alexandria).
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Since rules for the ethical reporting of human research data prohibit researchers
from revealing “confidential, personally identifiable information concerning their patients, . . .
research participants, or other recipients of their services” (APA Publication Manual [PM];
6th ed., p. 16; APA Ethics Code, Standard 4.07), I have re-baptized my interlocutors to
prevent them from being identifiable and to protect participants’ confidentiality. As in other
qualitative research, I have opted for pseudonyms as it helps portray their story by
maintaining a human element.
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First, I will explain the presence of the Jesuit NGO in Minya (where I met Mr.
Emad) that is both influenced by a Jesuit-Roman Catholic thinking and local
initiative. In this context, Mr. Emad, along with several other community workers, will
voice the pluses and minuses that being affiliated to a transnational Church has
brought Catholic Coptic Minyians in terms of development.
While being part of a larger Catholic church has advantages for Catholic
Coptic activism, the last section of this chapter will complicate the ambivalence of
Eastern Catholicism. Despite being in full communion with the whole Catholic
Church in terms of dogma, the Catholic Coptic Church is a unique entity that retains
their distinctive liturgical rites, laws, customs and traditional devotions. The
inculturationalist approach that was assumed by Rome during the last half of the 20 th
century was a top-bottom approach that aimed to be closer to their flock. At the
same time, this has created native institutions with its very own leaders, highlighting
the participation of local agency.

3.1

The peasant and the priest: The Egyptian Society of Jesus

In 1991, Timothy Mitchell and Richard Critchfield embarked in blame game
about bogus realism and plagiarism to define what they considered "the real"
Egyptian peasant.24 Regardless of the outcomes of this duel, what was undeniable
in this quarrel was the print and impact that the writings of one man had left on
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Besides other accusations, Mitchell’s "The Invention and Reinvention of the
Egyptian Peasant" criticized certain popular studies of the Egyptian peasant for their
recurrent bogus realism (Mitchell 1990: 129). This so-called realism was the product of an
uncritical repetition of stereotypes from one study to the next, where the apparent veracity of
the peasant image in one work is the result of its resemblance to all the others. Despite the
claims of photographic realism of studies as those of Critchfield, he argued that this "real
peasant" was something constructed out of earlier representations, plagiarized from earlier
writings, in particular from the previous popular study in a similar genre: “The Egyptian
Peasant” by Henry Ayrout (Mitchell 1990: 130). See Timothy Mitchell (1991). A Reply to
Richard Critchfield, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 23, p 279-280; Critchfield,
R. (1991). A Response to "The Invention and Reinvention of the Egyptian Peasant",
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 23(2), 277–279. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/164259.
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Egyptian Rural studies (among other fields) decades behind. That man was Abouna
Henry Ayrout.
Originally published as “Moeurs et Coutumes des Fellahs”, Abouna Henry
Habib Ayrout prepared his dissertation on the "Customs and Habits of the
Peasant" to acquire his PhD degree from the University of Lyon, France, in 1938
(Habib 1938; ii) and then published it to the public in a book called "The Peasant".
Ayrout's study is a mix of human geography, anthropology and social psychology
that described the peasantry in terms of their manners and customs, psychology and
social relations in the home and community as well as their relationship with the
geography and social-polical history of Egypt. He focused on the detailed description
of all the aspects of life of the Egyptian peasant, mentioning his economic, political,
and social life.
Father Ayrout's book was accepted at once, not only in France, but also in
Egypt as a standard work on the fellahīn (peasants, sing. fellah). It was among the
first attempts of full-length study of the life of the fellah in all its main aspects (El
Shakry 2007: 128) yet, it should be situated within its historical moment. Following
the 1919 revolution, the period was characterized by a great flourishment of new
Egyptian literary genre. Taha Hussein, Ahmad Sawqi and Abbas Al Aqqad shaped
prose and poetry moved by the years filled with political upheavals. The years after
1929 in worldwide economic depression also affected Egypt's economy and inflation
exacerbated an already difficult time for the urban and the rural poor (El Shakry,
2007: 130).
The book started by tackling the political environment of Egypt and its direct
and indirect impact on the poor peasant (Habib 1938; 1-7). He then went forward on
picturing the daily life of the peasant, answering basic questions regarding his
everyday life and environment. It went through several revisions by the author before
being translated and published in English in 1963, particularly for the purpose of
indicating the influence of the Nasser agrarian reform of 1952 (which he was hopeful
about) (Habib 1978;v), but the portrait of 1938 still stood.
Since his first edition, he developed through his ethnographic observation a
description of the mentalité of the peasantry that was changeless. Ayrout’s fallah
was passive and fatalist and has "become like the Nile, indifferent rather than idle"
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(Habib 1978: 143). Whatever rhymes he elaborated, Ayrout produced a fellah that
was static, resigned and submissive defined by his proximity to nature; a fallah that
though capable of repetition, memorization and reproduction, lacked of personality
and initiative (Habib 1978: 139). He produced a predictable natural kind (Putnam
1975) whose behavior was governed by a collective psychology and a lack of
individuality.
He featured the village as a homogeneous interdependent community
composed by the same types of people, the same customs, traditions , modes of life,
standards of living and physical structure as "Nothing is more like one Egyptian
village than another Egyptian village" (Habib 1978: 89). The fallah, thus, was not an
occupational concept but a rather unifying one that reflected social values and
worldviews shared by those in a rural community, even those who were not directly
involved in the agricultural economy.
This assumption of a collective unconscious psychology that unified the
Egyptian village would become a hallmark of writings on the peasantry. Ayrout's
methodology acquired continuous relevance and hence, monopoly in the minds of
Western Orientalists by its ahistorical method of explanation, in which the condition
of rural Egypt is attributed not to political and economic forces of the day but to a
timeless peasant mentality (Mitchell 1990: 131).
Although such an approach inhibited historical investigation into the social
political and economic conditions of the peasantry (El Shakry, 2007: 130), this, of
course, was not Ayrout’s legacy alone. Classic works such as Edward Lane’s (1836)
"Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians" and Blackman’s manuscripts
(1916-1924)25 and her later “The Fellahin of Upper Egypt” had long been in
circulation.
Furthermore, in the missionary field, the Eurocentric view of what
"backwardness" meant had also been a popular theme. Cultural imperialism had
been deployed to justify more "enlightened" or "civilized" attitudes and justify
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Blackman, Winifred Susan. (1916) “The Magical and Ceremonial Uses of Fire”,
(1918) “The Rosary in Magic and Religion”, (1918) “Traces in Couvade” and (1924) “Some
beliefs among the Egyptian peasants with regard to 'afarit' ("demons").
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missionary campaigns (Israeli, 1995:208). The 19th century contest to reform Coptic
Christianity by Protestant and Catholic missionaries was also filled with this politics
to label the Copt, particularly the fellah Copt, as backward since both of them were
drawing from the same pool of misinformation that Europeans had accumulated over
centuries (Sharkey 2011:31).
In the particular case of the Jesuits, although the strategy of “accommodation”
and efforts to naturalize Catholicism by using local concepts (Whitehead, 2014: 447)
has been a trademark of Jesuit missions, this has not exempted them from
insinuating European claims of superiority. For instance, the Jesuits in late Ming
China rendered the image of a land tyrannized by eunuchs in order to bolster
European self-perception as a civilized and superior race (Harris 1966).
Nonetheless, Ayrout orientalist tones can seem somewhat surprising, as he
was not a foreign missionary. Born an Egyptian of Syrian origin, and fluent both in
French and Arabic, he was the second son of a wealthy family (El Shakry, 2007:
130). He got his education at the Holy Family School (Collège de La Sainte Famille)
in Cairo, which explains to some degree his decision to join the Jesuits. It is
noteworthy that the main source of data for the book was gathered directly from the
community of peasant in contact with Fr. Ayrout (El Shakry, 2007: 131) and that he
shared a native language with these communities. Still, his writings also speak of his
Western education both in Cairo and after departing to France in the mid 1930's.
For his celebrated essay, Pére Ayrout is remembered as a Jesuit sociologist;
for his contribution in designing modern day Heliopolis, 26 as an architect; but his
most important legacies, at least for the purposes of this study, are as educator and
activist. Not only did “The Peasant” become a benchmark for ethnographic work
regarding fellahīn, but the book introduced an applicable paradigm for development.
Upon his return to Egypt in 1940, he established the first of his associations, the
Catholic Association for Schools of Egypt, now known as Association of Upper Egypt
for Education and Development (AUEED, the “Gamaiyyat as-Said”) (AUEED 2006).
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After being educated in Paris as an engineer-architect, he participated in the
planning and construction of Heliopolis along with his two brothers, Charles and Max, who
were also contracted for multiple projects. Their father, Habib Ayrout, was also a LebaneseEgyptian architect practicing in Egypt. See Mitchell, Timothy. Rule of Experts: Egypt,
Techno-Politics, Modernity, University of California Press (2002), p. 332.
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The Association of Upper Egypt for Education and Development (AUEED) is
considered the application to the methodology that he set in his book for aiming to
provide a better life for the poor people of Upper Egypt. Ayrout was assisted by
several wealthy Egyptian families to support the AUEED as it provided its free
education before the government applied this program on the national level
(Goldschmidt, 2001).
Abouna Ayrout was considered a charismatic figure with a high drive for
development (Sharkey 2013: 193). He advocated for land reform in Egypt, he
participated in many scientific committees, non-governmental organizations, and he
also held the post of vice-president of Caritas Egypt (Sharkey 2013: 194). Yet,
although The AUEED is has been one of the biggest Catholic associations in Egypt
since its inception, it was not enough of a contribution for him.
In 1966 in the capital city of Minya, Father Ayrout started a club to serve the
inhabitants of the neighborhood. It was then named “Graduates of the Union of the
Jesuits and Brothers”. As the priest that was my initial and main contact with the
association would narrate, it is through organizing cultural, social and scientific
activities and events and helping poor students that they learned the needs of their
community. The establishment was registered that same year as a non-profit NGO
before the Ministry of Social Solidarity with the name “The Jesuits’ and Brothers’
Association for Development” (JBAD) and it would find shelter in the facilities that the
Jesuits had in Minya since the end of the 19th century.
Once registered, a more specific mission was developed for the Minya-based
association on which this study focuses. Through this mission, the JBAD was to
assume its developmental responsibility for improving the lives of marginalized and
poor communities and enable them to build their capacities. At the same time, the
JBAD would work to promote values such as justice, love, accepting the other and
intellectual enlightenment through awareness programs and cultural events.
As Milad, a member of the board and high range administrative worker would
comment on their last bi-annual report, just from 2014 to 2016 the association
reached more than 3,000 direct beneficiaries with 190 employees, countless
volunteers, through 19 programs and 12 independent projects in 3 centers in Minya
and lately, Aswan. This industrious and vibrant society has a very versatile scope
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that ranges from cultural development, leadership training, educational and health
services. After half a century of operating, the JBAD boasts of being the
grandmother of a large extended family, of whose many of its members became
leaders and professionals in their communities.
Whereas the JBAD continued on its own and outlived Father Ayrout, he would
dedicate the rest his life to promoting education in Egypt.27 He became rector from
1962 until his death of his own nest as a priest and activist: the Jesuit College
in Faggala. Across from the busy train station on Ramses St. in Cairo, this Collège
de la Sainte Famille (School of the Holy Family) had once been ordered in 1879 by
Pope Leo III as a seminary to help prepare students become Catholic priests 28 that
would then spread throughout Egypt (Khouzam 1937:8). Its standing as a quality
institution would be testified by alumni such as Dr. Nagy Habib, Sayedna Maximos
V Hakim and former UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, among others (Oficial
Site: 2015).
Besides Ayrout, it is noteworthy to say that many Jesuits, particularly Coptic
Jesuits, have played an important role in promoting development in Egypt. The
Roman Catholic foundation of Caritas-International was established by the Jesuits in
1950 and made major contributions to the medico-social centers in Egypt, giving
special attention to those suffering from Hansen’s disease, and working within the
Department of Leprosy (Campbell, 2013:147). The Jesuits have also been
recognized for their unique endeavor for opening cultural spaces. From Alexandria to
Luxor, each of the centers established in Egypt by the congregation has facilitated, in
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The reputation of the Jesuits as high quality educators, nonetheless, was not
limited to Egypt. Since its foundation in 1540, the Society of Jesus quickly established itself
as one of the most dynamic, influential orders within early-modern Catholicism that went
from a modest association of students to a worldwide power (Campbell, 2013:17). The
incredible global success of the Order as a teaching body must be attributed to the
superiority of their methods such as the pedagogical directions and exercises of St.
Ignatius27, the great scholastic ordinances of Aquaviva, and the testimony of
contemporaries, to understand the genius of Loyola as an educator (Campbell, 2013:22).
28

Not only had the Jesuits been founded to draw Protestants back to Roman
Catholicism, but the order had also been founded to help revive Catholic missions and form
Melkite, Coptic, Armenian, and Chaldean “Uniate” churches in the Middle East and the
founding of this school was part of such an agenda (Bicentenary, 2014).
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different degrees, activities fostering cinema, photography, animation, literature and,
to a lesser extent, dance.
In this regard, the order has been a strong advocate for theatre. Not only did
theatre instruct and develop students' skills, but it reached out to the public. Thus
theatre serves both a didactic purpose as well as a public relations opportunity by
offering a local community a form of free entertainment. As I will elaborate in Chapter
Six, theatre had become a cherished tool of social critique and education at the
JBAD until they had to be paused due to sectarian attacks.
Due to the high educational and adaptational requirements for Jesuits to
become priests, their thinking has been classified during several times of history as
theological free and academically oriented. There have been times when the
relationship between Jesuits and the Holy See has been tense due to questioning of
official Church teaching and papal directives, such as those on abortion, birth
control, homosexuality, and liberation theology (Campbell, 2013:3).
This last one found its way to Egypt particularly during the uprisings of 2011
and 2013. Abouna William Sidhom,29 Coptic Jesuit and director of the Nahda Center
in Fagalla, is the first Egyptian priest to translate and write intensely about Latin
America’s theology of liberation in Arabic.30 The 1960s-70s Latin American
movement was initiated by Catholic activists that pushed the church not just to care
for the poor, but to liberate them from political and economic structures that held
them in place. In his Egyptian edition, he has surrounded himself with Muslim and
Christian activists that were at the forefront of the Egyptian revolution, that spread
much of the early artistic graffiti in and around Tahrir, and that were vocal and even
martyrized in Maspero.
Like elsewhere in the world, the spokesperson for the Catholic Church in
Egypt Abouna Rafiq Greiche expressed that the Egyptian church hierarchy distances
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As mentioned earlier, all the names in this thesis have been changed in order to
protect interlocutors. Comments from interviews I held with with public figures such as
Abouna William and Abouna Rafiq, among others, are the exception to this due to the public
nature of their statements (similar positions have been disseminated in his books, public
Facebook posts and media coverage has already made their positions public).
30

Abouna William has written fourteen books, five on the subject.
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itself from liberation theology because of Latin American associations with
communism and violence. Nevertheless, Abouna William is upholds that “there is no
faith without justice”.
Egypt has changed enormously in the last eighty years since Ayrout’s study
on Egyptian peasantry. Electrification, radio, television, smart phones and social
media have brought the larger world into Egyptian homes. Government schools have
increased educational horizons for children. Opportunities to work in other areas of
the Arab world have been extended to peasants as well as to young artisans from
the towns. Urbanization has brought many families to live in the belts of substandard
housing around the major cities. But the conservative and traditional world of
unremitting labor that characterizes the lives of the Egyptian peasants, or fellahīn as
well as the institutions he conceived for them also survive and continue their
dialogue as new actors arrive.
The term “Jesuit” from the outset could speak of a foreign institution alien to
Egypt. Nonetheless, contributions of Jesuit Copts such as Abouna William or
Abouna Henry are yet another example on how the Jesuit scheme can have fruits in
all races and all nations, including Copts.

3.2

Catholicism: A passport to development

In the Middle East, Christians are better off than the Muslim majority...or so
several sources in my research claimed. This is due to the natural selection-like
process (i.e. the survival of the fittest) triggered by the imposition of the poll tax on
non-Muslims or jizya upon the Islamic Conquest of the then Coptic Christian Egypt in
640 (Salah 2013: 11). The tax, which remained until 1855, led to the conversion of
poor Copts to Islam to avoid paying the tax and to the shrinking of Copts to a better
off (Meinardus 1970: 21), sort-to-say, elitist minority. The Copts, in particular,
benefited the most from missionary education (Sedra 2011:7), have strong diasporic
support (as they are most likely to get selected in visa lottery claiming religious
persecution) (Salama 1996). The Church also motivates its believers to pay nonobligatory oshour (10% tithing of their salaries) as well as bokour (which is donating
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one’s full first salary to the Church) to support their community and thus, they
constitute a privileged and stable elite in Egypt (Salah, 2013: 18). The idea that
Christians in Egypt constitute a privileged elite is argued in studies like those of
Salah (2013), in the media (El Borqoqi 2015) and it was the opinion of Ahmed - a 29year old Muslim activist who I interviewed in Cairo with 7 years of experience in
projects related to vocational training and economic empowerment - that explained
the lack of Christian beneficiaries in the projects he participates in as, “why would we
help Christians if they are all rich?”, right?
Minya, the “Bride of Upper Egypt”, under that surrealistic logic (where financial
capacity is attached to one's religious affiliation) should be one of the most advanced
governorates in Egypt as, after Assiut, it shelters the largest Christian population in
the country (Hopkins and Saad, 2004: 12). It is called the “bride”, in part, because it
is rich in natural resources that include about 6.5 percent of all of the country’s
arable land (Mina, 2013). It is ranked as the top wheat producer and a major
producer of sugar cane, cotton, and onions in Egypt (Egypt Network 2015). It enjoys
a privileged location being a mid-point between the capital and the rest of Upper
Egypt and it also feeds a couple hundred villages that surround it.
It is famous for its vivid green fields and Cairenes (surrounded by traffic and
pollution) would romanticize its rustic way of life full of fresh air and clean water.
Queen Nefertiti’s statute in the city's entrance (the new one)31 stands august as the
only female symbol of any governorate in Egypt. Yet this statute is a far cry from
symbolizing the well-being of its daughters. Minya has been one of the poorest areas
in the country over the last three decades (ironically finding the highest poverty rates

31

The original 3,300-year-old Queen Nefertiti was discovered in Ammarna, Minya in
1912. The local government installed in July of 2015 a statue in her honor but it instantly
went viral on social media, with hundreds of Egyptians mocking the as “extremely ugly” and
comparing to Frankenstein. It was removed due to local pressure and a new, higher-quality
bust was installed in the same location in on January 6, 2016. See “6 months after
'Frankenstein' Nefertiti removal, new bust of pharaonic queen installed” Ahram Online,
Wednesday
6
Jan
2016.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/180289/Egypt/Politics-/-months-afterFrankenstein-Nefertiti-removal,-new-.aspx
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in Assiut 69%),32 and due to the quality (or lack of it) of life Minya offers to most of
her inhabitants, she may seem to be more of an old maid or a spinster than a “bride”.
The idealized image of Minya became politically fashionable under the
socialist government of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The fellah became an iconic figure
during his 1952 land reforms that gave poor tenant farmers rights to the land they
worked in perpetuity and 50 per cent of seats in parliament were reserved for those
from worker and fellah backgrounds (Mina, 2013). But after decades of Cairocentric, neoliberal cronyism, rural poverty, already severe in Minya, would see the
undeniable effects of State neglect.
Prior to the advent of political-economic restructuring in the 1980s, the Middle
East was largely dominated either by pro-Western rentier states (Arab oil states,
Iran) or, in the case of Nasser, nationalist populist states. These authoritarian states
had pursued a state-led economic development strategy as oil and other rents
allowed states the possibility of offering social provisions. Ideologically driven
populist states – Egypt included- dispensed significant economic and social welfare
in education, health care, employment, housing and so on (Abdelrahman, 2013:
569). Yet the oppressive nature of both types of states restricted political
participation and the development of civil society organizations.
The arrival of liberalization and marketization in the Middle East during the
1980s brought about important socioeconomic changes. The free market economy
made consumer commodities available and enriched society’s upper strata, while it
has also increased income disparity. State provisions were undermined and poor
people had to look for solutions off their own bat for survival (Abdelrahman, 2013:
570). Meanwhile, the globalized notions of human rights and political participation
placed economic rights and citizen participation on the political agenda, opening up a
new crusade under the flag of development.
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The highest poverty rates in Upper Egypt are found in Assyut 69%, Sohag 59%
Aswan 54%, Qena, 51%, and Minya 50% (according to statistics from Central Agency for
Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). See Mohamed Adel, “Assyut, Sohag, Qena,
Aswan and Minya are the poorest governorates of the country “Al Wafed newspaper on 21st
June 2013.
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In this context, the spread of NGOs gained momentum during the 1980s and
especially in the 1990s.

The growth of this type of activism coincided with the

relative decline in traditional, class-based movement, such as peasant organizations
and cooperative movements, but not faith-based community services. Like
elsewhere, the general phenomenon that developed at the end of WWII where
missionary institutions turned into NGO’s (Jawad 2009) reverberated in Egypt.
Coptic Jesuit initiatives for development were no exception to the transition
from mission into an NGO under Egyptian Law and nation-wide Jesuit organizations
underwent major administrative changes. Since the 60s, both the AUEED and JBAD
administrations shifted to staff other than clergymen, the scope of services of the
AUEED started to widen and new internal bylaws were set. In 1971, the AUEED
changed the name of the Association from "The Catholic Association for Schools in
Egypt" to be "The Christian Association for Schools and Social Promotion", and then
in 1990 to be "The Association of Upper Egypt for Education and Development"
(AUEED) so as to reflect the field and stakeholders of the activities of the
Association (AUEED Official Site, 2015). The Nahda Center in Fagalla (central
Cairo) soon saw its organization translated into a managerial system when World
Bank funds were injected in the 90’s to this Jesuit culture center and Nahda
activities, as well as the networks with the other Jesuits’ NGOs in Alexandria and
Minya, grew and became more influential.
As mentioned in the previous section, the JBAD in Minya was registered
almost from its inception before the Ministry of Solidarity in the late 60s. In other
words, though it was conceived by a Jesuit, incubated by a group of Jesuits and its
facilities (that include the School of the Jesuit Fathers,"Madasat El Aba'a El
Yesuueen") clearly state their ties to the order; it is subject to the same legal
provisions as any other secular NGO in Egypt. It remains independent from the
congregation in an administrative level, its official payroll does not include clergy and
only a handful of its employees and beneficiaries are actually Catholic.
Despite its secular character at a legal and administrative level, the
patronage of the Jesuits is a trademark that, in practice, represents several
advantages for the work of the JBAD. The Jesuits own its buildings and the JBAD,
as an NGO, only uses the space. The Jesuits’ donations were the main stable fund
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that the association relied on since its foundation, and the instances in which
affiliation to the congregation represent a meaningful credential do not stop there.
In order to understand the range of benefits that its affiliation to the Jesuits
and its identity as a Catholic-founded NGO brings to the JBAD, I recall the concept
of social capital and one of its offshoots: religious capital. Robert Putnam explains
that social capital comprises “features of social organization such as networks,
norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit”
(Putnam: 2000, 65–66). Pierre Bourdieu had clarified earlier the concept of social
capital and contrasted it with other two forms of capital: economic capital (which is
convertible into money) and culture capital (as in cultural habits, personal
dispositions, and credentials) (1986: 47).
For Bourdieu, social capital is an aggregate of the actual or potential
resources linked to possession of a durable network or to membership in a group
that provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity (1986: 51).
While none of the major works of Bourdieu tackle the subject of religion or its
interaction with the concept of social capital, Christopher Candland (2000: 356, 370),
remolded the concept of social capital and considers faith to be also one of its forms
as the basis of binding people together for developmental projects. This particular
dimension, an adaptation of the theory of social capital, is loosely dubbed as
"religious capital" (Iannaccone 1990; Bremmer 2006; Tomalin 2007: 14).
Among those proposing the theory of religious capital is Laurence Iannaccone
(1990, p. 299) who writes that religious practices can also be viewed as productive
service. Essentially, the religious dimension of the theory of social capital consists of
three spheres (Bremmer, 2006). The outermost sphere of faith capital is defined by
aspects of spirituality in a given community (elaborated on in Chapter 6, when
addressing the humanistic approach of Jesuits that allows the participation of
Muslims in their services). The second sphere of faith capital is constituted by
participation in religious services and affinity to religion by the members of a
community (q.v. Chapter 5, when addressing the Coptic elements of Catholic Coptic
spirituality), and the first sphere of faith capital is defined by the power (formal and
informal) vested upon religious organizations (in this case the Church) through its
distinctive status, visibility, and embeddedness in cultural practices in a given setting.
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Urban (2003) has neologized this last sphere as “sacred capital” (2003:363).
He describes it as the role and power vested upon the church and its priests to
impose a specifically religious habitus upon the laity. Development practitioners
invoke this first sphere of faith capital to give legitimacy to their initiatives and
creating demand to an array of social goods through the power vested upon religious
leaders due their scholarship, affiliation, and general recognition (2003:364). In
Egypt, international and national Christian NGOs including CRS, Caritas, the Coptic
Evangelical Organization for Social Services (CEOSS), Gamaiat Al Said, besides the
organization on which this study focuses, have a unique sacred capital vis-à-vis
other secular or Muslim Egyptian NGOs. Christian, and particularly Catholic
institutions have a privileged position before a rich (meaning both ample and
wealthy) pool of international Christian donors which, in return, are translated in
other types of capital.
Besides the teachings in the Gospels that are common to all Christianity, the
central social teachings of Catholicism are to be found in Pope Leo II’s 1891 Rerum
Novarum (Latin for "of revolutionary change"). Among other sources, these social
teachings of the Church impose a religious habitus upon their flock that legitimatizes
the collective backing of institutions worldwide such as the JBAD and promotes
donations.33.
To wit, the JBAD owes about 70% of its funding to foreign donors (the other
10% is local contribution and 20% is self-funding). While other traits of the JBAD
come under consideration during the fundraising process (such as technical
capacity, previous projects and experience), the fact that many of these donors
consider the JBAD trustable for funding due to its Catholic background speaks of the
relevance of the sacred capital of the JBAD at a transnational level. Abouna Hany,
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While it is ironic that Catholics as whole give the least amount of their incomes
than any other Christian denomination, what they lack in individually they make up for in
numbers (Molony, 2006: 148). With over 1 billion worldwide souls that it claims, it makes up
the largest civil society organization in the world with outsize influence across international
borders (Molony, 2006: 149). Catholics do not officially tithe but besides donations, the
Church has stable financial sources such as real estate and capital investments, church
museums, schools and hospitals. Though many are actually money-losing propositions, the
profits turn by the remunerative ones are largely reinvested. The Vatican itself gets most of
its money from admission fees to museums, from the Peter Pence charity and from the
Vatican Bank.
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my initial contact with the JBAD, reassured to me that “no project has ever failed due
to lack of funding, only due to lack of dedication”. Still foreign funding, particularly
from Catholic donors who sympathize with the causes and the trademark of the
Jesuits, is an important part of their success.
Catholic sacred capital, however, can be a double-edged sword that comes
with its downsides for Catholic NGOs in Egypt. The first of the two that were pointed
out by Marina and Michael (two consultants in the fundraising department at the
JBAD) are related precisely to the drive of donors (Catholic or not) and the paradigm
of development.
Development has been a complex and contested term that has no single
agreed meaning. It is used by its advocates to denote desirable societal change or
progress (Cohen 2001). It implies a value judgement, a standard against which
things can be compared and rated (Gardner and Lewis 1996). Drawing on a
Foucauldian concept of power,

the 1990s saw the emergence of a "post-

development" critique which suggested that development in any form was not a
solution to problems of global poverty and inequality, but rather a highly restrictive
and controlling discourse that simply "served to extend the power of richer countries
over poorer ones" (Cooke and Kothari 2001).
The judgmental and controlling drive that can move donors to promote
development in the Global South has been widely criticized for failing to
contextualize poverty and for ignoring its structural causes (Arnold 1988: 71). While
sacred capital capitalizes on emotional responses and solidarity to attract funds,
when these responses are centered on ideas of pity, charity and even sectarianism34
rather than a concern with justice, they are translated in donations and projects that
are out of context.
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In the case of Catholic Copts, this sensationalism has been accentuated in the
past among Catholic donors in the struggle against heresy. A whimsical pamphlet34 found in
in the library of Coptic seminary in Maadi exemplifies how already missionaries at the
beginning of the last century would sensationalize sectarian devision to appeal to foreign
benefactors for Catholic Copts. Language of “Schimatic priests” (to refer to American
protestant sects such as the Methodists and Evangelicals) who “swarm in Egypt” as “they
prey off the Copts” (Arnold 1988: 13) exploited images of both poverty and vulnerability of
Catholic Copts to Protestant proselytism or Orthodox backwardness in order to touch
Catholic donors.
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The post-modern delusion and disappointment that has left development "like
a ruin in the intellectual landscape" (Sachs 1992: 1) was echoed by Marina, who
would complain:
“Okay, while the country was drowning in chaos
[referring to the 2011 and 2013 uprisings], the NGO industry in
Egypt lived like no other. Tourism died. All other industries died
but NGO’s saw money coming in like rivers! But now that all
that has died out we can see that many of the things that were
funded meant nothing to the people”.
Michael equally disenchanted explained:
“I have been in the Association [JBAD] for the last fifteen
years and my parents helped before me too. Many people
already know how it works and they will go program to another
program shopping for benefits, from one organization to
another. The projects are good but many of them are not
studied well and even if they do, donors have a different agenda
to the real needs of the people. Our biggest competition for
funds is with Israeli NGOs but Minya is one of the most funded
cities in all the Middle East...Can you believe it that 30 years
later, all that money and nothing has changed? Many projects
are not what the people need but what the donor wants to
believe they need.”

It would be easy to point out that a significant blame for the failure to achieve
societal change can be laid at the doors of NGOs since they have sought short-term
financial advantage over building a longer-term constituency of support for
development (Edwards 1999). However, Marina and Michael's complaints suggest
that the issue of unrealistic and inefficient development lies in disparity in matters of
power as donors, Catholic donors included, assume a monopoly of decision-making
and establishing developmental priorities.
The second disadvantage of receiving foreign, Catholic funding is particular to
the administrative structure in which the Catholic Church deals with its autonomous
churches. In an attempt to understand the potential as well as the complexity of the
Catholic Church´s roles, Hehir (1987) distinguishes two levels of activity involving the
“center” (Rome as embodied in the Pope and the Vatican Secretariat of State) and
the “periphery” (the local Church) (Hehir, 1987: 109). This analysis enables us to
understand how the Vatican formulates and projects an international policy on major
48

Middle East questions of its interest such as Jerusalem and the Arab-Israeli conflict,
the situation of Catholics as a minority in Muslim-majority lands and, more recently,
the encroachment of ISIS. It also explains why only the center has the capacity to
attract attention for its positions. Conversely, the relationship of the periphery to the
center involves the activities of the Arab Christian Communities in the Middle East as
a source of pastoral concern, of information and perspective which influence the
specific positions of the Vatican takes on the Middle East (Hehir, 1987: 111).
The Holy See, which established its Secretariat of State in 1487, is the world’s
oldest diplomatic entity, but it is something of an anomaly (Hehir, 1987: 110). The
Vatican plays an important role in global diplomacy but Hehir is careful to point out
the mistake in focusing only on the diplomacy of the Holy See in the classical model
of church-state relations. Since the Second Vatican Council, he states, primary
emphasis has been placed on the Church´s role in society as an advocate of social
change, human rights and human dignity (Hehir, 1987: 109).
The Church can serve as a catalyzer to canalize international funding to
coreligionists, but on the other side, it can also place limits on the periphery
according to its interests and values. As Michael recalled, in middle of the 90s the
Gamaiat Al Said (AUEED) witnessed a strong crisis after voices began protesting
against its president - Amin Fahim - had been so for thirty-five years and was of
dictatorial management. While the war raged inside the Association through papers
containing accusations between the two parties, the Ministry of Social Affairs and
even the Vatican had to interfere in the crisis (Sulayman 2006).
As one of the biggest educational benefactors of the country (with thirty six
schools serving eleven thousand students, in addition to many development
projects) periled, the leadership of the Egyptian Catholic Church advised Fahim to
resign but he did not respond (Helmy 1999). This, as well as the many complaints
sent by members of the society to the Vatican and financing organizations asking for
his dismissal, made him an undesirable person inside the Vatican. Some members
of the society accused the Vatican and the Egyptian Catholic Church of passiveness
concerning the misappropriations taking place in the society. As employees
presented collective resignations, those members affirmed that this attitude would
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lead to the collapse of the society unless all misappropriations were dealt with
(Sulayman 2006).
While the Vatican refused any liability as it was not running the society, in
reality it proved to have a strong influence inside the society because most of the
foreign organizations that finance the Society- 90% of the society’s income- were
Catholic. Fahim tried to increase the foreign finances for the society but he was not
able to do so because the Vatican refused to support his request after his way of
managing the society.
These previous examples of Catholic engagement are significant for
development scholarship and practice as they illustrate the importance of a particular
social identity in shaping development engagement. This is not to suggest that faith
identities necessarily provide a more coherent way of engaging, but it points to the
macro and transnational layer of identities. They point out the significance of
particular subjectivities in shaping engagement in development in ways that
potentially offer large solidaristic connections and relationships.
Nash argues that solidarity requires both “a shared sense of values and
relevant facts and dispositions to act in certain ways”, as well as “social relationships
across difference, the shared appreciation of material risks and benefits that are
unevenly distributed and yet experienced as of common concern to the group” (Nash
2008, 176). This conception of solidarity can be particularly seen in faith-based
public action, which, framed by an idea of a global faith community, sets it apart from
more secular approaches.
Although the task is more complicated, after analyzing the engagement of the
Church as an institution, until this point, we will categorize the JBAD as faith-based
organization. We will distinguish it from secular organizations and from organizations
of different faith traditions not solely due to their foundational motives, but because
many of their donors are driven to some extent by strong religious solidarity.
Not only is this label an asset among coreligionist institutions in an
international level, but being a Christian association has two additional advantages in
a domestic level.
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The first advantage can be at times a liability. George, an account at the
Association grieved in one of our meetings how he could not get a license for a new
doctor for one of the programs:
“Since his [of the new doctor] boss [one of the priests’
names appeared in the names of the board] is a Christian, they
[employees of the Ministry of Health] reject the application. We
are never going to get a new doctor like that!”

He complained that religious persecution by some of the employees of the
Ministry of Social Affairs has not changed as “the laws are limiting us more but they
[employees of the Ministry of Social Affairs] still live under the mentality of law 32 35
and want to supervise everything…these are other times, or they should be”. Despite
his distress, the 38-year-old employee found optimism: "The Ministry of Social Affairs
counts every piaster coming from abroad but at least we can still work.”
Amnesty International has labelled the actions of the reform to the corpus
regulating NGO’s of the current administration in Egypt as a “crackdown on civil
society” recommending that it should end “investigations into the legitimate, peaceful
activities of human rights organizations and the harassment of human rights
defenders” (Amnesty 2014, 2016). When the Egyptian government began posting
warnings for NGOs on newspapers, it issued urgent action alerts regarding Egypt’s
draft NGO law that imposed a deadline for NGOs to register with the government as
per the 2002 law’s stipulations. They, among many other civil society organizations,
were very vocal in upholding the right to freedom of association.
As many NGOs in Egypt were registered as civil corporations companies, law
firms or other legal entities which are supervised by less intrusive government laws
before the Ministry of Investment, human rights organizations interpreted this as yet
another wave of state attacks on civil society. Past government crackdowns of the
current administration have included smear campaigns against NGO groups and
activists, armed raids of NGO offices, the seizure of private information and property,
the harassment and arrest of NGO employees and office closure (Mada Masr 2014).

35

Nasser's Civic Association Code (law 32/1964) gave governments wide
discretional powers over NGO's (Agati, 2007).
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Foreign funding, if not approved by the Ministry, is considered "an intervention
in internal affairs” (Amnesty 2014), yet Christian NGO’s can be assisted by the
church not only regarding the pool of donors that will sympathize with them but also
for practical issues such as bank transfers. While the umbilical cord that transmits
funds to secular NGO’s is tightening, the JBAD, as other Christian FBOs in Egypt,
can actually carry out their projects with fewer administrative impediments (other
than occasional sectarianism).
Finally, being Catholic offers flexibility in the identity of the community and a
promise of protection by a major transnational church to which they belong. As we
dipped chunks of baladi bread into fresh white fettah cheese, Mr. Emad- the father of
the bride I presented in the opening of this chapter- talked to me during breakfast the
morning after the wedding about the benefits that the Jesuits had brought to him and
his family. The icons, hanging in the middle of the well-furnished living room he was
able to provide to his family as product of his work in Saudi Arabia until the 90s, offer
a certain amount of hope and pride to him that no couch or chair could add.
Of course, Mr. Emad does not care if the Council of Chalcedon or the
Nestorian heresy (cf. Chapter 2.1). He does not care if Muallim Ghali or the Uniate
project, but he cares that today he is Catholic and there is a church- lead by Pope
Francis in connection to him through the Coptic Catholic Church - behind him. He
cares that the Jesuits –his agents to the Catholic word- are in his community
contributing to social welfare by direct provision of services like the water pipes they
managed to fix in his district. He cares that they assist the needy, like when he was
abroad and they educated all his nine children for almost nothing.
Furthermore, whether Egyptian or foreign, these Jesuits also set a standard to
other churches and institutions, to do the same:
“Humar (donkeys)….zibala (garbage)….Coptic Orthodox
and Catholic priests would do nothing for the community before
the Jesuits arrived. Their long black gowns and long beards
would slow them down. Then the Jesuits came and opened
their schools and would actually do stuff for the community.
Bousy ya Coco [“listen, oh (Egyptian pet name for Carol)], now
the Copts learned and everyone is doing something for the
community”.
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While some christians in Egypt -like Naguib Sawiris- are billionaires, the need
of a complete army of Christian FBOs is a symptom that wealth is in small pockets of
Egypt’s upper class and a Copt diaspora. What Ahmed (the activist) at the beginning
of this section) ignored is that most of Egypt’s Copts live in poverty, sometimes dire
poverty. His Cairo based subjectivity ignores that most of the Coptic population, like
Mr. Emad’s family is rural (Baer, 2013). At the same time he also ignores that
Christians in Egypt are also trash collectors like those of Medinat El Zabaleen (Trash
City) and Manshiet Nasr, showing the huge economic gap among Copts.
Despite this gap, Catholicism has provided Catholic Copts like Mr. Emad a
religious capital that knows not of clientelism or politicizes religious differences. This
capital allows Catholic Copts such as Mr. Emad to have access to both spirituality
and a network of people that he deems think progressively. It allows Catholic Copts
and their institutions to have access to all these prerogatives while still being a Copt;
which, as I will explain in Chapter 5, is equally central to their subjectivity.

3.3

A Church of many nations

“I need chocolate”, he would say in a resigned tone. I would joke calling him
“Abouna Matteo” but he would sigh and reply with an “inshaAllah” ("God willing").
“Cheese, milk, anything!” would beg this 28 year-old seminarian on his thirtieth day
of Coptic fasting (out of 55) in the Lent of 2015. The once athletic, joyful and
whimsical Italian classmate of mine in Dar Comboni36, was - according to the other
Coptic Franciscans that were hosting him during his stay in Egypt to study Arabic- a

36

Dar Comboni is an institute that is run by the Combonian mission that, in
cooperation with the Pontifical Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies, train Catholic
missionary personnel assigned to the Middle East and equip them with the necessary tools
to work in such environment. Their two-year baccalaureate program includes an intensive
course in Standard Arabic Language; an introduction to Islamic culture to foster mutual
understanding between Christians and Muslims, and Inter-religious Dialogue. The Institute
was initially opened in Lebanon but due to the escalation of the civil war, it was transferred to
the Sakakini and then to Zamalek (both in Cairo), where the community of Comboni
Missionaries and the Institute reside at present.
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walking example of how different Coptic and Latin Catholics, even if they claim the
same faith, can be.
“It’s not that fasting is not hard for the other seminarians
but they grew up with it…they just laugh when I tell them I
dream about eating meat…and we still need fifteen more
days!”.
Although he would be consecrated within the Latin rite when returning to Italy,
his stays at the seminaries in Jerusalem the last four years and now Cairo showed
him that Catholicism was more diverse than what he had at home.
Fasting was not the only practice of Catholic Copts that was unconventional
for Matteo, who is Roman Catholic, when he first arrived to the Franciscan seminary
in Giza:
“The fact that the priest faces the altar at the beginning
feels quite Pre-Vatican II”37 and “I have to admit I was a little
horrified when I first saw a priest slit his finger bathe in
consecrated wine into a toddler’s mouth38 during communion.39 I
now understand and see some kind of solidarity in welcoming
infants who have been baptized at the Lord’s Table, but I still
believe children should understand what they are receiving”.

37

Versus populum (Latin for "towards the people") is the liturgical orientation in which
the priest celebrates Mass facing the people. The opposite orientation, whereby the priest
faces in the same direction as the people, is often called ad orientem ("towards the east" as
the rising sun is linked to the idea of God’s universality), even if the priest is not in fact facing
the east. Although Vatican Council II inaugurated a liturgical reform (for example Latin was
changed for the vernacular to celebrate Mass), it said nothing about the direction of the
celebrant during Mass. The versus populum orientation belongs to the Novus Ordo Mass of
Pope Paul VI that was adopted after the Council (1964). This uniformity has led to the
widespread misunderstanding that the celebration of Mass "facing the people" is required.
38

Paedocommunion is standard in the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Eastern
Catholic Churches. Fr. Robert Taft, S.J. explains in “Liturgy in the Life of the Church” :“The
practice [of communing infants] began to be called into question in the 12th century not
because of any argument about the need to have attained the “age of reason” (aetus
discretionis) to communicate. Rather, the fear of profanation of the Host if the child could not
swallow it led to giving the Precious Blood only”.
39

Holy Communion or Eucharist is a rite considered by most Christian churches
instituted in the New Testament by Jesus Christ during his Last Supper. Giving his disciples
bread and wine during the Passover meal, Jesus commanded his followers to "do this in
memory of me" while referring to the bread as "my body" and the wine as "my blood" (1
Corinthians 11:23-24). Through the Eucharistic celebration Christians remember Christ's
sacrifice of himself on the cross.
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In other occasions, Matteo would tell me- smiling as though he remembered a
cherished sister who is missed or departed- how after finishing law school in a small
town near Milan he broke his fiancée’s heart when he announced to her that the Lord
had “called him to serve him”:
“She is a pious girl. Of course, she was sad at first but
she respected that I had a bigger mission. She wished for me
the best and she has a very cute baby girl now”.

With this anecdote in mind, it would be predictable that he would not be as
receptive to difference among Catholic Copts when it came to the matter of priest
celibacy. Despite the mass of sexual perpetrations of Catholic priests in the West,
the resignation and understanding of priests as holy quasi-eunuchs inside the
Church is still the norm since the eleventh century when celibacy was instituted for
Latin Catholic priests.40 When I told Matteo about Facebook messages a seminarian
from Minya sent telling me saying “ibtisamik helw” (“you’re smile is nice/ pretty) or
another from Cairo that would always call me “amar” (“moon”; a flirtatious adjective
in Arabic to call a girl "pretty") or “asl” (“honey”), the distance between Rome and
Egypt became larger as it was related to basic rules defining Matteo's life:
“Roman Catholic priests are actually the only Catholic
priests that don’t get married. In most Eastern Catholic
Churches a large percentage of priests and deacons are also
celibate and monks cannot get married but if a seminarian
wants to get married, many will do it if they take a wife before
they get ordained. Religious life is not easy and the Gospel
says that ‘No servant can serve two masters’. I find it hard to
understand how they think they can manage a distraction such
as marriage or even filtration. Seminary life is not easy without
devotion. Maybe those are not really serious about their service
to God”.
Fasting, allowing children to take communion, allowing priests to get married,
might seem as mere ritualistic differences but this is precisely the added value of
Uniatism or Eastern Catholicism. The Catholic Church or Roman Catholic Church is

40

In 1139, Pope Innocent II declared all priestly marriages annulled and declared
clerical celibacy the rule for all Roman Catholic priests from that day forward (Second
Lateran Council, canons 6 and 7).
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still the largest Christian church today and it is made up of 24 autonomous (sui iuris)
churches,41 which reflect historical and cultural diversity rather than differences in
belief. The largest group is the Latin Church42 besides the Eastern Catholic Rites.
Here, the term "Rite" (often upper-case) refers to juridical status, not to liturgy.43 All
of these churches come under the jurisdiction of the Pope through the Congregation
for the Oriental Churches created in 1862 as part of the Propaganda Fide (which
oversaw the church’s missionary activity) (Yurkus, 2005).
The most obvious distinctions between Western and Eastern Catholics, as
Abouna Matteo pointed out, are external. Each Church uses a distinct ritual for Mass
and sacraments. For example, most Eastern rites remain standing for most of the
celebration and do not kneel for the consecration; they give peace in an affectionate
closed handed position and then kiss one’s own palms closed to another (Latins only
offer a handshake to strangers); and they use the sign of the cross much more
frequently than Latins during mass. All of these difference can make Eastern rites
seem closer to their Orthodox counter-parts than to Rome, but none of these
differences, however, constitute a separation of faith or of communion with the See
of Peter.
In contrast with partial communion (for instance, with Protestants, where
some elements of Christian faith are held in common), the Eastern Catholic churches
are in full communion with the whole Catholic Church. While they accept the
canonical authority of the See of Rome, they retain their distinctive liturgical rites,

41

According to the new Eastern Code, the Eastern Catholic churches fall into four
categories: (1) Patriarchal (the Chaldean, Armenian, Coptic, Syrian, Maronite, and Melkite
churches), (2) Major Archepiscopal (Ukrainian, Syro-Malabar, Romanian and SyroMalankara churches), (3) Metropolitan sui iuris (the Ethiopian, American Ruthenian,
Hungarian, Eritrean and Slovak churches), and (4) other churches sui iuris (Bulgarian,
Greek, Italo-Albanian, Russian, Belarusan, and Albanian churches, as well as the
Ruthennian eparchy of Mukačevo and apostolic exarchate in Prague, and the three Greek
Catholic jurisdictions in former Yugoslavia.
42

There is a Roman Rite within the Latin Church. The Roman Rite has two forms ordinary and extraordinary. There are other rites within the Latin Church (Ambrosian,
Carmelite, Mozarabic). "Eastern rite church". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. (2015) Web.
18 Dec. 2015 http://www.britannica.com/topic/Eastern-rite-church
43

There are five distinct Eastern rite liturgical traditions—the Byzantine,
the Alexandrian, the Antiochene, the Chaldean, and the Armenian—each (except the last)
with two or more branches.
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laws, customs and traditional devotions and have their own theological emphases
but not in the level of dogma.
One of the greatest insights of the Second Vatican Council (1962–65), was
that pluralism was desirable, if not necessary.44 It recognized that the communication
of the message of the Gospel must always be particularized into local contexts,
cultures, and languages (Robinson, 1991: 191). In other words, the liturgy must not
be foreign, but intimately proximate. Liturgical enculturation, thus, became a way of
adapting the liturgy for a particular culture in such a way that the liturgy itself might
be said to be a cultural event.
This process of enculturation allows very diverse individuals such as Matteo –
this Italian seminarian of the Latin rite- and Mr. Emad (father of the bride at the
beginning of this chapter)- a farmer, observant of the Coptic rite- to come together
under the same faith without compromising core ritualistic practices and even some
core religious tenants (such as clerical celibacy, to Matteo's shock).
However, the fact that the Catholic Coptic Church of Alexandria is in full
communion with Rome, it is not a license to undermine its uniqueness. Rome itself
has been outspoken in defending their right and obligation to "preserve their
legitimate liturgical rite" (Orientalium, 9)45 and has formally legislated this right in the
1990 Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches46 calling for them to restore their
traditions.47

44

The Second Vatican Council's Lumen Gentium explains how the diversity Eastern
Catholic churches “of local churches with one common aspiration is splendid evidence of the
catholicity of the undivided Church” (Lumen gentium, 23).
45

Orientalium Ecclesiarium, the Decree on the Eastern Catholic Churches, was
promulgated at the Second Vatican Council by Pope Paul VI on November 21, 1964. This
decree instructs Eastern Catholics stating that that "it is the mind of the Catholic Church that
each individual Church or Rite should retain its traditions whole and entire and likewise that it
should adapt its way of life to the different needs of time and place" (n. 2), and that they
should all "preserve their legitimate liturgical rite and their established way of life, and ...
these may not be altered except to obtain for themselves an organic improvement" (n. 6; cf.
n. 22).
46

The Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches (Latin: Codex Canonum
Ecclesiarum Orientalium or CCEO) is the title of the 1990 codification of the common
portions of the Canon Law for the 23 of the 24 sui iuris Churches. While the Latin Church is
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Eastern Catholic Churches have then slowly begun to reduce Latinizations
and practice their Eastern Tradition and this has made some impact on the
Alexandrian rite48. Some of the Latinizations of 1898 have been reversed: icon
screens have been restored, the Divine Liturgy has been renewed and the
administration of sacraments according to Coptic rites has been revived.
Nevertheless, there is still a scholarly and political assumption that Catholic Copts
should be identified as part of the broader Catholic denomination rather than as
Copts (Shatzmiller 2005: 12),
While ecumenical negotiations have taken place between professional
theologians, the inculturationalist approach to bring churches closer to Rome has
proven itself more effective as it takes place at a cultural level. The last picture on
Mr. Emad's wall, of el Anba Ibrahim Sidrak, is a a trophy of this approach as it
contributes to dispelling the notion that local inhabitants are mere receptors of
Western missionary activities (Makdisi 2007: 197) and highlights native agency. The
frame is a trophy of a translational system that can produce native institutions and its
very own leaders that are close to their people without compromising their roots.

guided by its own particular Canons, the 23 Eastern Catholic Churches have been invited to
codify their own particular laws and submit them to the pope so that there may be a full,
complete Code of all religious law within Catholicism.
Pope John Paul II promulgated CCEO on October 18, 1990, by the document Sacri
Canones. The Code came into force of law on October 1, 1991 See Roberson, 1999.
47

Unions with Rome have resulted in an inevitable process of latinization or the
adoption of certain practices and attitudes proper to the Latin Church. The degree of how
this adoption has endangered contact with their spiritual roots has depended on the
individual circumstances of the groups. Priest praying for the souls in Purgatory, the
congregation kneeling during consecration, spoken (as opposed to sung) Divine Liturgy
without the use of incense, are some examples of Latin practices that would be alien to
Eastern Catholics. Pope John Paul II in his 1995 apostolic letter, “Orientale Lumen”
reinforced the need to conter latinizations.
48

The Alexandrian Rite is the liturgical rite used by the Coptic, Eritrean,
and Ethiopian Catholic Tewahedo Churches as well as by those corresponding Orthodox
Churches. The Alexandrian Rite is sub-grouped into two rites: the Coptic Rite and the Ge'ez
Rite. The main liturgy used by the Coptic Churches is known as the Liturgy of Saint Basil
(Estefanous, 2001: chapter 3)
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4. The Nation of St. Mark:49 Coptic identity Politics

It was October 3, 1956. Two days before the UN Security Council's debate on
Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal and the crisis was approaching a climax.
The Coptic Orthodox Church held an inter-faith unity rally at its headquarters with
leaders representing all Christian denominations found in Egypt and Muslim
dignitaries in order to emphasize that the entire Egyptian nation stood behind Nasser
(Wakin: 51).
Despite overshadowing Suez in the private worries of the minorities, no one
would dare to fall out of script and speak about other pressing issues such as
religious persecution. The sole speaker who dared to address such issue was a
Coptic Jesuit priest - well-known in his time- whose gullible honesty made him sound
like what Wakin (1963) described as "some poor player who had forgotten his lines":
"Now that the foreigners are gone, we are like a family. I
watched Egyptian pilots taking ships through the Suez Canal
and I was proud. Now that our foreign guests are gone, we can
look at our internal problems. If we look into the minds of
Christians, we see that there is a feeling of disquiet and so we
must work for peace of mind. Christians must remain Christians,
Moslems must remain Moslems, and they must all be linked in
order to keep the landscape beautiful as a landscape containing
a variety of flowers" (Wakin: 52).

By underlining the anxiety of Christian communities, this Catholic Copt had
violated the rule of public silence both accepted by Orthodox Copts and imposed
upon them by the Nasser regime. While the need to address sectarianism was

49

Though his original name was John, St. Mark is known with the titles of "the
Evangelist", "the Apostle", "the Witness" or "the Martyr". He is the traditionally ascribed
author of the Gospel of Mark (the second book in the New Testament) as he witnessed
Jesus's preaching in Palestine as well as his passion. He was originally a Libyan Jew, he
became Peter’s interpreter and, founded the church of Africa, particularly that of Alexandria.
Senior, Donald P. (1998), "Mark", in Ferguson, Everett, Encyclopedia of Early Christianity
(2nd ed.), New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., p. 720
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evident for this Coptic Catholic priest, his Orthodox counterparts in that courtyard
had conveniently accepted not to acknowledge it.
The attitude of the Orthodox priests in this anecdote epitomizes the strategy
of the Coptic Orthodox Church has adopted repeatedly throughout modern history,
particularly since Ottoman ruling. Be it the 1919 campaign from independence, the
1952 July Revolution, the 1973 October War, Tahrir and the explosion of the Arab
Spring, or the 2013 coup, the Coptic Orthodox Church is aware that the optimum
bargaining time for the Copts is a national crisis (Wakin: 53). It is at these times
when the regime needs the open support of all Egyptians and the appearance of
happy minorities is important for propaganda positions abroad (Wakin: 55).
Coptic leaders, embracing caution, have felt that professing an almost blind
loyalty and cooperation with the state has avoided trouble or at least postponed it.
The Muslim regime, in return, has confirmed in its attitude that Orthodox Copts as a
group can be manipulated (Wakin: 54). This ability to negotiate, institutionalized in
what scholarship has depicted around the figure of the Ottoman milla (Rowe 2014,
Iskandar 2012, Sedra 2014), has blurred what it means to be an Egyptian minority
until today.
This chapter will thus concentrate on the status and power relationships
derived from religious identity in Egypt, particularly Coptic identity. After exploring the
historical conditions under which this partnership was contracted with the Egyptian
State, this chapter will address the strategy deployed by the shepherded by Coptic
reformers such as Pope Shenouda to secure the pact from within:

Coptic

nationalism and reform.
Despite its claims of sameness, equality important to the Coptic Orthodox
Church is the constructions of otherness in order for it to defend and promote its
Christian identity vis-á-vis the Muslim majority and Non-Orthodox Egyptian
Christians. Considering the deployment by the Orthodox Church of the national unity
narrative at key moments to shut down debate about contentious issues, this chapter
will then examine, historically and ethnographically, whether or not it is suitable to
continue framing Coptic identity in ethno-religious terms, particularly in the
environment surrounding the JBAD.
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Finally, as Catholic Copts are not part of the same “imagined community”
(Anderson 1991) of what has been constructed by mainstream discourses to mean
"Copt", this chapter will contest how the arithmetic concept of "wahda" (unity) based
on two players (Sedra 2014: 2) has complicated the classification of Egyptian
minorities.
The rejection of the Coptic Orthodox Church to be labelled as a minority has
casted out groups such as Catholic Copts to continue to constitute what Bengio and
Ben Dor (1999)'s define as a "diffuse minority". Just like the Coptic Jesuit during the
Suez crisis, the existence of other minorities and even other Copts nowadays, is an
imprudent reminder that exposes the delicate sectarian formula on which Egypt is
constructed today.

4.1

Fixation on Ottoman administration: contracting the millet partnership.

Understanding the pantomimic unity of Christians in Egypt under the single
banner of the Coptic Orthodox Church with the modern Egyptian State today takes
us back to Egypt's Ottoman history, the transition from a multicultural empire to
becoming a modern nation-state and the presidencies that have followed such
period.
The almost century and a half when the Mohamed Ali dynasty ruled Egypt
awakes a sense of nostalgia for all types of Christians in Egypt alike (Hulsman: 21).
Coptic citizens and other Egyptians were treated equally and had the same rights
and duties, they were allowed to assume natural roles in society, they held
appropriate positions, they were exempted from paying tribute, and were no longer
regarded as non-Muslims living in a Muslim land (Martin: 37). In the Christian
Egyptian imaginary, it was in this time that the members of the Christian elite
enjoyed great freedom in economic and educational endeavors.
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Since the Arab conquest of Egypt, Islamic law had delineated minority status
of the Peoples of the Book as dhimmia who received protected status and were
allowed to regulate their own affairs. This concept was later transformed into
the millet system of the Ottoman Empire that brought minority subjects into its
administrative structures. Muslim and Non-Muslim minority groups were included in
this system: the Kharijites, the Shi'a, non-Arab converts to Islam, clients of Muslim
tribes who were not accorded the financial or cultural advantages that benefited the
earliest Arab converts and, as it is relevant to the present study, all the different
types of Christians in the Empire(Martin: 41). This administrative assumption – which
was the cornerstone of the millet system - that personal practice, law and faith blend
together in Christianity as in the religion of the Empire (i.e Islam) would later become
a heavy Islamic influence in the public (political) life of Coptic Christianity (q.v.
Chapter 4.4).
The year 1952 would represent a watershed between two eras in the Coptic
history, dividing the prerogatives they had enjoyed in Ottoman Egypt and their
negotiations with presidencies to come: Abdel Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak, Morsi and
now, Sisi. The country restructured into the new regime and faced major junctures including the events motivating the modern exodus of Egyptian Jews that began in
the late 1950s (Carasso:12). As the country reconfigured itself, the historic
foundations of peaceful coexistence that had been in place since the beginning of
the nineteenth century began to crumble. Soon enough, the Coptic elite lost
momentum and they perceived church reform efforts as insufficient to meet the
challenges of the modern era (Hulsman: 36).
Although Copts favored the idea of defining Egypt under the paradigm of
national unity (where Muslims and Christians constituted one nation), the
appearance of the notion of citizenship in the modern Egyptian State was a source of
uncertainty for Copts. By placing the Coptic Orthodox Church in the same position as
any other Egyptian, the notion of citizenship threatened the privileged control,
security and stability that the millet system had afforded the Patriarch (Seikaly: 71).
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Further threaten by Abdel Nasser's intense Arab nationalism and a tide of
Islamism beginning in 1979 (Carter: 95),50 the church was bound to secure a position
as a powerful institution in the new nation of Egypt. The answer that was deployed
by the Coptic Orthodox Church to cope with these threats has been coined by
different scholars with reference to the Ottoman concept of "milla" as a common
denominator.
When comparing the Egyptian model to the Lebanese, Paul Rowe (2014)
highlights that historically, Egyptian Christians have been described as "passive and
cooperative" (Rowe: 85). Unlike the Christian sects of Lebanon who do not accept
any national identity that is not connected to Christian domination, he asserts that
Copts have accepted their place within a secular Egypt, in what he refers to as a
"neomillet system" (Rowe: 87).
Iskandar (2012) also neologizes this strategy as a "quasi millet" by mentioning
tha the Coptic Orthodox Church embraced the national unity discourse in the face of
sectarian tensions. This quasi-millet approach gave church leadership power over
internal affairs in return for loyalty to the state.
Paul Sedra (2014) also traces what he labels a "millet partnership" back to the
tacit pact developed between Kyrollos VI and Nasser that would become a model for
future relationships with Egypt’s new leaders. As part of this strategy, he would
cooperate with the regime, present the concerns of the community directly to the
President, and promote loyalty to the regime among the Copts.
president

would

furnish

the

Patriarch

with

government

In return, the
concessions,

accommodations and resources which would then be distributed among dioceses
(Sedra: 1-4). With Nasser's elimination of political parties and the political
marginalization of the Muslim Brotherhood, Copts retreated from political life. Since
then, the church has emerged as the undisputed voice representing all the Copts
while other voices outside this equation were inhibited.

50

This opposition is understandable under the transubstantiation of the "national
unity" discourse from the agenda of the Sadat regime as well. In an attempt to introduce a
constitutional amendment that would have allowed him to stand for re-election as President
more than twice, the bundling of this amendment to the insertion of Islamic principles into the
Constitution as a source of law was viewed by Copts as a step towards a more radically
Islamic Egypt (Iskander:15).
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The President vested on the Patriarch the responsibility of administrating the
Coptic awqaafs (endowments), appointed him as a spokesperson for Egyptian
Christianity and finished off any opportunities for dissent by dissolving the maglis el
mili (Wakin:151). Kirollos would join hands with Nasser in laying the cornerstone of
the Cathedral of Saint Mark and proudly echo Nasser's declaration, "Christians and
Muslims have always lived as brothers" (Meinardus 1970: 49).
Like any system that is dependent on personal pacts, the glory of this model
was challenged once the original contractors (Nasser and Pope Kyrolos VI) were
replaced. Whereas Pope Kyrollos was a devote advocate of the national unity
discourse, Pope Shenouda was prone to criticize the regime since early in his early
leadership. The election of Bishop Shenouda as the 117th Patriarch of the Coptic
Orthodox Church in October 1971 would mark a temporary rupture of the "millet
partnership" as Shenouda refused to pledge his loyalty to the regime (Sedra: 15). 51
Notwithstanding Shenouda's house arrest, the patriarch was allowed to
reconsider his approach to leadership of the Coptic community. A month after Pope
Shenouda's banishment, Sadat was assassinated by Islamic extremists and the
Patriarch looked back to the millet partnership that his predecessor had developed
with Nasser (Sedra 1999:221). Pope Shenuouda would convert from a Coptic activist
to a political patriarch that supported national unity and renewed (though not
necessarily improved) the partnership with the state.
As Sedra (2014) points out, the Patriarch's iron grip over church affairs denied
Coptic laymen a role in both communal and national affairs and prevented the Coptic
middle class from reforming their church in accordance with their shifting needs
(Sedra 2014: 239). This persisting model, as I will argue at the end of this chapter,
has not only traded the agitation for rights of middle-class Coptic Orthodox laity for
the success in business of Coptic elites and the consolidation of the Coptic Pope as
head as the only legitimate voice of Egyptian Christianity, but has become a further
obstacle for secular leadership. It has additionally challenged the notion of
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Ten years into his papacy, the Pope fell out of Sadat's favor and was accused by
the president of plotting a Coptic secession from Egyptian rule, with Assuit as the capital of a
Coptic state (Karas: 23). In September 1981, Sadat rescinded the presidential decree
recognizing him as Pope of Alexandria, banishing him to exile to the western desert
monastery of Saint Bishoy (Karas: 28).
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citizenship that the country has hopelessly tried to achieve since the end of the
British occupation and the creation of the modern state.

4.2

Resuscitating a nation

"Blessed is Egypt, my people"
[Isaiah 19:25, NRSV].

Egypt is one of the best regarded lands throughout the Bible. It is said that
God made it as paradise, "like the garden of the Lord, like the land of Egypt"
(Genesis 13:10). It was blessed by welcoming many fathers of the Old Testament
such as Abraham and Sara (Genesis 12:10), Jacob and his family (Genesis 39:50)
and prophets like Jeremiah (Jeremiah 43:1-13). Egypt is mentioned in the Bible
approximately 600 times, second only to Jerusalem.52 The Holy Family found refuge
throughout Egypt (Matthew 2:12-23) and even Jesus himself chose Egypt – despite
being punished by plagues prior to the Exodus (Ex. 1:13-14; Ex. 3:7; Ex. 20:2) - to
be the spiritual equivalent of Golgotha during the first Passover ("... Egypt, where
also our Lord was crucified" Revelation 11:8).
As if the moving of el Mokkatam and the Mariane apparitions weren't sufficient
proof to Egyptian Christians of God’s special favor towards them (q.v. Chapter 6),
the apparition of a washed up Bible in the banks of the Nile below the Virgin Mary
Church in the Southern Cairene neighborhood Maadi at the end of the 70s was
interpreted by the community as a divine dedication to their people. Opened to
chapter 19 of the book of Isaiah, verse 25 miraculously delivered God's message to
the dwellers of the Nile: “blessed be Egypt, my people.”
Beyond this apparent divine favoritism for "Um El Dunia" (“Mother of the
World”, a nickname that Egyptians use to claim pride over their historical heritage),
Egyptian Christianity can also claim earthly weight throughout Church History.
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Egypt: 595 times, Egyptian(s): 120 times. See Assmann, Jan (2009). "Moses the
Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt". Oxford Bible Commentary, Harvard University Press.
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According to tradition, Christianity was introduced to Egypt by the staff of Saint Mark
the Evangelist in Alexandria around 42 AD, shortly after the ascension of Christ
(Armanious: 22). From Alexandria, Christianity spread throughout Egypt within half a
century to rural areas, and by the beginning of the 3rd century AD, the Church of
Alexandria was recognized as one of Christendom's five Apostolic Sees, second in
honor only to the Church of Rome (Meinardus: 9).
Egypt contributed immensely to Christian tradition. The Catechetical School of
Alexandria (founded around 190), was the oldest catechetical school in the world
and became an important institution of religious and scientific learning (Dunn: 26).
Here, students were taught by scholars such as Athenagoras, Clement, and Origen
(the father of theology). However, the scope of this school was not limited to
theological subjects; science, mathematics and humanities were also taught there.
The invention of instruments such pipe organs are attributed to this school 53 and 15
centuries before Braille, wood-carving techniques were in use there by blind scholars
to read and write (Gabra: 28-33).
Another major contribution donated by Egypt to Christianity was monasticism.
Early Christian monasticism drew its inspiration from the examples of the Prophet
Elijah and John the Baptist, and above all, from Jesus himself his in solitary struggle
with Satan in the desert in preparation for his public ministry (Matthew 4:1-11). St.
Paul and St. Anthony the Great (251-356) were the first well-known Christians to
withdraw to the isolation of Egyptian desert and pursue ascetic lives (Dunn: 7).
While this heritage is common to Christianity as a whole, the 381 Second
Ecumenical Council (that decided to designate Constantinople as second in primacy
after Rome, instead of Alexandria) was the first major collision that would isolate
Egyptian Christianity from the rest of the ecumene (Schalf 1995: i). By the end of the
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The very first pipe organ was built in Alexandria (Egypt), when Ctesibius of
Alexandria, a musician and engineer, build the first known hydraulis in 200 BC. Ironically, as
the pipe organ became very popular throughout Europe, it was considered an extremely rare
instrument in Egypt. Pipe organs did not return to Egypt until the 19th century in Catholic
venues such as the Jesuit College or the Basilica of Our Lady of Heliopolis.
See Metwaly, Ati "Celebrating the centenary of the Basilica of Heliopolis and the
restoration of its rare pipe organ". El Ahram, 11 Jan 2011. Available at:
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/5/33/3607/Arts--Culture/Music/Celebrating-thecentenary-of-the-Basilica-of-Helio.aspx
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fourth century, Egyptian Christians, extended mainly throughout Upper Egypt, had
developed their own religious and cultural style creating a distinctive national
community (Tellyrides 2009: 18). Thereafter, this community would define itself and
underscore cultural differences between Egyptian and Greek Christian communities
(Tellyrides 2009: 19).
The emergence of a Coptic national consciousness can be tracked down to
the times of Dioscorus (Patriarch of Alexandria in 444 AD) that lead to Alexandria's
divorce from the Byzantine church in Chalcedon (Atiya I968: 56-58). Besides
claiming a momentous heritage, the most important institution that became key to
Coptic nationalism is that of the patriarch. From the times of Discorius, the loyalty of
the Egyptian people was gradually transferred to the Coptic Patriarch making all the
attempts of Byzantine reconciliation void (Iskander: 17). This monopoly of
representation would be instrumental to the Coptic revivalist and nationalist
movement of the 19th and 20th centuries.
Isolated from Christendom since the fifth century and sieged by Islam in the
seventh, the national church of Egypt did not face major challenges to its authority
until contrasted to Western modernity through colonist efforts (Masters:112). Then,
land-owning Copts became exposed to new religious ideas and to new models of
Christian practice, hierarchy and priesthood of missionaries who were allowed by the
Khedive to open churches and schools (Hamilton: 91). This first lay reform was a
series of changes lead by 19th century aristocratic Copts who presented their local
institution as stagnant in the face of modernity. The complaints of the elite that the
Coptic clergy was “backward” and the later formation of the majlis al-milli put on the
Coptic religious establishment to reform (O’Mahony: 44).
As well as supervising the financial affairs of the community, there was an
emphasis on educational reform and improving the educational level and overall
quality of the Coptic priesthood. As mentioned earlier, Patriarch Kyrillos IV (papacy
1854-1861) – known as “Abu al-islah" ("Father of Reform") - was key in the clerical
front of reform and began training programs for priests and deacons (Meinardus
1970, 38).
The activism of elite Copts in the nineteenth century set the stage for the rise
of "Coptism" in the twentieth. It was a moment of rediscovering a glorious past and
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the quest to revive it. Through the Sunday School Movement, Coptic youth became
increasingly aware of their religion's foundation, their church's roots, and their
community's heritage (Assad: 118).
It was a first-year student at the newly inaugurated theological seminary,
Habib Girgis (1876-1951), who noticed that teachers of both government and Coptic
Schools no longer had sufficient Christian religious education and Coptic students
were even pressured to participate in Islamic religious education (Huslman: 92).
Threatened by the lack of religious education for Copts, Habib sought education
reforms for both religious leaders in seminaries and Christian education in all public
and private schools. The first Sunday Schools were founded in 1898, and on 1918 its
first organizational structure was establish by forming the "General Committee for the
Sunday Schools" (Dunn: 2014).
The Sunday School Movement paved the way for an influx of a new group of
middle class, educated Copts who taught in Sunday schools before choosing to
enter the monasteries. Among these young Copts was a Sohagy called Nazyr
Gayyid, who stood out by his radical views and spoke of the need to rally the Coptic
community (Hanna 1996). After being appointed as Bishop of Education in 1962,
Nazyr, or - as he would be known from there on- Shenouda, would mobilize the
community by delivering lectures in the Cathedral each Friday on matters central to
the daily lives of Copts. (Heikal 1983, 160).
The election of Pope Shenouda III brought the reform movement to the
frontline of the Coptic Orthodox Church with the particular vision of the new leader
(Huslman: 11). Shenouda's vision - for which he would be known as the "father of
Coptic nationalism"" (Iskander: 20) - was to provide Coptic Orthodox Christians in
Egypt with an alternative social universe in which they could live their lives with
dignity, self-esteem, and a sense of achievement. It predicated on the notion that the
church should be an all-encompassing reality for Coptic Orthodox Christians. It
would become a spiritual nation within the nation where one's identity can be fully
invested in cradle-to-grave programs of churchly socialization (Jacobsen: 54).
The revival process involved restoring the authority of the church hierarchy
and re-centering communal life on the church. Control of monasteries was
centralized and numbers of bishops and priests were increased. The lay community
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was also brought into the institutionalization process through an expansion in the
number of lay khudam (servers), who were to assist in every aspect of church life
(Huslman: 30). In terms of its institutional spread and ability to provide services for
those in need, the Coptic Orthodox Church became unique. In fact, it is arguably the
strongest and best financed nongovernmental organization in the country (Rowe:
96). Christian citizens in the effective service of the church are generally not enticed
nor motivated to create rival organisations, and thus, according to this design, the
Coptic Orthodox Church would operate as the single most important representative
of Coptic interests (Huslman: 37).
The generation of reformers that enacted his project, they took a neotraditionalist approach to create a common Coptic identity, based on the proud reappropriation of glorious Coptic past (El Khawaga: 290). The pope also aimed to
strengthen the family as the foundation of Coptic Christian identity and to make the
Coptic Orthodox Church a place where every Copt could find meaning.
At the same time, the monastic order became key to the direction of the
larger church (Huslman: 69). Monks are singularly loyal to the Coptic Orthodox
Church and form the foundation of the church hierarchy. Thus, Coptic popes and
church leaders traditionally come from the monasteries and have sponsored a
relatively passive revivalist spirit among their disciples lives which is apolitical (Dunn:
4).
Although there is little evidence to support political motivation (Huslman: 62),
it was clear that such activities had political ramifications. This renewal and its
insistence on the unity of the Copts within the framework of Mother Church was
fostered by efforts to undermine the Nasser regime's broader political activities and
Arab nationalism (Rowe: 98). Commitment to church activism meant acceptance of
individual non-involvement or "withdrawal" from political life (El Khawaga: 294).
Initially, this withdrawal was sponsored by the church itself to strengthen its hold on
the community and later enabled the church to provide a strong institutional
response to Islamization and provided Copts with a mechanism to resist state
actions.
Whereas the lay reformers had focused on modernizing and rationalizing the
community and the church as part of a project to build a modern Egypt, the new
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middle class monastic reformers were concerned with effecting a spiritual revival in a
church that was threatened by resurgent and sometimes hostile Islamist politics and
the presence of other Christian denominations. Shielding itself from these hazards,
this revival would aim to define a Coptic identity which looked inward, focused on
family, church and community (Huslman: 71).
From the outside, the Egyptian state endorsed a neo-millet partnership with
the church by recognizing the patriarch as the official representative and voice of the
Coptic community (Shatzmiller 2005: 17). From the inside, the Pope secured the
loyalty of his community by fostering an ethno-religious identity that provided social
services as well as religious ministry.

4.3

The Coptic kafr: (De)constructing "Copticness"

During the Holy Week of 2015, I was adopted by a Christian family from the
JBAD to spend Easter and Sham El Neseem54 with their relatives in the rural
outskirts of Edfu. Ibrahim, a mid-aged office worker at the JBAD and his wife – Vivian
- had stopped paying regular visits to their relatives 600 km down the Nile during the
holidays and, unaware of their family situation, I was glad to tag along for their
reunion.
Before settling in Minya, and long before his cousin from his father's side
succumbed to his constant marriage proposals, Ibrahim had emigrated to the capital
to look for the opportunities that his village could not provide for him. Single and
bored with his nine-to-five routine, he would volunteer in different church-lead
community services in his spare time until he found a convent in the Southern-
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Although this name is a rough Arabization of the pharaonic holiday of creation
(Shemu), Sham el-Nessim, or "Smelling/Taking In of the Zephyrs," is an Egyptian national
holiday marking the beginning of spring. It always falls on the day after the Coptic
Orthodox Easter. Despite begin a Christian-related date, the holiday is celebrated by all
Egyptians regardless of religion. See "Egyptians celebrate ancient festival of Sham ElNessim"
Ahram
Online,
MENA,
21
Apr
2014.
Available
at:
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/99540/Egypt/Politics-/Egyptians-celebrateancient-festival-of-Sham-ElNes.aspx
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Cairene suburb of Maadi that presented him with more than a chance to volunteer.
Helping at a home for senior Copts that was run by Spanish nuns made him learn
Spanish55 and exposed him to an alternative kind of Christianity (i.e. Roman
Catholic) to the Coptic Orthodox tradition through which he had been raised. While
his wife, kids, and all his relatives back in the village of Edfu lived what they consider
an "orthodox" Coptic Orthodox life, Ibrahim went on and converted to Catholicism.
After a loud argument he had with his cousin's 56 wife, Ibrahim warned me that
being raised in a devote Coptic Orthodox rural family, his conversion was only
understandable with the flexibility that not living in his hometown gave him. His
departure from what in his eyes was an "old-fashioned" Church that demanded long
fasts, inhumanely long masses57 and corrupt leadership, was a subject that he
preferred to leave untouched until it was inevitable. His wife respected his decision
as long as he allowed her to raise their children as Orthodox and he would not
abandon his duties as a husband. But visiting his extended family was a reminder of
the clash his decision had presented in his extended family.
The complete family lived in a building where each floor had an apartment,
and each of the three married brothers had kept a floor. Everyone rested and
showered in their corresponding apartment, yet, due to the festivities and presence
of guests, all meals and gatherings were held in the ground floor where grandpa
Abanoub lived. Since teta58 Mariam had passed away the Christmas before, in a winwin agreement, Wageh (Ibrahim's brother-in-law and cousin) and his wife, Salma,
had moved downstairs to keep him company and prevent Salma from waddling up
and down the stairs.
Some hours after we arrived from the train station, shouts erupted in the
ground-floor's kitchen. The eight-month pregnant daughter-in law (who was also
fasting some days during her pregnancy) had gotten upset about Ibrahim's cooking
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which explains how easily we established rapport (me, being a native Spanish

speaker).
56

who was also his brother-in-law, as Ibrahim married his parental cousin.

57

Unlike Catholic masses that normally range between 45 to 90 min. services, he
would complain that Coptic masses range between 90 to 270 min., in average.
58
Endearing nickname for grandmas.
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of chicken in her kitchen during the last week of their 55-days vegan fast. Although it
could have easily been attributed to the tiredness her full-blown pregnancy or her
unwillingness to clean the kitchen again, her complaint broke the ice and unleashed
a series of reproaches and recriminations from other members of the extended
family:
"It's like he doesn't care about his family anymore",
"What kind of example is he going to give his children?" "He is
not fasting? He doesn't go to our church anymore?"

More than a theological or a spiritual threat, the unease among his family
members circled around his function in society, particularly inside a family. The
church, as perfected in Shenouda's nationalistic model, is more than a center of
worship but a center of social design and management, and, while the Mary Girgis
(St. George) tattoo on his right biceps and both cross tatoos on his wrist and below
his thumb said otherwise, the wife of his wife's brother insisted: "he is no longer a
Copt".
In a conciliatory gesture, Wageh rubbed her shoulder and said with a
mischievous smile "enough, you kafr!".59 The fact that Wageh used a derogatory
term that is traditionally deployed to describe an unbeliever or an apostate from
Islam, shows in a sarcastic way – as Ibrahim later explained to me- the level of his
departure from faith in the eyes of his Orthodox relatives.
As a caveat, I must point out that Ibrahim's case is special in that he openly
converted to Latin Catholicism and not Coptic Catholicism. Had he continued as an
observant Catholic Copt, he would still follow the 40 day vegan diet that the Coptic
Catholic Church encourages her children to follow (in contrast to the 55 vegan diet of
the Coptic Orthodox Church) and not the 2-day fasting (on Ash Wednesday and
Good Friday) and abstention from red meat on Fridays during Lent that the Latin
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I decided not translate this word as it is nearly impossible to find an English
equivalent that reflects all the meanings that it is charged with. The word kafir is the active
participle of the root K-F-R which means "to cover". In pre-Islamic Arabic, it described
farmers burying seeds in the ground, covering them with soil while planting. In Islamic
parlance, a kafr is a person who rejects Islam, i.e. "hides or covers the truth" and it is usually
translated into English as "infidel" or "unbeliever"(Adams 2009: 32).
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Church prescribes. Although still Coptic by birth and by culture, his ritual practices,
nonetheless, allows us to analyze how "Copticness" can be defined and constructed
in different levels.
Ibrahim's case could equally reflect a soft version of the accusations that
converts to virtually any creed or denomination would have to endure in a
conservative family. It could seem irrelevant, for instance, compared to the
ramifications that Copts converting to Islam would face and meaningless in front of
the lives of Muslims who I came across during my fieldwork who were forced to run
away from their lives to avoid State and family persecution for converting to
Christianity. Nonetheless, I bring Ibrahim's case to the table to illustrate how when
the ethnic-religious boundaries of Pope Shenouda's nationalist model are blurred
and contested, the meaning of "Copticness" or knowing who is a "Copt" is nuisance.
In other words, despite being ethnically a Copt, Salma's cry placed Ibrahim's identify
on trial: Was he not really a "Copt" anymore? Is Coptic identity something that can
be lost in the first place? What and who is a Copt? Who determines it?
As most literature addressing Copts that I’ve encountered during my research
eventually states (Iskander 2012, Sedra 2014, Wakin 2001, Watson 2000), I will now
yield to the practice of exposing the etymology of the word, without implying that this
gives is an ipso facto explanation of its meaning. The word “Copt” (Arabic: qibṭ)
comes from the Greek Aigýptios ultimately related to Caphtor, a locality mentioned in
the Old Testament that refers to what is now known as Egypt (Watson 2000: 7).
From this, we could be tempted to say that "Copt" means “Egyptian”. We could
elaborate and say that every Egyptian is a Copt and every Copt is Egyptian; none of
which are true. Knowing who is a Copt requires much more than an etymological
analysis.

4.3.1 Copticness and ethnicity

After the initial Arab invasion of Egypt in 639 D.C., Egypt was gradually
transformed from a majority Christian to a majority Muslim country (Meinardus: 14).
Initially, as local converts to Islam were seen as inferior to Arab Muslims, the mawla
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system was introduced so non-Arab Muslims could be "adopted" by an Arab tribe
(Iskander: 22; Cragg 90). In this way, non-Arab converts were integrated into Arab
culture and adopted such an ethnicity (Cragg: 92). Additionally, those who converted
or who conducted business with the Arab rulers began to learn Arabic. By the eighth
century Arabic became the official language of Egypt (Tagher: 85), and - although it
is not agreed how long this displacement took- it is generally believed that Coptic
was gradually replaced around the ninth century (Meinardus: 14; Wakin: 63). As a
result of these intertwined processes of Islamization and Arabization, those who
converted to Islam came to identify themselves with an Arab and Muslim identity,
whereas those who remained Christian continued to identify themselves as Coptic
(Wakin: 64).
This narrative that portrays modern Copticness as an ethnic residue that
survived the Arab conquest is one of the attempts to attach categories of ethnicity or
racial heritage to Copts in the many debates of the last century concerning modern
Egyptian identity. Pharaonism/Egyptianism, Mediterraneanism, Easternism, PanArabism and Pan-Islamism were also part of the theories that informed debates
concerning where Egyptians belonged ethnically and culturally in the first half of the
twentieth century (Macari 2007: 14).
Prompted by archaeological breakthroughs of the early twentieth century –
such as the 1922 discovery of Tutankhamen’s tomb - Pharaonism or Egyptianism
developed in the 1920’s and 1930’s (Macari: 15). It related national identity primarily
to Egypt's ancient civilization and was one of the key movements highlighting
Egyptian national identity at the beginning of the last century. Both Muslims and
Christians were among the proponents and supporters of this ideology arguing that
Egyptians were a distinct nationality, and that religion and language were insufficient
indicators of unity between Egypt and other Arab-Islamic states (Carter: 98). It was
primarily popular among Copts who considered it a means to pre-empt allegiances to
Islam and Arab culture that could potentially exclude Copts from the public sphere
(Carter: 99). Many Muslims, however, did not embrace Pharaonism as unequivocally
as the Copts did, as they were hesitant to reconstruct a pre-Islamic Egypt that would
rival modern, Islamic Egypt (Carter: 100). Contemporary to this movement, the
Coptic politician and founder of Coptic Museum Marcus Simaika Pasha went as far
as extending the meaning of Copts to all Egyptians. He described that some were
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"Muslim Copts" and others "Christian Copts" but all Egyptians were descendants of
Ancient Egyptians (Hasan, 2003: 41, 42).
In another attempt to situate Egypt’s cultural legacy, Taha Hussein was a
prominent supporter of Mediterraneanism that insinuated merging Egyptian heritage
with European heritage through the Mediterranean region (Carter: 102). Its Egyptian
edition explained that Pharaonic knowledge had passed through the Greeks to
modern Europe, thus Westernized Egyptians would be reclaiming their original
destiny rather than adopting something foreign (Egger: 137).

The Coptic Arab-

socialist and journalist Salama Musa also believed that Egyptians, Western
Europeans and Mediterranean peoples belonged to the same “racial stock,”
legitimizing the connection between Egypt and the dominant West (Egger: 138). The
ideology ultimately lacked appeal outside of elite circles as it was seen as potentially
Eurocentric and implicative of European superiority (Egger: 139).
After World War I, another transnational challenge to Pharaonism emerged
out of a desire to maintain a feeling of cohesion and cooperation with other lands
once belonging to the Ottoman Empire. "Easternism" claimed that solidarity among
Eastern lands was rooted in the shared experience of oppression under Western
imperialism, and cooperation between these lands could result in their recovery of
control over Eastern resources (Gershoni: 258). Unlike most of the other identity
movements, its objectives varied enough to be attractive to secularists, modernists,
and Islamic traditionalists alike. However, this same lack of consensus and
ambiguities on the definition of the “East”, and its potential interpretation to mean
"the Islamic world", "the Middle East", or even the entire regions of Africa and Asia
(Egger: 123) caused this proposal to eventually lose momentum (Gershoni: 257).
These debates coincided with the period of the aftermath of the British
Occupation (1882-1922), which is often looked on nostalgically by Copts as a time of
Coptic prosperity, expanded political representation and inter-communal cooperation
(Egger: 12). The nationalist period is remembered as a time of public displays of
solidarity between Copts and Muslims, with Muslims attending Easter services while
Copts participated in Eid al-Fitr celebrations ("Festival of Breaking of the Fast"/ end
of Ramadan) (Carter 58). This period witnessed unprecedented cooperation
between Christian clergy and Muslim sheiks in opposition to the British and a
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conspicuous Coptic presence in nationalist movements, evidently to counter the
British strategy of “divide and conquer” that many Egyptians anticipated (Chitham:
103). The British occupation had constituted a setback to national autonomy that, in
some instances, it inspired cooperation and mutual sentiments between Copts and
Muslims (Henderson: 157).
However, the aftermath of the 1952 revolution would prove itself less inclusive
as all three ideologies – Pharaonism, Mediterraneanism

and Easternism- lost

prestige in favor of Pan-Arabism and Islamism. Supporters of Pan-Arabism fell into
two categories: those who characterized Egypt as “Arab” by citing linguistic and
religious commonalities, and the secular theorists that defined Arab identity along the
lines of common history and language (Carter: 104). Most Egyptians, however, found
it difficult to separate Islam from Pan-Arabism, especially because of the Muslim
reverence of Arabic as the original language of the Quran and Sunna (Chejne: 16).
This became evident in the exclusion of Copts from the Dar al-ʿUlum (the training
institute required for language instructors) and from teaching the subject in Egyptian
schools (Carter: 105).
By the 1950’s Pan-Arabism and Nasserism had overshadowed the viability of
Egyptianism and Mediterraneanism. Although Pan-Arabism would dominate Egypt
during Nasser’s presidency, influential Islamist segments were always dissatisfied
with the ideology (Said: 335). Islamism - the principle that Islam should be the
primary guide of social, political and personal life - gained momentum in Egypt with
the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna in 1928. Al-Banna
formed the Brotherhood in response to the perceived ills of “Westernization” in
Egypt, which included increasing materialism, neglect of Islamic principles and
general moral decline (Said: 336-7).
Parallel to the Muslim reaction against perceived foreign cultural threats to
religious identities, the Copts did likewise through the previously explained revivalist
reforms to stress religious identity as opposed to a civil, Egyptian identity. Both the
Islamic overtones to Nasser‘s Arab nationalism and increasing Islamism led Copts to
turn to internal communal survival mechanisms and divorce their religious realm from
the Muslim environment, where they had once hoped to participate at all levels of
society (Reid: 291; Makari: 61). Copts reacted to this shift by taking refuge in an
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offshoot of Pharaonism in which Copts claimed ethnic pedigree being the "purer"
descendants of the ancient Egyptians (Khawaga: 2).
The concept of "ethnicity" is often associated with differentiated, even
discriminated,”sub-national units” and minorities in relation to the majority
(Shatzmiller 2005: 7). Complaints such as that religious discrimination prevents
Copts from obtaining promotion to top-level positions in the civil service, the army
and in universities (Meindarus 2010: 45) and laws on conversion and building places
of worship that treat citizens differently on the basis of religion could support this
parameter to determine whether or not "Copts" constitute an ethnic category
(Iskander:19).
Nevertheless, following Thomas Hyland Eriksen definition of ethnicity that
"refers to groups considering themselves culturally as well as racially distinctive",
Smith (2002) argues that Copticnesss cannot be defined through terms of ethnicity
as they can claim neither of those distinctions from other Egyptians (Smith: 57).
Regarding cultural distinctions, Copts have often adopted Muslim cultural
practices. Examples of this include legal institutions such as polygamy and
establishing clauses found in Islamic contracts (such as conditions stipulated by the
bride prohibiting the husband from taking a second wife) - even though such
contracts contradict the Christian precept of marriage as an unbreakable sacrament
(Smith: 65). Cultural practices include female genital mutilation, male circumcision
and exclusion of menstruating women from major rituals (Wakin: 49). Such fusions
reflect a great deal of interaction among communities even if the blending of
arrangements that apparently seemed quite acceptable, are contrary to Coptic
doctrine (Smith: 60).
Although Smith does not elaborate on what he considers to be "race", Eriksen
himself stresses the dubious descriptive value of the concept through which he
defines ethnicity. Whereas it was for some time common to divide humanity into four
main races, modern genetics tends not to speak of races due to interbreeding
between human populations and the inefficiency of hereditary physical traits to follow
clear boundaries (Eriksen: 5). The great variations within a "racial" group renders a
discussion of fixed boundaries between races senseless, but the concept can
nevertheless be important in the extent that it informs people's actions (Eriksen: 7).
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In other words, there is a general consensus in anthropology that race exists
as a cultural construct, whether it has a "biological" reality or not "(Eriksen: 6). In any
event, race may assume sociological importance even if it has no "objective"
existence (Eriksen 7). While Copts may claim to be the original core of the Egyptian
nation and the descendants of the Egyptians of the Pharaonic era, it is arguable that
a majority of Egyptian Muslims are themselves racial descendants from Coptic blood
who only converted to Islam. This renders the argument that Copts are always more
closely related to ancient Egyptians flawed and historically inaccurate (McCallum,
2010: 74).
Finally, beyond the lack of cultural distinction that Smith explains, Eriksen's
rendition of the concept of "race" as ambiguous can be understood at its fullest when
one considers that not all "Copts" have been ethnically Egyptian. It is misleading to
deploy the term "Coptic" as an ethnic category if one overlooks and denies sixteen
centuries of its transnational, non-ethnic connotation. Although it declared itself
independent from its Egyptian heritage in 1959 60 and it no longer accepts the term
"Coptic" to describe itself, not six decades have passed since the now
Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo61 Church was still officially known as "Coptic". The
Ethiopian Church was administratively part of the Coptic Orthodox Church of
Alexandria from the first half of the 4th century until 1959, yet the centuries of
administrative influence do not compensate to build assumptions and argue a
common descent among Egyptian Copts and Ethiopian Copts (Farag: 96). It is
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Egypt's rulers have vested interest in keeping Ethiopia in the Coptic ecclesiastical
fold in order to leverage political pressure on Ethiopia. With the 1942 liberation of Ethiopia
from the Italian occupation and the spirit of independence that swept Africa in the 1950s,
Ethiopia sought a higher degree of ecclesiastical independence. After of the enthronement
of Pope Kyrillos VI in1959 the two came to an agreement by which the Metropolitan- Basilios
of Addis Ababa- was elevated to Patriarch-Catholicus and the Pope of Alexandria remained
"the supreme spiritual head of the Church of Ethiopia" (Meinardus 199:134).
In 1971 the Ethiopians pushed for complete independence and on May 9, Patriarch
Theophilos was enthroned in Addis Ababa (Farag: 95).
61

Tewahedo is a Ge'ez word meaning "being made one". This word refers to the
Oriental Orthodox, Non-Chalcedonian, Miaphysitic belief in the one perfectly unified Nature
of Christ; i.e., a complete union of the Divine and Human Natures into one nature is selfevident in order to accomplish the divine salvation of humankind (Farag: 96), as opposed to
the "two Natures of Christ" belief commonly held by the Roman Catholic and Eastern
Orthodox Churches (q.v. Chapter 2.3.1). As explained before, this resulted in the first major
split in the Church (Council of Chalcedon in 451).
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impossible to uphold that Copticness in this case is an ethnicity as members of an
ethnic group are ascribed to racial categories that correlate with biological traits (e.g.
phenotype) which they cannot escape entirely.
In this manner, the adoption of common cultural practices and the ambiguity
of the concept race, in Eriken's terms, shows how the Copts do not easily fall into
this definition of an "ethnic group" because "other than religion, they are neither
culturally nor racially distinctive from Muslims" (Smith: 59).

4.3.2 Copticness and the land

The etymology of the word and its history may create the impression that
"Copticness" is firmly rooted and can be define in terms of the Egyptian space. For
Copts, Egypt is the soil that holds the footprints of the Holy Family; the ground that
absorbed the blood of the early martyrs; and where the Virgin Mary has regularly
made her appearance over the past decades (Walkin 2001: 19). Whilst Copts are
largely concentrated geographically in Upper Egypt (particularly in Assiut, Minya, and
Sohag) and in certain suburbs of Cairo, there is no isolated region of the country in
which they form a vast majority to claim territorial attachment (Meinardus 2010, 29).
Rather, they are scattered throughout the country.
That national loyalty linked to a territorially bounded state can coexist with
retention of religious identities, or even more, that religious identities themselves can
constitute a source of nationalist sentiment challenge basic assumptions underlying
the arguments of Benedict Anderson in his 1983 book, "Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism". Here, Anderson examined
how nationalism led to the creation of nations, or as the title puts it, "imagined
communities". In his nomenclature, an "imagined community" does not mean that a
national community is fake, but rather refers to Anderson's belief that any community
so large that its members do not know each another on a face-to-face basis must be
imagined to some degree (Anderson: 22).
While the term "imagined community" is helpful in describing the PostShenouda Coptic community in that it created imagined bonds among people
79

claiming a common identity, Anderson's understanding of "nation" is not. His
assumption that the secular nation is "part of the universal history of the modern
world” (Anderson: 11) is challenged by Partha Chatterjee (1996) arguing that this is a
Eurocentric reading of nationalism that extends the European experience to the nonEuropean world, which, unlike Europe, was colonized (Chatterjee: 216). For him,
anticolonial nationalism had two domains: the material or Western, which was
rejected, and the spiritual, by which one sought to retain the essence of indigenous
spiritual culture (Chatterjee: 217). Chatterjee uses the term "spiritual," rather than
"religious” to argue that such nationalisms seek to create a modern national culture
that is not Western” (Chatterjee: 217).
Considering this possibility of a "spiritual nationalism", where Egyptian
nationalism failed to unite Egyptians, Coptic nationalism succeeded. The Coptic
revival managed to develop its own nationalism centered on the Church (Van DoornHarder: 23). What started out as a theological-nationalist separation in Chalcedon,
settled in the Ottoman milla and then revived as a national church, cemented into a
religious community during the revival of the 19th and 20th centuries. In Chatterjee's
terms, these individuals can view themselves as a party or nation that Pope
Shenouda III popularized as "EsShaab El Qipty" ("the Coptic people") (El Manawi:
192).
Smith further supports this challenge to Benedict Anderson's theory of secular
nationalism when he maintains that modern communications technology has turned
loyalty away from secular nationalism and back to religious identity. Following Copts
who emigrated because of fear of recent persecution or for better economic
opportunities

(especially

after

President

Nasser's

nationalization

decrees)

(Meinardus: 124), the Coptic Church takes pride in the rapid expansion of Coptic
dioceses overseas (Gabra 2014: 137-139). Outside of the traditional Coptic areas in
Egypt, Sudan and Libya, the largest Coptic diaspora populations are in the United
States, Canada and Australia, followed by smaller communities throughout Europe
and Gulf States (Elsässer: 77). As this study is being written, Coptic Orthodox
Church boasts of having churches in 79 countries around the world in six continents
(Girgis 2016).
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The expansion of overseas dioceses clearly reflects the desire of the church
to minister to its flock abroad to consolidate of church authority, but this was spurred
in recent history by activist tendencies of some diasporic Copts who interfered with
the intentions of church leadership. Using new modes of communication, the Copts
abroad keep alive the memory of a long-lost momentum and of past and current
violence, documenting in detail every incident of what they deem anti-Coptic
behaviour. Through social media, websites and pamphlets, some have taken on a
specific role in defend the Coptic community back in Egypt (Iskander: 110).
The influence of diasporic Copts in Muslim-Christian relations through
lobbying has been a particular matter of concern since the 1970's. Although Coptic
diaspora are not a monolithic block, they have attracted attention back home for
embracing a discourse of persecution, discrimination and human rights (Iskander:
111), in opposition to the national unity discourse that Copts in Egypt have embraced
under the control of the church (Huslman: 27). This was particularly alarming when
independent Coptic publicists demanded representations to the US Congress to
politicize the so-called "Coptic question" by labelling it as persecuted minority in an
Islamic state (Henderson: 157).
In 1981, when President Sadat visited the United States for peace talks with
Israel, he was surprised by protests from Copts affiliated with the American Coptic
Association (ACA). Along with the Canadian Coptic Association, the ACA took out a
full-page advertisement in the Washington Post accusing the President of lacking
"courage in handling the systematic assaults launched by Muslim fanatics against
the Christians of Egypt "(Haddad: 217). While the ACA was not speaking for all
Copts, not even all diasporic Copts,62 their political voice could not be ignored. When
Sadat returned to Egypt, he accused the Pope – whose relationship with Sadat was
already uneasy - of inciting the Coptic community to mobilize against Sadat and
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Two days prior to the ACA advertisement, twenty-six Coptic churches in the United
States and Canada took out their own full-page advertisement saying that the clergy and
congregations of the Coptic Christian Orthodox Church ‘welcome President Sadat to the
United States of America and pray ... for the success of his peace mission for the Middle
East". See "Welcome President Sadat to the United States of America", New York Times, 3
August 1981.
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utilize their political allies in the United States. This intervention and criticism of the
Egyptian government ultimately lead to Shenouda's banishment (Haddad: 209).
After his house arrest and exile, Shenouda would claim that Copts are
thoroughly integrated within the Egyptian state. He defended that the "Copts are no
minority. They do not qualify for the definition of minority. They are not the blacks of
the USA nor the Muslims of Germany. They are part of the texture of society, part of
the history of Egypt" (Smith: 68).
Shenouda specifically rebuked overseas Copts for blaming the Egyptian
government for terrorism and for publishing harmful materials without consulting the
church declaring that those who publish such blasphemous material against the
Egyptian state ”can no longer be identified as Egyptian" (El Banna: 41). Elite Copts,
such as geologist Rushdie Said, also accused the extremism of diasporic Copts as
"harmful to the Copts in Egypt, because it makes the people of Egypt think of us as
disloyal" (Salama 1996). Their sensationalism enabled them to secure the attention
of the international community for the diaspora activists without reflecting the reality
in Egypt, and since they are not under church supervision, they do not suffer the
consequences of their remarks. Furthermore, they cannot accurately describe that
alleged plight given that diaspora Copts often left Egypt due to bitter encounters with
discrimination (Sedra 1999: 229).
From examples like these we can understand why more often than not the
concept of long distance nationalism has a negative connotation. Long-distance
nationalism, according to Anderson, is as a set of identity claims and practices that
connect people living in various geographical locations to a specific territory that they
see as their ancestral home (Anderson 1998: 70). The drawback of diasporas is that
they are considered marginal groups who do not give up easily on matters that are
related to homelands and conflicts and they are usually reluctant to make
concessions for peace (Basser: 6).
Schiller argues that long-distance nationalism does not necessarily refer to
malignant activities (Schiller, 2004: 570). To that end, a great source of pride of the
Coptic Orthodox Church is the active mission that it has developed in Africa, setting
up churches from Sudan to South Africa. According to Karim - the leader of the
missionary youth to South America of St. Mark's Coptic Orthodox Church in the
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northern-Cairene neighbourhood of Heliopolis- the first Coptic Churches were
established in South America since 1991 and regular missions to Bolivia are
scheduled by both US-based Copts and Copts from St. Mark's Church in Heliopolis
to provide social and medical services. Copts in the West have also become
influential in promoting the cultural and academic life of the Copts and have played a
growing role in financing the church in Egypt (Bishara: 23).
Anderson's view on long distance nationalism shows how the "Copticness" of
immigrants is remorseless and unaccountable as it is not attached to a territorial
space (Anderson, 1998:74). These developments illustrate the transnational nature
of "Copticness" where national territorial borders no longer delimit membership in the
nation.

4.3.3 Copticness and Church hierarchy

The number of Christians in Egypt has remained a matter of significant
controversy. Nobody knows exactly how many there are: while official Egyptiangovernment statistics place their proportion at 6 per cent in order to confirm that they
are a relatively marginal minority (Johnstone: 13), and some church sources defend
that they comprise from 15 to 20 per cent of the population (Noumnoum 2012), the
figure accepted by scholars in the field oscillates between 10 to 12 per cent of the
Egyptian population (Meinardus 2010: Sedra 2014). Despite this uncertainty, such
estimations make them the largest Christian minority in the Middle East by sheer
numbers (Rowe: 79). Orthodox Copts are the largest minority in the country and the
region, yet the superlative “largest” implies that they are not the only one.
Again, without accurate numbers,63 there is an acceptance among scholars
that approximately 90 percent of Egypt's Christians consider themselves devotees of
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Religious statistics are notoriously difficult to compile anywhere in the world.
Despite the political challenges mentioned earlier, their collection can be complicated by
loose cultural affiliation; a sense of ‘belonging’ to a religion, personal identification as
religious vis-à-vis institutional records; and different perceptions between believing in the
core tenets of a particular religion or levels of religious practice (whether self-reported or
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the Coptic Orthodox Church (Meinardus 2010: 113). Because Orthodox Copts form
the vast numeric and political majority of the Christian population of Egypt, the Coptic
Orthodox Church has assumed the role of a national Egyptian church, shadowing
out other denominations (Van Doorn-Harder: 23; Smith: 33). The kaleidoscope of
Christian denominations in Egypt includes Eastern Orthodox Churches,64 Latin and
Eastern Catholic Churches, several Protestant denominations and even NonTrinitarian groups (namely, Later Day Saints and Jehova Witnesses) (Meinardus
2010). While most of these began as local branches for immigrants and expats in
Egypt, which do not normally use the term "Coptic" to describe their church, in this
section, I will focus on those two who have done so in the past or still do. This
exploration is particularly relevant as it reflects the power relations between the
Egyptian State, the Coptic Orthodox Church and Catholic Copts in securing a
monopoly of meaning for the former.
Either through its millet-partnership or under the banner of the so-called
"national unity", the Egyptian state has had an important role in defining modern
Coptic identity by recognizing the Coptic Orthodox Church as the central authority to
minister all Egyptian Christians - both inside and outside the community. Indeed,
while in times of stress patriarchs as Shenouda have been accused of "beard-kissing
and forgetting",65 the Egyptian state has also caved in to protecting the monopoly of

observed). See Gorman, Michael (2003). The Enduring Library: Technology, Tradition, and
the Quest for Balance", American Library Association.
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The Eastern Orthodox communion is organized into several regional Churches
unified in theology and worship: including the fifteen autocephalous Churches
of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Georgia, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Serbia,
Russia, Greece, Poland, Romania, Albania, Czech and Slovakia, America and a number of
autonomous Churches. See "Eastern Orthodoxy" Encyclopaedia of World Religions,
Concord Pub., 25 October 2006.
65

Though the Egyptian pope seemed too innovative to some, he also seemed too
conservative to others and many disliked his mild response to allegations of forced
conversions of Christian girls and sectarian violence. So was he blamed by the Muslim
analyst Ahmad al-Aswani. See al-Aswani, Ahmad (June 7, 2008). “It’s ‘Open Season’ on
Egypt’s
Copts,”
MEMRI
Special
Dispatch,
Available
at:
http://www.aafaq.org/masahas.aspx?id_mas=1905
After his house arrest, he rarely challenged the government, preferring to work
behind the scenes, and he upset Muslims and Copts by endorsing Mubarak's candidacy for
re-election as president in 2005. See Joffe, Lawrence (18 March, 2012) "Pope Shenouda III
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Christian representation of the Coptic Orthodox Church when aligned to national
policy.
Since the early years of the Nasser era, it became clear to both Catholic and
Protestant missionaries that their foreignness was a liability as anti-missionary
nationalism gained a significant boost in the region. In 1953, two Lebanese Muslims
- Mustafa Khalidi and Omar Farukh - seeded a postcolonial Arabic genre of Muslim
anti-missionary

treatises

that

portrayed

Christian

missionaries

as

cultural

subversives and political infiltrators (Sharkey 2013:204). Just five years after the
emergence of Israel, one year after the Free Officers coup, and at the dawn of panArab nationalism, resentment against Western intervention in the Middle East was
intense. Their book, titled "Evangelism and imperialism in the Arab world", became a
touchstone for Islamists who argued that Christians in Arabic societies should know
their subordinated status (Scudder: 8). According to Khalidi and Farrukh, these
"latter-day Crusaders" were the most powerful and dangerous agents of Western
imperialism, and mission institutions (schools, hospitals, bookstores, etc.) should be
seen as nothing but tools for Western intervention (Khalidi and Farrukh: 39).
Sharkey (2013) suggests that perhaps the Egyptian government was
responding to Khalidi and Farrukh's call when it announced Law 583 on December 4,
1955 that in Article 1 provided that a private school in Egypt must:
""teach the subject of religion to its Egyptian pupils, each
in accordance with his own religion and following the syllabus
set by the Ministry, and it is not permitted for the school to teach
its pupils any religion other than their own or to have them
participate in the religious exercises of a religion other than their
own, even [if] this is approved by the pupil’s guardian" (Quoted
from Tignor: 114).

Catering to a predominantly Muslim student body, particularly Protestant
missionary schools were pushed to reconsider the basis of their work. E.M. Bailey,
head of the American mission wrote in May 1956 to the minister of education
explaining that it was out of the scope of the American mission (as a Christian

obituary" The Guardian. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/18/popeshenouda-the-third
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organization) to teach Islam in its schools. He asked that the government continue
the earlier policy of allowing Muslim parents to assume responsibility for their
children’s religious education or they would be forced to cut enrolments and only
allow Christians in their schools (Sharkey 2013: 198). The Ministry of Education
replied that it would not allow foreign schools to discriminate against students on
account of their creed (Sharkey 2013: 199). In other words, this meant that the
government would not allow them to deny enrolment to Muslims. Unable to meet the
minimum in all its schools, the American mission would decide to comply to Law 583
but they would still close two of their schools in Port Suez and Ismailiyya
(Tignor:114).
The processes of nationalization that prompted the Suez Crisis had farreaching consequences for Christian missions and churches as well. The initial
nationalization of many British, French, and Jewish assets into "Egyptianized" ones
(massarat) prompted the exodus of Jews (again), Greeks, Italians, and members of
other jattyat (expatriate communities) who did not claim Egyptian nationality (Tignor:
116). After Britain, France, and Israel launched their Tripartite Aggression in late
October 1956, the ground shifted even more. Many Catholic schools were
associated by the Egyptian government with France as they either had French
teachers or taught in French (Sharkey 2013: 201). Thus, all Catholic schools that did
not operate under Vatican auspices were nationalized, Britons were deported, their
bank accounts frozen and the few remaining British missionaries had to turn to the
Americans for loans so that they could buy airplane tickets and leave (Sharkey 2013:
203).
Whereas some scholars believe that converts should be identified as part of
the broader Catholic or Protestant denomination rather than as Copts (Shatzmiller
2007: 12), further State reforms pressured Egyptian Protestants to take a stance.
Targeting foreign schools, the Egyptian government announced another law— Law
160 of 1953 —that stipulated that the directors of all schools in Egypt had to be
Egyptians. Although it was not actually implemented until 1962 (Tignor: 120), the
American mission transferred all of its remaining schools to the authority of the
Evangelical Church of Egypt. Partly for the sake of political expediency, Protestant
missionaries began to give full credit to Egyptian Evangelicals (Sharkey 2013: 206)
writing themselves out of the record to some degree. It is in this post-Suez period
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where the historic role of foreign missionaries (both Protestant and Catholic) became
harder to trace.
As missionaries stepped out from the spotlight, the Evangelical Church of
Egypt and other independent Protestant churches in the Middle East assumed an
increasingly prominent role. This would translate in the ability of local converts to
make decisions themselves while easing the Evangelical Church's relations with the
government.
Accommodating to the mood of the time, Evangelical leaders christened this
church as the "Coptic Evangelical Church in the Nile Valley". Their insertion of the
adjective "'Coptic"' was a plea for indigenousness and an attempt to distance
themselves from the foreign mission that had fostered it (Sharkey 2008: 204).
Henceforth, the Evangelicals became the only Protestant community in Egypt to
include the word" ‘Coptic" in their church (Sharkey 2013: 81). Nonetheless, in
practice, this adjective was counter-productive to this Church as it implied a closer
identification with Coptic Orthodoxy, which they were not looking for (Huslman: 108).
In an attempt to distance itself from the Coptic Orthodox, in 2004 the church rechristened itself as the “Evangelical Presbyterian Church of Egypt” (Sharkey 2013:
82).
In just 53 years, the term “Copt” for Evangelicals went from being a statement
of indigenousness to an unwelcomed association to an institution that they
considered mislead. In contrast, Catholic Copts had claimed the title of "Copts" since
the institution of this church in 1741 (q.v. Chapter 2.3.1) and continue to do so today.
Besides this State-sponsored exclusivity, the Coptic Orthodox Church has
been the obvious and most important definer of what "Copticness" does and does
not entail. Despite the deployment of the national unity narrative at key moments to
shut down debate about contentious issues, framing Coptic identity in ethno-religious
terms has become increasingly dominant with the Coptic community. Orthodox
Copts consider themselves to be the inheritors of ancient Egyptian civilization
(Rowe: 96). Copts have also defined their community in exclusive terms, drawing on
a narrative of the miracle of the survival of the Coptic Church and distancing
themselves from the Muslim environment through specific traditions, rituals, and
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liturgies (Botros 2006: 195). In this process, they have also distanced themselves
from non-Orthodox Christians.
Copts define themselves insisting that their Christianity is the true Christianity
and retain pride in their distinctiveness vis-a-vis other Christians. They trace their
Christianity back to St. Mark through an unbroken chain of 118 Patriarchs (Joffe
2012) clinging to what they consider as “original Christianity” (Meinardus 2010: 28).
The fact that Egypt was a major centre for the development of early Christianity, the
influential writings of the Desert Fathers, a large mythology of miracles and
apparitions, numerous Egyptian saints and distinctive art, provide Copts with a rich
heritage (q.v. Chapter 4.2) that builds a sense belonging to a blessed and ancient
community that has been pivotal to the development and spread of the Christian
faith.
According to Edward Wakin, Copts disliked being labelled "Christians" on
their identity cards because it lumped them together with other Christians and
blurred their identity (Walkin: 52). This separation was also perceived in the agitated
warning of a Coptic Catholic nun that explained to me during a bus ride:
"The Orthodox are so proud of being Copts that if they
have to imagine their daughters married outside their people,
they prefer to marry them to Muslims than people of our Church
[Coptic Catholics] … even if their husbands can divorce them
[their daughters] and then leave them, even if they are not
allowed to teach their children how to pray to the Virgin or
believe in Christ!".

Even though there are no distinct ethnic traits to separate Catholics and
Protestant Egyptians from other co-nationals, Mariam, a green-eyed, tan-skinned
Catholic volunteer in her early twenties would make fun of how – despite the
commonness of her phenotype in Minya- she would still over-hear the wife of her
doorman call her and her friends from church foreigners:
"All my family is from Minya and I never left the country.
I do not look different from people here but Hoda [the doorman's
wife, who happens to be Muslim], because she knows we go to
a different church than tant Mervat ["aunt Mervat", another

88

neighbor of the same building who is Orthodox] she laughs and
tells her sister we are "khawaga".66

Mariam emphasized, however, that the comment is probably also prompted
by the financial status of her family rather than her actual religious affiliation:
"One time we [Mariam and her family] were in a
resort in Hurghada [a beach in the Red Sea] and a random lady
selling baskets also called my family like that [khawaga/
foreigners]; maybe it was that she was angry because she
wanted us to buy something from her".

These discourses of Christian authenticity tied with Copticness and Egyptian
indigineity seem to reach both urban and even diasporic Copts. Such was echoed in
a session of the "Coptic Discovery Community" (CDC) at the American University in
Cairo while I was preparing this study. Andrew, an American student whose Coptic
mother had married an a non-religious American, had seized the opportunity to
obtain his master's degree at AUC, rediscover his Coptic heritage and resuscitate a
Coptic student group along the way. Unlike the Prophet Daniel's Assembly (PDA) an unofficial student group at AUC representing the church and which admission is
purely Coptic Orthodox - CDC intended "to cater to insiders and outsiders" affirmed
Andrew, "teaching Coptic language, organizing trips and conferences to spread
awareness on Coptic identity". Nonetheless, when asked about non-Orthodox Copts
(Catholic and Protestant) in one of his presentations on Coptic Diaspora, Andrew
was unreserved in saying that:
"I don't know them but I can say that those are not real
Copts. They are just people that like to make friends with
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The official word for foreigner in Arabic is "ajnabi" (Egyptian: "agnabi") but the
colloquial "khawaga" carries distinct connotations, at times even pejorative ones. It is
originally a Persian origin that meant “master” (as in master of slaves), thus, there is a
distinct amount of respect and envy mixed in it.
As the columnist Salama Ahmed points out, Egyptians’ relationship with foreigners is
a complicated affair. Being both rich and clueless, both a sense of superiority and inferiority
are paradoxically expressed -often at the same time- in what he coins “the khawaga
complex”. See El Amrani, Issandr (March 30, 2011). "The khawaga’s lament" Egypt
Independent.
Available
at:
http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/khawaga%E2%80%99s-lament
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foreigners and agree to what they say so they can get jobs or
get better treatment in their schools; they are not really related
to this presentation."

As innocent and inconsequential as Andrew's response could have been, the
dangers underlying ideas of indigineity and distinction made among Egyptian citizens
on the basis of religious belonging were dramatically manifested during a period of
heightened tension in Egypt. With the precedent of the "Camilia Shehata Zakher
Affair,"67 and the capture of the "Coptic Arms Ship" on September 2010,
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second highest-ranking official in the Coptic Orthodox Church, Anba Bishoy, stated
in an interview with the newspaper Masr Elyoum that “Muslims are only guests" of
the Copts who are the original inhabitants of Egypt (Hulsman 2010). Besides
claiming that Quranic verses disputing the divine nature of Jesus Christ were
inserted by one of the Prophet's successors after his death (Cesari 2014: 90), his
assertion provoked a heated exchange across different media channels and even
demonstrations. The Pope's apology came a day after Al-Azhar criticized the bishop
for provoking sectarian tension and, in his attempt to mediate the situation, he
countered by saying that in fact Copts are the guests of Muslims because Egypt is a
Muslim majority country (Cesari 2014: 92).
Statements such as those of Anba Bishoy and Andrew are ironic when
considering that all surviving (mainstream) religious discourses in Egypt are imports;
be it be Islam or any type of Christianity. The early Church that established in Egypt
was part of what is now known as the Greek Orthodox Church (Armanios 2011: 26).
Egyptian names do not begin to appear in the lists of bishops of the Church in Egypt
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The "Camilia Shehata Zakher Affair" was a public scandal that took place in July
2010 when Coptic activists speculated that the wife of a prominent bishop had been
kidnapped. Upon her appearance, Islamists alleged that Camilia, on disappearance,
converted to Islam and that, upon reappearance, she was forced back to Christianity. See
Cesari, Jocelyne (2014). The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity, and the
State", Cambridge University Press, p. 74-78.
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On August 16, 2010, the Egyptian media reported the capture of a ship loaded with
explosives that arrived to Egypt from Israel and was owned by the Coptic Church raising
suspicion on them. Reported by Al-Shurouq (Egypt), August 16, 2010; AlMisriyyoun (Egypt), August 17, 2010. See Cesari 2014: 80.
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until the late second century because many Egyptians considered the early church
establishment as foreign, as part of the Byzantine Empire (Tellyrides: 14). Thus, the
acceptance of church authority was a gradual process and the merging of Egyptian
and Hellenic culture through the Christian faith also took at least a couple more
centuries to consolidate into a national church (Tagher: 1). Inspite of that, Anba
Bishoy's imprudent blunder illustrated quite dramatically how the sentiment of
authenticity and indigeneity remains among Coptic Orthodox Christians and that
other communities in Egypt- Catholic, Protestant or even Muslim - cannot claim.
Given that they claim to be indigenous Egyptians, one would be tempted to
say that membership to their community is automatically inherited by birth. Their
names (despite several exceptions of neutral names that can be either Muslims or
Christian), their label on their national ID cards and their tattoos on their wrists
(mostly applied from an early age) are birthmarks that make it seem as though one is
born into the church, more than it is a religion one adopts by choice. Both sanctioned
by the state69 and the community, Copticness would seem to be constructed by
kinship, blood, and communal practices as much as (if not more than) it is a matter
of doctrine.
Nonetheless, in the villages surrounding the JBAD - as elsewhere in Egypt
where different denominations of Christians interact as a result of missionary work -
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Though religion is no longer written on Egyptian passports, including that trait on
Egyptian identification cards has triggered controversy since the 90s. Among the Egyptians
who did not identify themselves as Muslim, Christian, or Jewish on government identity
documents, the most affected were Bahá'ís. Unless they lied about their religion, which
conflicted with Bahá'í religious principle, they were unable to obtain the necessary
government documents beginning with birth certificates, identification cards, passports,
death, marriage or divorce certificates, or passports, and were therefore unable to be
employed, educated, treated in hospitals, vote, among other rights to which properly
identified citizens are entitled to.
As of August, 2009, the situation was pacified yet not resolved. Identification
documents may now list a dash in place of one of the three recognized religions (Islam,
Christianity, and Judaism). The first identification cards were issued to two Bahá'ís under
the new policy on August 8, 2009 allowing them to exercise legal personality, yet this blank
entry on the cards of all Egyptians continues to carry privacy issues to disclosing one's faith.
See Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (2006-12-16). "Government Must Find Solution
for
Baha'i
Egyptians".
Available
at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20070209221817/http:/www.eipr.org/en/press/06/1612.htm and
Human Rights Watch (November 11, 2007)“Prohibited Identities: State Interference with
Religious Freedom," Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/11/11/prohibitedidentities/state-interference-religious-freedom
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the Greek meaning of the word "Copt" has been transformed for practical terms in
everyday parlance not to mean Egyptian, nor Christian; but "Orthodox".

"The

wedding was a'and (at the prescence/the place of) el Catholik"; "El igtima'a (the
meeting/lecture/Bible study session) will take place a'and el Brotestaant"; "The
prayer was a'and el Aqbat (at the prescence of/with the Copts)". However, it is
important to clarify that staff, beneficiaries and neighbors were only open to make
distinctions when taking about locations, not people. As Justina, an Orthodox
assistant teacher of the vocational training program for youth with mental disabilities,
proudly remarked in one of our conversations, "we are all one church, under Christ
Our Lord, we don't make those differentiations here [at the JBAD] of who is Catholic
or Orthodox".
The next chapter (5.2) will explore the ceremonial or community environments
where Catholic Copts are eager to label themselves as Copts as well. Yet beyond
the borders of their community, among the three main denominations of Christians in
Minya, "qibty" (Coptic) has been reconstructed to refer to those which profess their
loyalty to the Coptic Orthodox Church only. In Anderson (1998)'s terms, the “Coptic
imagined community” is not centered on ethnic traits nor a territorial attachment (that
would be common to any other Christian Egyptians), but this "Copticness" is defined
to the degree that one is affiliated to the church itself and its representation by
clerical hierarchy. El-Khawaga describes this as a “retotalization of meaning” (El
Khawaga: 182), through which adherence to a church becomes a complete source
of identity. In other words, the monopoly of the Coptic Orthodox Church over Coptic
identity has created a vacuum where only Coptic Orthodox Copts are "Copts" and
Catholic Copts are not.

4.3.4 The boundaries of Copticness

While boundaries play a determining role in the sustainability of politics of
belonging of a community (Barth: 17), these boundaries are also constructed and
deconstructed by discourses of belonging that are not necessarily fixed. Thus, it is
not possible to define Copticness by exclusion as the boundaries that separate what
is Coptic and what is not are not as evident as they would seem to be. Conversion
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and nominal adscription are the two most evident phenomena in my fieldwork that
exposed how ambivalent and ambiguous overlapping interpretations of elements of
ethnicity, national identity, loyalty and religion contest such boundaries.
While conversions in and out of the Coptic Orthodox Church are not unheard
of, the most noticeable conversions seem to be related to questions of marriage and
divorce as they affect more than one party. Copticness must be adopted by those
marrying a Copt as the Church does not admit mixed marriages (Meinardus 2010:
58, cf. Chapter 5.1.1), while renouncing to such identity has been resorted to by
those who wish to divorce from a Coptic marriage (Khalil 2011). Since Pope
Shenouda III's assumption of the papacy in the early 1970's, the grounds for Coptic
divorce have tightened.70 As there is no civil marriage in Egypt and the government
recognizes the authority of religious institutions to regulate matters of personal
status, conversions out of the Coptic Orthodox Church to Islam and other
denominations are the solution to those wishing to escape an irremediable marriage
and remarry (Khalil 2011).
Whereas a conversion to Islam mostly ceases self-identification as a Copt
(Khalil 2011), Copts who convert to other branches of Christianity tend to retain an
ambiguous allegiance to their original identity. Despite his family's objections and his
own heavy critiques of clergy, Ibrahim (my Catholic convert host who I introduced at
the beginning of this chapter), continued to sympathized with his Coptic roots by
singing taranim (Coptic hymns) to his toddler, Nader; by naming his daughter after a
Coptic saint he venerated (St. Marina the Monk/ of Alexandria) and occasionally

70

Not so long ago, the Coptic Church had a more relaxed stance regarding divorce.
The 1938 personal status code bylaws provided nine grounds for divorce and
remarriage, including: adultery; absence of a spouse for five years without any news of him
or her, or if the wife went missing; if one spouse was a threat to the other; mental illness,
infection with contagious diseases, impotence of the husband; imprisonment for seven
years, taking religious vows; and in the event either member of the couple decided to
renounce Christianity.
In June 2008, the 1938 Personal Status Regulations for the Coptic Orthodox Church
in Egypt were amended to limit the grounds for divorce only to adultery and change of
religion. This revision followed a ruling of the State Council requiring Pope Shenouda III to
grant a divorced Orthodox Copt a license to remarry. The amendments ended a longstanding conflict between the Egyptian national courts and the Coptic Orthodox Church
regarding the effects of judicial divorce: prior to the revision, thousands of couples divorced
before the courts were considered by the Church to be still married. See Rowberry, Ryan
and Khalil, John (2010).
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attending both Orthodox and Catholic liturgies upon his wife's request or for
particular celebrations that presented an opportunity to socialize.
Unlike Ibrahim's "Copticness" that was challenged for stepping outside the
Church, his wife's youngest brother (and brother-in-law), Ayad could go by not
fasting, staying home to chat on Facebook while the family celebrated the Easter
liturgy. He could get away with not joining family prayers as long as his loyalty to the
hierarchy and leadership of the church was not contested. Despite Ayad's general
apathy to the Church, his adscriptive nominalism, was still convenient at times. As
the 23 year-old explained, keeping such linkage particularly opened the pool of
bachelorettes from him to choose when he graduated from the Faculty of Agriculture
and wanted to marry or find jobs. In this sense, the community as a whole is the
bearer of the faith, and not everyone is expected to evidence the same level of
spiritual devotion. Religiously non-practicing members of the community are thus still
seen (and they typically see themselves), as full members of the community as long
as they still confess a nominal loyalty to church hierarchy.
Either of these cases illustrates that "Copticness" is an elastic and
constructed term that circles under loyalty to the hierarchy and leadership of the
church itself and this identity is later channeled into a communal consciousness.
At the same time, it cannot simply be assumed that relations of inclusion and
exclusion are a one-way construction that is shaped only by the majority or the
dominant group seeking to enclose an "other" within a certain category. While the
meaning of "Copt" has been (re)constructed, appropriated and negotiated, Copts
that do not profess this loyalty to the Coptic Orthodox Church (i.e. Catholic Copts)
have also struggled to distinguish their church from their foreign missionary heritage
to claim a shared heritage as Copts.

4.4

The other side of Coptic Identity Politics

In the 90s, with a resurgent Islamism visible in public spaces and concern
about Islamist violence, the question of Coptic status within Egyptian society was
again a contentious topic. A proposed conference to be held in Cairo in 1994 entitled
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“The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Minorities and People of the Arab
World and the Middle East” received a strong public reaction for including the Copts
on the agenda. A number of key figures, including Pope Shenouda III, condemned
the designation of Copts as a minority. In a press release he wrote:
"We do not accept being distinguished from other
Egyptians. We do not accept the word 'minority' in the meaning
of claiming political rights or foreign help. We are Egyptians,
part of Egypt, of the same nation" (Meinardus 2004, 85; see
also Makari 2007).

Arguing that religious affiliation was not a relevant way to divide the nation, he
pointed out that the term minority in Arabic (aqalliyya) can be interpreted to imply
lesser status rather than numerically smaller, and therefore imply a particular power
relationship rather than demographic reality (Sedra 1999: 221). In this discourse,
Orthodox Copts and Muslims have been historically united, particularly against
foreign (i.e. Western) invaders such as the Byzantine Empire, the Crusaders, the
French, the British and the Israelis. This strand has been fed by ideologies such as
Political Pharaonism (or Egyptianism) that, as mentioned earlier, tried to rally all
segments of Egyptian society, Muslims and Copts, to the ideal of an independent,
more or less secular nation state Egypt.
To assume that Copts are a minority, therefore, as was the case for
Shenouda, represented a threat not only to an official national unity narrative, but to
core pillars defining Copticness. Coptic identity, from this perspective, claims that
sameness and difference are simultaneous constructions and closely interconnected
with the development of a modern Egyptian national state. By claiming sameness,
the Coptic Orthodox Church is contesting the constructions of otherness. Yet the
difference in faith is equally important for the Coptic Orthodox Church in order for it
to defend and promote its Christian identity vis-á-vis the Muslim majority and NonOrthodox Egyptian Christians.
For Catholic Copts such as Angie, a youth missionary and student at the
JBAD, this juggling of sameness an otherness leads her privilege her civil
identification over a religious one without being mutually exclusive. While a group of
children who were waiting for their parents to pick them up repeated (in an abusive
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manner) on their cellphones "Boshra El Kheir"71 at the front stairs of the JBAD, we
discussed what being Egyptian meant to her:
"I am a Copt. Christianity is my faith. But Coptic means
'Egyptian', not Orthodox. Overall, I am Egyptian like any other
Muslim, Orthodox or Protestant".

Additionally when questioned whether or not they consider themselves a
minority, all Catholic Coptic participants during my fieldwork would not hesitate to
point out both their numerical and political disadvantages:
"it is not like I will ever get to be president of
Egypt…even if I tried, it is not like Egyptians would trust a
woman or a Catholic but that doesn't mean I can't have a good
life".

Baher (another youth missionary who we will return to in the next chapter),
that was overhearing our conversation and was staggered by Anige's comment
jumped in the conversation:
"I cannot separate being a Copt or being Catholic or
being Egyptian. I do not need to explain to the Copts [Orthodox]
that I am also a Copt. I am a Copt because we have a rich
history and culture that is tied to Egypt, not because I follow
Pope Tadros or fast nine hours before communion. 72 Of course,
there are many people that will label you like something weird
because of all the rivalry between denominations but there are
also people who understand that we are sister churches.
Anyway, if you will not become president ya sity (lit. "mylady",
used to show both respect and humor simultaneously) [He
looks at Angie in a playful way] it is because you cannott even
finish school!" [Angie rolls her eyes].

71

Lit. "Good tidings", this song was particularly moving for some Egyptians not only
for its catchy beat and mentioning of many Egyptian cities but because it was released
during the spring of 2014, in the dawn of the presidential election that took Gral. Abel Fatah
El Sisi to office.
72

Since Orthodox Copts need to fast nine hours before taking communion, services
including communion are mostly held in the early morning (to count the hours as people
sleep). Catholics only fast one hour before communion and thus, services with communion
are held at any time during the day.
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In this line, Catholic Copts must negotiate Copticness and Egyptianess that is
questioned despite their strong adherence to a heritage which knows not of
denominational borders but is ultimately Coptic and Egyptian.
Ultimately, the negotiation of identity that was described in this chapter is
translated into political and social ramifications (as elaborated in the next chapter.
Unlike Catholic Copts, the question for Orthodox Copts is not so much that of identity
but of the status and power relationships derived from their identity. As articulated by
Ortner (2006), Orthodox Copts as a majority within a minority "have their own
politics" (2006, 46). To the inside, this politics was institutionalized as Coptic reform
and Coptic nationalism. To the outside, this was systematized as the millet
partnership. In any event, the identity politics of the Copts which called them into a
simultaneous process of insistence and resistance to other national groups has
complicated the classification of Egyptian minorities.
Van Doorn-Harder rejects that the Coptic revival has created a separation
among Copts and other Egyptians. She argues just the opposite. Utilizing Anthony
D. Smith's theory of "ethnic survival potential," outlined in National Identity (1991),
she maintains that the Church's revival has brought about various projects that
strengthened inter-communal relations between the Copts and Muslims (Van DoornHarder: 128). Still, Gamal, a Muslim teacher for the Liberal Studies Program at the
JBAD,73 pointed out that Copts’ strong attachment to the church, he believes "hurts
the concept of citizenship and even promotes antagonism towards Non-Copts."
Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. would agree with Gamal when discussing
identity politics in his book "The Disuniting of America" (1991). In his view, basing
politics on group marginalization fractures the civil polity, and therefore works against
creating real opportunities for ending marginalization (Schlesinger: 51). The rejection
of the Coptic Orthodox Church to be labelled as a minority has therefore left players
outside this equation. It has outcasted groups such as Catholic Copts, to continue to

73

Despite running a primary and preparatory school founded in 1889, the JBA is
aware that education does not end at school and a program of Liberal Studies is offered for
alumni and university students. Organized in different fields that range between civil and
social issues and leadership trainings, these workshops are organized to allow future
generations to stay updated, as well as having access to their library.
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constitute what Bengio and Ben Dor (1999)'s define as a "diffuse minority", who have
no strong regional base or access to the centers of power (Bengio: 28).
In the discourse concerning the social and political marginalization of the
Egyptian Christians, there is a widespread assumption that a secular, liberal
Egyptian state is the only type of state that will respect Coptic interests and promote
democracy and equality. However, the dominant Coptic Orthodox Church has
continued to exhibit traditional attitudes towards pivotal issues such as personal
status law and State-Church relations, suggesting that the type of secularism
supported by Copts is complex and distinctive from secularism in a Western context.
Most importantly, this bid for equality is also different to the Western
democratic value in that it assumes a de facto uncontested privilege alliance with the
state vis-á-vis other minorities, rather than promoting secular citizenship as a
collective entitlement. While the advent of the notion of citizenship threatened the
control, security and stability that the millet system had afforded the Patriarch, the
apparent unity of Christians in Egypt under the banner of the Coptic Orthodox
Church has managed to perpetuate the ambiguous political situation of nonOrthodox minorities in Egypt.
Just as the insolent Coptic Jesuit priest in Wakin's anecdote (refer to the
opening quote of this chapter), the imprudent existence of non-Coptic Orthodox
minorities in Egypt is still (half a century after the Suez crisis) an uncomfortable
reminder of the vacuums constructing Egyptian identity based on a dichotomy and
the denial ambivalent subscription to a minority status. This reminder is
uncomfortable not only because Orthodox Copts are not the only kind of Copts, but
because this strategy of rejecting the label of minority simultaneously rejects the
implication that religious affiliation affects the relationship between citizens. Such
fallacy keeps on inhibiting and denying other alternatives for more inclusive
citizenship.
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5. “Numin bikanisa wahda” (We believe in one Church): the dispute
for "Copticness".

A normal workday at the JBA starts with mass in a small room at the rooftop
of the headquarters’ building. Yes, we must remove our shoes as we anticipate the
liturgy and step on a holly place as would be expected in Oriental rites and churches.
Yes, the Byzantine style Prosfora bread is set on the table as it is natural for Oriental
churches74. Yes, the walls of this room are decorated with traditional Coptic icons,
written (as they are considered to be a visual gospel) in their backgrounds of gold
and portraying images such as Mar Girgis (Saint George, just like in Mr. Emad's
living room q.v. Chapter 3) and the Virgin Mary. As the clock reaches 8 am,
employees – both Catholic and Orthodox - begin to claim an individual cushioned
square to sit on over the carpet of this rooftop chapel.
Yet this is not an ordinary Catholic Coptic mass. There is no iconostas
hiding the mystery of consecration. The blue-eyed Dutch priest, who was ordained in
Maadi more than 20 years ago and is more Egyptian now than foul and tameya,75
starts the ceremony in flawless Arabic; no, not in the Latin rite (as it would be logical
since the father is European) but in the Coptic rite.
The majority of the attendees are much more than that, despite being women.
These are not the shy Coptic ladies from the villages around that veil their heads
while listening to the liturgy and their boldness does not stop in their naked hair.
Unlike pretty much any of their Oriental (whether Orthodox or Catholic) gender-

74

The Eastern tradition likens yeast in bread to the soul in the body. The soul gives
life, and therefore the "living bread" of the Eucharist must have yeast.
The West uses unleavened bread because that is what Jesus used in the Last
Supper. There was no leavened bread around at the time of the Last Supper/Passover, plus,
the fact that all leavened bread would have been destroyed, locked away, or given to
Gentiles the day before Passover, as per Jewish religious practice.
Roman-rite Catholics are not permitted to use leavened bread (Code of Canon Law
926) as the Church desires uniformity to show that the sacrifice of the Mass is the same
sacrifice everywhere. Eastern-rite churches in communion with Rome are allowed to retain
their own tradition of using leavened bread as the Council of Florence approved the use of
either kind of bread in 1439 for Catholics of Eastern background. See Runciman, 1955
(Chapter
2
bibliography).
75

Beans and Egyptian falafel, which are staple foods of Egyptian breakfasts.
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peers, these women participate actively in the organization of the mass to the point
of even reading liturgy or leading hymns (a role reserved to male deacons, par
excellence).
Reading the astonishment in my face, my informant explains to me that the
private and very cozy nature of this mass (which is only for JBAD staff) allows
bending the orthodoxy of liturgical rituals to some degree. Nonetheless, the
naturalization and routine of this practice is the beginning of a much larger image. At
the peak of the celebration, the breaking of the bread among a larger number of
Orthodox attendees compared to the couple of Catholic parishioners, along with their
Catholic hosts and employers, is an everyday practice that forgets the historical
wounds and rivalry between these two sisterly churches.
Outside from this rooftop chapel, this chapter will exemplify how sectarian
lines between Christians, particularly Catholic and Orthodox, are both practiced,
contradicted and denied in the community surround the JBAD. It also aims to
highlight how despite the completely unsymmetrical power relationships that these
two minorities have vis-avis the state (q.v. Chapter 4.1), the almost identical cultural
identity that all Copts (Catholic and Orthodox) share hints that these two
communities are much closer than they are willing to accept.
Of course, not all of their 190 employees and volunteers of the JBAD wake up
early for this event. Yet what matter is that every day, between those four walls and
before any other order of the day, the practice of praying together, sharing the bread
together, and remembering one God before resorting to difference, creates a microsociety in the JBAD that makes sense of the oath they repeat every mass: “Numin
bikanisa wahida”, “we believe in one Church”.

5.1 Wounds inside the Church

Not 30 km down South of the JBAD, an Egyptian Evangelical couple in the
village of Atlidam experienced more than they had ever expected during the last
weekend of January 2016. Their promise to be together "until death do part" them
was a short-lived one once a gas leakage killed them both on their wedding night
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while sleeping in their new home. As their local pastor was on vacation, the
distressed wedding guests (now funeral guests) moved to the neighboring Coptic
Orthodox Church. The church opened its doors to receive the large crowd of
desolated mourners; however, they were further vexed by the reaction of the local
Orthodox priests who refused to pray over the deceased bodies.
Despite the fact that the international press was notoriously silent on the
matter,76 Egyptians through social and national traditional media77 attacked the
Coptic Orthodox Church accusing it of sectarianism and hatred for other Christians.
A local mosque even offered the funeral to be moved to their venue 78 ignoring that
the Coptic Orthodox Church –like any religious institution- has internal rules and
traditions.
Such was the pressure that even the Pope (through the official spokesman of
the Coptic Orthodox Church) and the local bishops released a statement the day
after on their website explaining that that decision was beyond the internal rules of
Church and insisting was disrespectful the own will of the deceased (The Coptic
News 2016). The Church argued that while the doctrine of the Church does not
allow them to pray for non-Orthodox who are dead, the request of the mourning
families was opposite to their own tenants as Protestants do not believe in the rituals
of the Church. The raising of incense, their rejection of the priesthood and the fact
that Protestants do not believe in the usefulness of prayer for the dead in the first
place were an apparent contradiction. Furthermore, the statement stressed that
introducing a deceased person against his/her will in a church that he/she had
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I was not able to find reliable sources in English covering this tragedy.
See Aalam, Sarah. "Alttayifat al'iinjiiyya: rafad "alUrthodks" alssalat alaa mutain bil
Minya karithat 'iinsaniyya" ("Anglican Communion: the rejection of Orthodox prayer for our
deceased in Minya is a humanitarian disaster") El Youm Es Sabaa (January 28, 2016),
Available at: http://www.youm7.com/2559087; or Aadel, Michael.(Jan. 26, 2016) " Alkanisat
al'Urthudhuksiat bel Minya tarfud alssalat alaa jththamayn arousein Brotestant" ("Orthodox
Church to in Minya refuses to pray on the bodies two Protestant newlyweds"),Al Bawabh
News. Available at: http://www.albawabhnews.com/1738465
77

78

Khalil, Emad (Jan, 27, 2016) Kinisa Urthoduksiyya bel Minya tarfud asSala alaa
mutawaffin "Brotestant" ("Orthodox church in Minya reject prayers for the deceased
«Protestant»") El
Masry
El
youm.
Available
at:
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/882085
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openly rejected during life was unacceptable. The statement added that the prayers
could have also been held in the Church of the bride's hometown village in Samalout
(50 km from the incident) as it is traditional to pray for every person in the church that
they normally attended and which is of the same denomination as the couple.
Nonetheless, the Church offered her sincere condolences to the family of the dead
couple and continued to offer to receive them in the hall of the Church (Coptic News,
2016).
Neseem, an Evangelical English teacher at the JBAD, was the first of
my contacts to share the news on Facebook complaining:
"They just ignore the feelings of those who are suffering
with the excuse of their rite? Where is the Christian love you
teach people? God have mercy on our sister and brother and
shame on you!"

While the solidarity of other Protestant contacts was understandable, my later
survey on Catholic reactions to the event presented an opportunity to bring out their
own claims. Ibrahim (my Catholic convert host during Easter) insisted that the
Orthodox Church in the village where they married should have held their funeral:
"In reality, funerals are not for the dead, they are for the
living family members who are suffering. Even an "Abana
Elazzi" ("The Lord's Prayer") would have helped… We all pray it
in common in all denominations –Orthodox, Catholics,
Protestants too! It is in the Bible! If they really wanted to help,
they would have made it possible…They just really didn't want
to help because they are closed-minded".

The incident further reveals that Justina's comment about inter-Christian
sectarianism (q.v. Chapter 4.4.3) was either contextualized for the JBAD or a
symptom of denial. If sectarian clashes between Muslims and Christians are
sensationalized, sectarian issues among Egyptian Christians are contingent to both
relations of power based on denomination and also on the historic and theological
wounds that linger.
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Although this is an individual incident, it can be further understood by recalling
that the relations between the Coptic Orthodox Church and different Protestant
groups in Egypt have by no means been fully amicable. Since 1854, the American
Presbyterian church sent their first missionaries to Egypt but their educational
activities and open proselytism soon developed into rivalry with Christian
denominations that (Sharkey 2013: 12). The pope of the time, Pope Demetrius II
(1862-1870), focused his efforts on soliciting support from Egyptian authorities to
expel the foreign missionaries and called for the public burning of books distributed
by these Presbyterian missionaries (Atiya: 51). Two centuries later, in the late 90s,
Pope Shenouda III also campaigned heavily against Protestant and non-Trinitarian
groups. Conferences on Coptic Orthodox apologetics, increasing the availability of
revised books in Coptic Orthodox Churches, strengthening pastoral care in slums,
spreading warnings on deceiving attitudes of proselytizers, advising the Orthodox
against joining activities in joint cooperation with Protestants and Catholics (since
these were used for proselytism), prohibiting Protestant choirs in Orthodox churches,
and withdrawing from participating in Sat 7 satellite station, were some of the
measures that the Pope deployed to protect his flock from Protestants (Husulman:
81-83).
In this sense, the Coptic Orthodox Church rejected a unity based on sympathy
arguing that “God is not only love but the truth” (Secretariat 2011). These efforts to
segregate the flock from the "wolves" (Sharkey 2013: 57) resulted in preventing
dialogue between Orthodox and other Christian denominations in Egypt.

5.2 Coptic sectarianism: Catholic-Orthodox othering.

The political pact that was described in the previous chapter (q.v. Chapter 4.2)
has a major flaw: it promotes national unity while assuming church unity…something
that is still very far from being a reality. Indubitably, the most effective and intense
ecumenical dialogue that Orthodox Copts have held is with the Roman Catholic
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Church79 due to the high similarities, believes and common ancestry that they
share.80 Nevertheless, these differences are negotiated differently on the ground
particularly with Catholic Copts. This section will explore how both Orthodox and
Catholic Copts interacting with the JBAD negotiate sectarian differences in their
everyday lives.
In addition to theological arguments,81 the impasse in the road to full
communion between Catholics and Oriental Orthodox has been accentuated in
Egypt (as in other countries where Eastern Catholic/ Unite Churches were
established) by the rivalry generated by missionary work (Rowe 2014: 12). As my
main informant proudly affirmed, several positive outcomes of the race and the
influence prompted by both Catholic and Protestant missionary work reached the
church from its cores. The Coptic Orthodox Sunday School Movement and the
development of its own entrepreneurial interest in providing basic social services the
community (such as clinics and social centers) were positive outcomes in the
Orthodox Church. In the particular case of the JBAD, even a welfare center for the
disabled in the village of Deir Barsha was established with the exact model of the
school for youth with disabilities of the JBAD and they even received technical
support from the JBAD.

79

By the end of 20th century, the 5th century Chalcedonian schism (q.v. Chapter
2.3.1) was not seen with the same importance. As a result of five Pro Oriente meetings held
in Vienna between theologians of the Catholic Church and those of the Oriental Orthodox
Churches, both churches arrived to an agreement on the 12th of February 1988,
expressing a common formula regarding the nature of Christ concluding the theological
clash that separated Alexandria from the the rest of Christiandom in Chalcedon (Radano:
305).
80

Both have valid 7 sacraments, valid Apostolic Succession, valid Holy Orders, both
revere and pray to the Virgin Mary as Theotokos (Mother of God), they pray to the saints,
they pray for the faithful departed, both believe in the Real Presence of Christ’s Body, Blood,
Soul, and Divinity in the Eucharist and both call their lead Patriarch by the title of “Pope,”
(Greek "pappas", meaning “daddy”), in addition to sharing four centuries and a half of
common history See Meyendorff, cf. Chapter 3.3 A Church of Many Nations.
81

Pope Shenouda III in particular, emphasized that Christian unity must be founded
upon a unity of faith and not upon a unity of jurisdiction (Husulman 2012). Despite the
Christological success of the Pro Oriente talks between the See of Alexandria and the See
of Rome, no agreement has been reached on theological aspects such as the purgatory, the
immaculate conception of the Holy Virgin, the salvation of non-believers and the precedence
of the Holy Spirit See Attia: 229.
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Howbeit the positive effects of this competition to benefit the community,
macro conversations of political and theological division undoubtedly inform
interactions among Orthodox and Catholics on the ground but in the form of
sectarian politics rather than theological discussions. Baher (a 23 year old volunteer
at the JBAD) and several priests were the few interviewees that could tell me with
confidence what the actual theological differences that separated Catholic and
Orthodox Copts were:
"I come from an Orthodox family but I always studied in a
Catholic school. When I was 13, I decided that I wanted to be
Catholic. My family insisted that I become a deacon to stay
close to the Orthodox but since then, I tried to attend Catholic
masses as much as possible… the churches are very similar in
rituals and we believe very similar things but I liked that Catholic
priests are more open and flexible in their thinking and will
encourage youth to think and participate. There are just little
differences in how they perceive the hierarchy between the Son
and the Holy Spirit, the dates and length of some feasts and
rituals, and of course, the Popes…but those things do not affect
my relationship with God and other Christians".

Beyond Baher's mentioning of the filioque controversy (e.i. "the hierarchy
between the Son and the Holy Spirit"),82 participants in my interviews could only
point out practices that would foster the maintenance of boundaries rather than
actual theological justifications that keep such boundaries. The two most frequent
instances where participants expressed resentment of continuing boundaries was
regarding closed communion and intermarriage.

82

In Pneumatology- i.e. the study of the Holy Spirit – this refers to theological
disagreement has to do with the Latin compound word filioque ("and the Son") which was
added to the Nicene Creed by Spanish Catholic bishops around the end of the sixth century.
With this addition, the creed says that the Spirit "proceeds from the Father and the Son."
Without the addition, it says the Spirit proceeds from the Father.
Eastern Orthodox have traditionally challenged this, either saying that the doctrine is
inaccurate or, for those who believe that it is accurate, that the pope had no authority to
insert this word into the creed.
Many today, both Orthodox and Catholics, believe this controversy was a tempest in
a teapot. The doctrine that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as well as the Father is
intimated in Scripture and present in the earliest Church Fathers. See Runciman, 1955
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Even though this particular character will be more useful in the next chapter
(to explain relationships between Catholic Copts and Muslims), I will briefly introduce
him in this section as he was one of the earliest interviewees that exposed to me
how these boundaries are preserved. Nabil is a social entrepreneur and farmer that
was very close to the JBAD. As his personal initiative had received support from the
Jesuits, my informant had arranged that I spend some time in his desert-reclaiming
project that was supported to promote peaceful sectarian relationships in the villages
surrounding that farm.
Munching on an improvised welcome lunch of some aish baladi (traditional
Egyptian bread), and fresh tomatoes and onions that had been picked from the farm,
we broke the ice by speaking about the background of their project. We spoke about
what it meant to be a Christian in Egypt and Nabil was bold to sustain that "there is
nothing that differentiates Christians in Egypt as we are all are one under Christ our
Lord". When our host finished eating, he got up to fetch some tea for his guests and
trusting my apparent lack of attention and the distance between the table and the
fire, he asked my informant in an inquisitive tone “Is she Orthodox? Why do you
bring and Orthodox to our fields?”
From Nabil's tone, it seemed that the answer would be a decisive factor of my
treatment as a guest and researcher, yet my biggest concern was with the
contradiction between both his attitudes in the same meeting. As days passed and
rapport improved, I summoned the boldness to confront both positions, to which he
replied with a mixture of shame and humor:
"Don't get me wrong, I respect my Orthodox brothers. We
get along well and share everything…well, except communion. I
have invited many priests to come and visit our farm and in my
home in my village, especially the priest of my village. But I
warned abouna [the priest] that if I came to visit him to his
church, he has to give me communion or all this friendship is
just empty words".
The Catholic, as the Orthodox Churches, practice closed communion holding
that reception of Holy Communion is reserved for those who are baptized. Unlike the
Coptic Orthodox church (Attia: 32), the Catholic Church has made an exemption only
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for Eastern Orthodox Christians (who are not in full communion with the Catholic
Church83) and allows them to receive Communion from Catholic ministers, if they
request it of their own accord and are properly disposed (Code of Canon Law,
Canon 844). However, to Nabil's regret, the lack of reciprocity has pushed several
local Catholic priests to deny Orthodox to take Communion as well.
The lack of reciprocity and ritual exclusion was echoed several other times
and was even articulated with irony through games. “Ana Omry” (“Never have I ever”
or a.k.a. “Ten Fingers”) is known in the West for being a verbal drinking game.
Among beneficiaries and volunteers of the JBAD it is an innocent time killer.
As its Western version, the game is started with the players getting into a
circle displaying all their ten fingers. Then, the first player says a simple statement
starting with "Never have I ever…". Anyone who at some point in their life has done
the action that the first player says lowers one of their fingers; the last person to
lower a finger (or the one with the most fingers up) wins. Needless to say that the
penalty is not to drink but is limited to lowering a finger until the person runs out of
fingers and is eliminated from the game. The more conservative Egyptian version (at
least the ones played among my sample) will not include sexual references or hard
confessions:
Fady: "Never have I ever…flown in a plane". (Nancy and
Kyrollos lower a finger).
Nancy: "Never have I ever... shaven my face". (Fady,
Kyrollos, and Mina lower a finger. Christine and Abeer smile).

Nevertheless, that does not imply that the game is devoid from bringing out
personal tensions among the players. Hanging out in the basketball court of the
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The Catechism of the Catholic Church, citing the Second Vatican Council
and Pope Paul VI, states: "Full communion involves completeness of "those bonds of
communion – faith, sacraments and pastoral governance – that permit the Faithful to receive
the life of grace within the Church." See Catechism of the Catholic Church – English
translation (U.S.A., 2nd edition) 1997, United States Catholic Conference, Inc., Libreria
Editrice Vaticana.
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JBAD, as the circle became smaller and fingers lowered, the group of volunteers
began to make more personal statements:

Christine (who had seen Kyrollos smoking before):
“Never have I ever... smoked. (Kyrollos has only one finger left)

Mina and Abeer had been eliminated, only Christine, Nancy, Kyrollos and
Fady survive. Fady, who is still in high school, gets upset and responds with a direct
attack to Christine (who is a pharmacist).
Fady: Never have I ever studied Pharmacology.
[Christine whines in anger and lowers her finger].
Kyrollos who, unlike the other contestants, is Coptic Catholic, strikes with a
sectarian hit:
“Never have I ever… taken Orthodox communion”.
The contestants shouted and whined while Kyrollos celebrated and bragged
about his petty victory but the party went on to discuss his win. “That was a low
strike, ya [oh] Kyrollos", Fady complains, "We don’t talk like that”. The group has
good rapport as they have known each other since their school days in the school of
the JBAD. Nevertheless, while this denial seems irrelevant to his Orthodox friends,
Kyrollos treats the matter with a mix of irony and resentment when questioned about
his ludic choice: “It's not a big deal…it's just that we say we are not divided but we
are also not together”.
These boundaries are not only internalized by youth but even supported by a
number of religious authorities. Organized by a group of Catholic Coptic youth that
collaborated with the Jesuits in Minya (among other Catholic congregations in the
country), a summer missionary camp to Sohag was organize to evangelize children
in rural Catholic villages along the East bank of the Nile. After a long day of games,
singing, praying, conferences and giving out snacks to the children that gathered at
the local church, the youth missionaries returned to their rooms, rested from the
melting heat and prepared for dinner.
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As a caveat, I must admit that my particular shock to evening activities in the
missions was informed by both my experience in Mexico and the USA. In other
mission I had attended, Catholic missionary work is traditionally seen as a spiritual
experience through giving – not an opportunity to go husband-hunting. Additionally,
my expectations as a researcher were informed by the highly conservative Egyptian
atmosphere where secluded co-ed interaction is frowned upon and hard to
arrange.84
Although the Catholic Church does not have an official dress code for lay
missionaries, countless church sources stress the need for modesty85 as "purity
requires modesty" (CCC, 2522). The Catechism of the Catholic Church stresses that
modesty and common sense be used regarding clothing (CCC, 2521), and together
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For instance, couples wishing to share a hotel bedroom are required to present a
marriage certificate, physical demonstrations of affection in public beyond hand-holding are
broady considered unacceptable (including hugging and kissing) and in rural environments
(as was the case of Edfu), even displaying terms of endearment (such as "Habiby","my
love") among spouses in front of relatives seemed scandalous for Ibrahim's wife who
interrupted him saying "Stop! They are going to think I am not respectable!"
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A particular emphasis is placed on the human body in Christianity as the Bible says
that all humans were created in God's image (Genesis 1:26-27) and that human bodies are
holy as they "are the temple of God" (Corinthians 3:16, 17). Although according to the Bible,
God made humans as sexual beings (Genesis 1:27; Matthew 19:4-6), the enjoyment of
human sexuality is reserved only for marriage (I Corinthians 7:1-5; Hebrews 13:4). Thus,
there are two aspects to Christian modesty. The first is to avoid being an occasion of sin.
This is an all-encompassing mandate that extends to sight ("everyone who looks at a woman
with lustful intent has already committed adultery with her in his heart" Matthew 5:27-28),
thoughts and desires ("You shall not covet your neighbor’s wife" Exodus 20:17). The second,
is to be instilled with the spirit of modesty inspired by a deep love for the virtue of chastity.
As a reaction to post-Christian fashion where, according to the Church, indecent and
improper dress had become the norm, on August 23, 1928 Pope Pius XI's ordered for a
"Crusade Against Immodest Fashions". It was from Pope Pius XI's universal standard that
an American priest, Fr. Bernard A. Kunkel, developed "The Marylike Standards For Modesty
In Dress." Fr. Kunkel's idea was to use Mary as the model of modesty and the Pope's
standard as a concrete guide. Thus with his "Marylike Standards," women could be sure of
pleasing God in their manner of dress.
Although this standard was not enforced on Catholic Copts, particularly girls are
strongly encouraged to dress in a manner that is not scandalous in vis-á-vis their Muslim
environment and the "Marylike Standards" have also echoed in Egypt See El-Shenawi,
Eman (May 31, 2012). "Coptic bishop advises women in Egypt to dress modestly like
‘Muslims
and
St.
Mary",
Al
Arabiya.
Available
at:
https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/05/31/217718.html
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with Pope's Franci's86 exhortation to “be missionaries of the Gospel not only in word,
but also with our own lives” (CELAM 2007), one would assume that modest and
simple dressing as well as chaste gender relations would be highly encouraged (if
not already implied) among youth missionaries.
After a long first day of being chased by children that called me "abla, abla!"
("ma'am! ma'am!"), trying to keep up with choreographies for hymns and model for
the children to imitate, being locked up in a room with 20 children that hyper on
karasy muzikiyya (musical chairs) began to break them, and dealing with the melting
summer weather of Upper Egypt, I arrived to my bedroom to find my sleeping mat
occupied. As the girls in my room spread their makeup tools and slit blow-dryers and
ironers through their hair, Angie jumps in front of me with a pair of summer dresses
(none of them long enough to cover her knees) “which one do you think is prettier:
the black and white one or the blue one?”. Sara, who intended to stay up all night
talking with one of the boys she had a crush on, jumps on the bunk-bed I had
occupied (in revenge for my mat) and asks me “Carol, you know how to make nice
braids, can you do something nice for my hair?”
Though understandable that is that girls will want to look their best to what,
according to the program on the cardboard in the dining room, was just " 8 pm:
dinner; 9 pm: prayer" and then "10 pm: sleep", my cross-examination with the main
nun that was responsible for that mission, Sister Mariam, justified their behavior:
“Missions are not only a good place to find God through
service but it is also a good opportunity for girls to find a
husband that will allow them to fully practice their religion and
for young men to find a wife that they share common values.
The parents of these girls trust us a lot and let them travel with
us because they know there are safe limits, but how else are
they going to find a husband?”
The three nuns that were responsible for the mission lectured the youth
missionaries before they retrieved to their cell to sleep: “Just don’t dance, play loud
music or make loud noises. Respect the people of the village as they all wake up
early to work the fields”.
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When he was still Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio, Pope Francis was one of the
primary authors, in 2007, of an important document from the Fifth General Conference of the
Bishops of Latin America and the Caribbean, called the Aparecida document.
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For the rest of the night, young men and women socialized on the rooftop of
the church's office and dormitories. Eventually, the roosters in the village announced
it was time for the farmers to wake up and for them to return to their corresponding
rooms and sleep for a couple of hours. This system was apparently so useful that its
results included three engagements while I drafted this text.
I recall this scene to illustrate how traditional Christian values such as the
promotion of modest dress codes and interaction of co-ed couples were actually
overlooked for the sake of protecting sectarian boundaries and protecting another
practice that is frowned upon by Catholic Copts: rebaptism in mixed marriages. As
mentioned earlier, the Holy Synod of the Coptic Orthodox Church decided that the
baptism of Catholic Church cannot be accepted until it agrees to Orthodox tenants.
In a 1977 letter to Catholic Coptic Patriarch Stephanous Sidarous I, Cardinal
Willebrands (President of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity from
1969 to 1989) spoke clearly and frankly about the practice of rebaptizing Catholics
who pass to the Orthodox Church through marriage. The Vatican argued that by this
custom, the Orthodox Church puts in doubt the very existence of the Catholic Church
and many Catholics find in this behaviour an obstacle to their participation in the
ecumenical movement (Attia: 248). As being an Orthodox Coptic means accepting
the whole package, even Christians of other, non-Orthodox denominations wishing
to marry a Copt must accept rebaptism. Consequently, to the degree that the
Orthodox Coptic Church strengthens its identity by rebaptizing Catholics, voices
such as Sister Mariam are more often heard that disapprove of marriages between
Orthodox and Catholics or even Protestants.
Unlike with Muslims where only females can be openly targeted for legal (yet
socially frown upon) mixed marriages,87 these boundaries between Orthodox and
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Most religious scholars agree that Islam permits Muslim men to marry "women of
the book" (Christians or Jews) as stated in Surah al-Maidah 5:5. Others rely on 2:221 to
justify that both Muslim men and women should not marry mushrikeen (unbelivers), and
verses 5:73 and 9:30 to justify that Christians and Jews (9:30) are unbelievers. Though there
is an apparent consensus that Muslim women are only allowed to marry Muslim men, as a
response to the increasing number of Muslims in Western countries (particularly single,
educated and economically independent women), recent movements (like those of "Ibn
Rushdie") and sheikhs (such as Sheikh Toufik Kacimi) have advocated against this
prohibition. See Abbass, Rudabah (31 December, 2012). "'Halal' interfaith unions rise
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Catholics (as well as Protestants) which Sister Mariam seeks to protect are not
contingent to gender. 37 year-old Michael complained about how such boundaries
destroyed what he considered his only opportunity to find happiness:
"My brother passed away two years ago. He climbed the
window to repair the AC and landed on his head from a second
floor. It took me long time to recover…my mother was going
crazy… she would stop, look at the wall and ask me if I could
see the angels in the room but there was nothing…I really had
to be strong but with the help of friends from work the pain was
less strong. One in particular was very caring. After a year, I
asked her father to marry her but her father did not allow it
because I am Catholic. They made her quit her job in the office
and married her to a man from her church. I never forgot her;
she was why I was happy again. Now she has two children from
him and I am still alone".
Perhaps due to his tragic background, Michael was the only participant that
was vocal and explicit from the start in pointing out how sectarian boundaries among
Christians in his environment affected him in several areas of his life:
"Before the Revolution [2011], I worked in an Orthodox
company. We were two Christians in the accounting department
but the Orthodox one was obviously sitting on the director's lap
[was his favourite]. They fired me because of him and no other
Christians would hire me because they spread the word in their
church. It took me two years to find a job until I came here [to
the Association]. The Orthodox complain that they are
discriminated by Muslims but they also discriminate against us.
It's an unwritten custom that they don't want to talk about".
These drastic differences from Justina's absolute denial of sectarian tensions,
Ibrahim's eclectic Coptism (cf. Chapter 4), Nabil's and Kyrollos's internalized
resignation, to

Michael's explicit resentment are all faces of how sectarian

boundaries between Catholic and Orthodox Copts in Minya are defined differently
by external and internal members. Cohen explains that for many communities, the
assumptions and stakes of such definitions can be strikingly different internally and
externally (Cohen: 35). For Ibrahim it is his ability to be a role-model father and
husband, for Nabil and Kyrollos it means being able to participate in different
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112

developmental activities while nurturing a friendship that dates to their early
childhood, and for Michael it meant the opportunity to fulfil his affective and labor
needs.
One finds that stable, persisting, and often vitally important social relations
(such as family) are maintained across such boundaries, and are frequently based
precisely on the dichotomized statuses of "other" and "proper". Perhaps, as Barth
explains, the “flow of personnel” across communal boundaries through conversion
and inter-marriage between Coptic Catholicism and Orthodoxy are a less thorny
communal issue now than in medieval (Ayouby) Egypt (Barth:89), yet their
negotiation and flow in no way has hindered the salience of those identity lines.

5.3 The other Copts

Ramadan is a very important time in the year for Egyptians. For Muslims it is
a sacred month when people fast, practice charity through grocery packages,
donations or even Mawait El Rahman88; some try to memorize the Quran and make
a general effort to be extra pious believers. For Non-Muslims in Egypt, it is a time for
better television, leaving work and school early, and empty streets during sunset. For
Christians throughout the country, it is a unique opportunity to increase church
activities through conferences, missions and trips.
Among a number of conferences that I was invited to during the Ramadan
during my fieldwork, a youth group of Catholic Coptic students from the Jesuit school
invited me to a special missionary conference that would target three villages a few
kilometers south from the JBAD. My group was assigned to the village of El Fo'ara
where we organized hymns, lectures and games for the Coptic Catholic children and
teens of each village. The elementary school group of children was particularly
numerous, and, since we were only four missionaries assigned to each village, the
help from the local groups of catechists was highly appreciated.
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Singular: "Meidat el Rahman" ("Table of the merciful") are charitable tables set up
during the month of Ramadan that provide an open invitation to iftar, or breakfast,
particularly to the needy.
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"Make a line!", "Sit down!", "Youssef, if you don't behave, I'm telling your
mother and she'll hit you with her shebsheb (sandals)!" [claps with each count as the
children imitate her] "One, two, three! shhhh!" [Silence]. These nine young ladies and
gentlemen could manage to control the almost 70 children that came from the
villages around the church to participate in our conference/ camp. They shouted, yet
still joked with the children. They played, yet did not smile. They were even
uniformed, but were all dressed in black. They had been regular volunteers at the
church as catechists so they had a close relationship with all the children in the
group. They had been regular until a tragedy hit the village.
Some months before, a group of 12 catechists from that same church had
travelled south of the country with their priest on a service mission. On their way
back, they planned to visit the monasteries near the Red Sea. As they enjoyed some
spare extra hours, they also decided to make a stop in a beach in Ras Gharib to
swim and ride a boat. Abouna, who was tired, decided to stay offshore… a decision
that he would later regret.
"Returning with the 12 bodies of the catechists who drowned in that trip was
only the beginning of his suffering". The priest who was sent by the Patriarchate to
replace the surviving priest explained to me as we waited in his office for the van to
take us back to the camp after a day of service:
"Of course, it was not the fault of the priest [that they
drowned and died] but everyone was in such pain that they
could only blame him for returning alive without their daughters,
sons, sisters, brothers and fiancées. After the funeral, people
stopped coming to church protesting for the priest to resign or
be removed. They accused him as if he were responsible for
their deaths and made him wish he had not survived. The
pressure was so high that he had to be evacuated from the
village, and then my family and I were relocated here to try and
repair the situation. It has been very hard to make them
participate. People are still very hurt and angry and focus their
anger on the priest".
I recall this unfortunate scene to illustrate how delicate and peripheral the role
of the local Coptic Catholic priest may be to group identity. Even without institutional
affiliation, according to what the newly installed priest narrated, the Catholic Coptic
community of El Foa'ra still managed to exercise religious practices such as funerary
prayers and Sunday Schooling in the months of the highest tension, until the
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previous priest was removed. Despite being primary educators for their community,
this example dramatically exposed how, in comparison to their Orthodox
counterparts, Coptic Catholic leadership in the village is by no means the resource
through which group cohesion is secured.
As argued earlier, the revival of the Coptic Orthodox Church would aim to
define a Coptic identity that looked inward, focused on family, church and community
(q.v. Chapter 4.2). Thus, Copticness is not simply a religious identity as the Church
sought to define itself culturally as well as religiously. However, in the particular case
of Catholic Copts, it would be numerically unstainable to follow the same model and
look inward in a country where Catholic Copts represent less than 1% of the
population (q.v. Chapter 2.1).
Catholic Copticness therefore has been neither attached to leadership nor a
closed sense of community. It is rather expressed with different degrees of
attachment to a common Coptic heritage that overlaps with that of the Orthodox and
at the same time stays ideologically independent from it.
That same Ramadan, I was invited to accompany the same group of Catholic
Coptic youth missionaries to pilgrimage visits to the Red Sea monasteries of St.
Anthony and St. Paul. I was also invited the week after that to a different trip near
Sohag that included the Red and White Monasteries, the Grotto of Pope Shenouda
and the Russian-like Church of St. Karkas, but with a Coptic Orthodox youth group I
had met at the JBAD. Although both trips were organized by different churches and
had no mingling of participants from other churches, the similarities in the way both
Orthodox and Catholic Copts relate to Coptic heritage in these trips was notable.
Fady (one of the Orthodox participants of the game described in the previous
section) had been the one who invited me to the trip with the Orthodox church that
he attends, yet his elder (and more patient) sister, Nervine, took upon herself the
mission of guiding their foreign female guest. The arrangement was ideal because
Nervine's age is similar to mine (Fady is about 6 years younger than us) and the
similarities in age and gender allowed us to keep a pace that was comfortable for
both. The youth scattered from our bus to arches and icons that could potentially
make Facebook-worthy pictures. As we approached the dusty walls of red, fourthcentury brick walls which give the monastery its name (the Red Monastery), Fady
115

takes out his selfie stick, programs his cellphone on automatic mode and shouts
"Group picture!" (an action that he would repeat vastly during the trip). The group
breaks apart and we walk inside the church. We arrive to a handrail that separates
visitors in the main hall from the altar that is being restored by an international team
financed by USAID (or so says the banner hung next to the altar). A Coptic monk
guarding the altar welcomes us and, as we huddle in front of the only fan inside the
monastery, we listen to his explanation of the meaning of the frescoes:
"This monastery was at the heart of a large monastic
community in the fifth century and it combines the artistic genius
of ancient pharaonic architecture and Coptic art. It has been
destroyed and rebuilt 4 times but about 80% the surface of this
altar is still covered with original frescoes. Now, the American
Research Center has helped to show them in their full glory…
like for example, over here on this icon of the Holy Eucharist [he
points at the icon] or the icon over there of the Cross… Anyway,
have any of your parents gone to the Holy Land? The chapel
was modelled on the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in
Jerusalem and Pope Shenouda said that coming here is like
going to Jerusalem… so, in a sense, you are now
moqadiseen89.”
After a few other group pictures, we put our shoes back on and took the bus
again until arrived to the base of a mountain. At the top of this mountain, you find
what seems like a church facade superposed onto the frame of the cave. Inside, our
party scattered again. Some did so to take pictures on the detailed icons of the
Apostles and St. George carved artistically on the white marble of the cave; others
would take the time to light a candle, offer it with their intentions and pray in the
corners of the cave. As we approached the priest responsible for the church, pilgrims
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"Muqadis (m.) / muqadasa (f.)" is a title given to people that perform pilgrimage to
the Holy Land, in a similar way like Muslims that go on pilgrimage to Mecca are called hagg
(m.)/ hagga (f.). In response to Israel's occupation, the Camp David Accords, the 1979 treaty
and the failure of Israeli courts to return the Deir El-Sultan monastery to the Coptic Church,
pilgrimage to the Holy Land has been banned for Copts below 45 years old (as an act of
mercy to elders; although people over this age need to be in possession of a
recommendation letter from any church in Egypt to perform pilgrimage). Shenouda's
successor, Pope Tawadros II, has maintained the ban his precursor imposed. See Hasan:
109; and Aziz, Ramy (Nov. 29, 2015). "Opinion: Pope Tawadaros’s visit to Jerusalem", The
Jerusalem Post. Available at: http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Pope-Tawadaross-visit-toJerusalem-436595
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lined up to kiss his manual cross and hand as a form of expressing respect and also
as a blessing.
Uninhibited by the bus driver (who was Christian and therefore, most likely not
fasting), we gushed bottles of water sitting in the first line of the bus while Nervine
prepared me for our next stop:
"The White Monastery was founded by St Shenouda.
Because of his popularity and his great love for his religion,
Shenouda was chosen to represent the Coptic Church to defeat
the heresy of Nestorius… This was a very important monastery
but it unfortunately died slowly because of the Arab invasion.
The Muslims asked for heavy taxes but this was one of the few
monasteries that survived".
All these exemplify how these sort of pilgrimage trips reinforce core values
and principles of Copticness such as asceticism, Coptic nationalism and resistance
to external oppressors through story telling. The tales narrated by Nervine and the
monk echo Maurice Halbwach’s "On collective memory" (1992) which rationalizes
how the Coptic collective memory is inscribed in the geography by remembering
sacred locations. The holy places are not only the destination of touristic or
pilgrimage visits, but are instrumental in the retelling of stories about the saints and
martyrs that inform group consciousness.
Even despite the apparent superficiality of a handful of youth in our party who
seemed to take this trip as an excuse to take pictures only, all participants respected
basic etiquette and devotion in sanctuaries (taking off one's shoes, touching images
and relics of saints and martyrs to "take a blessing", kissing priests' hands) and
some even seemed surprised to learn new stories of miracles, sanctity and survival.
Thus, trips like those described above serve as micro-sites where collective memory
can be shared, passed on, and constructed. A great deal of literature has dealt with
how heritage such as monasteries or specific churches known for their relics and
shrines emphasize the sense of belonging of Orthodox Copts through collective
memory,90 yet this literature has ignored how this same collective memory is
experienced by other non-Orthodox groups that also claim such heritage; the others
who also claim the title of "Copts".

90

For instance, See Ramzy (2014), Botros (2005), Davis (2008) Naguib (1994).

117

"Abouna Fanous? Like a Ramadan lamp? A Ramadan lamp priest?" as I
hoped for an explanation of this saint's name I joked ironically with Kyrollos (the
Catholic participant of "Ana Omry" in the previous section) who had invited me to join
the trip. The group of Catholic Coptic youth missionaries that had also invited me to
visit the monasteries of St. Paul and St. Anthony walked from the bus towards the
chapel and mausoleum that was being constructed at the entrance of the Monastery
of St. Paul for the priest (Abouna Fanous) who had died less than a year before.
Kyrollos explained to me the name of this new saint as we took off our shoes to enter
a holy place:
"Abouna Fanous was a very humble man and he didn't
mind washing the toilets of the monastery. One day, during
mass, a woman that had seen him washing the toilets refused
to take Communion from him because she said his hands were
dirty. Then, during that mass, as he was consecrating the
bread, light started to come out of his hands. After that, his
hands would light up so he would have to cover his hands with
a pair of black socks and even like that, people could still see
how the socks would shine. For that moment on, he performed
many miracles".
Touching the marble tomb of Anba Fanous and then making a sign of the
cross from head to chest "to take a blessing", Kyrollos guided the group to the next
building across the main road.
As soon as we arrive to the bottom of the stairs of the chamber where the
tomb of St. Paul is, Angie (a girl from our group) jumps in excitement but immediately
hushes herself. She had just noticed a Coptic priest inside telling the story of St. Paul
the Anchorite to a group of nuns in blue habits sitting on the carpet floor of the
chamber:
"He is considered the first Christian hermit and the father
of monaticism... St. Anthony the Great was told in a dream
about the existence of St. Paul and his solitary life so he set out
to find him… They met when St. Paul was 113 years old in this
cave…"
As soon as the priest ended his account, Angie and the other girls went to
greet the group of the Egyptian Sisters of the Heart of Jesus that were coincidentally
visiting the monastery as well: "How are you, Sister Therese? Is the Lebanese nun
still around? Oh, she went back home?"
118

I mention this encounter because the same sense of reverence that was
displayed towards Catholic Coptic nuns was kept immediately after with Coptic
Orthodox priests despite denominational borders. After greeting the Catholic Coptic
nuns, the group went to a chamber upstairs where Ramez – another young man
from our group- volunteered to play the daff (Coptic cymbals) standing next to the
priest and a banner with the lyrics to a mudih or eulogy for St. Paul. After intonating
this praise in the particular nasal tone of Coptic hymns, the crowd inside the chapel
lined up to kiss the hand of the Coptic Orthodox priest and exit; a practice which
most of my Catholic companions did not hesitate to carry out.
The youth wondered out of the 5th century oasis-like structure and raced to
the gift shift shop to get souvenirs for family and friends back home. Holy ointment
droppers with the picture of St. Paul for one pound for random friends, key chains
and fantasy jewelry for closer friends; but the most important request for friends and
family back home had been fulfilled earlier that day. After climbing the 2 km-hike to
the cave, we took off our shoes and squeezed ourselves inside the tiny cave where
St Anthony (the Father of Asceticism) is said to have spent the last four decades of
his life. After almost falling down the small and completely dark set of stairs, the
group of other four youth that fit inside the cave only with me stopped at the candle lit
altar in the middle of the cave. Ducking behind this altar, my companions crawled
towards a single candle that was standing on the rock in the narrowest corner of the
cave. They dropped pieces of paper they had brought from friends and family back
home with intentions or petitions to ask for the saint's intercession.
In addition to the liturgical and ritual practices that I described at the beginning
of this chapter, the identical ritual practices towards sites of their shared heritage in
pilgrimage trips shows that Coptic heritage is deeply embraced by Catholic Copts,
ultimately defining their "Copticness". Recalling Urban's (2003:363) offshoot of
Bourdieu’s work on the study of religion (q.v. Chapter 3.2), this shared heritage of
Catholic Copts would constitute the second sphere of ”faith capital" which in Urban's
terms "is constituted by participation in religious services and affinity to religion by
the members of a community" (Urban: 368). Religious capital is also described as
the attachment to a particular religious culture regardless of the degree of mastery
over its doctrine, history, and rituals.
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Aside from cultural practices such as the exclusion of menstruating females
from major religious rituals (in the case of Copts, prohibition to take communion),
veiling inside churches, and male and female circumcision and genital mutilation –
(that are common to Egyptians in the villages surrounding Minya despite religion and
are frequently confused for religious practices) this nearly identical way in which both
Catholic and Orthodox Copts approach their heritage further stresses the weakness
of Coptiness as an ethnic category (c.f. Chapter 4.3.1). The term in social
anthropology refers to groups considering themselves culturally as well as racially
distinctive (Smith: 57). Yet, this shared religious capital between Catholic and
Orthodox Copts further stresses that it is not a term applicable Copts as they are not
ethnically distinctive today. Though Orthodox Copts may claim cultural difference
with Egyptian Muslims by religion (Shatzmiller 2005: 19), another Egyptian group
(Catholic Copts) claims the same exact cultural heritage making these claims void.
This parallelism between Catholic and Orthodox Copts is amplified when
considering that there are six more types of Catholics (with official representation
and churches) in Egypt. Greek Melkite Catholics, Maronite Catholics, Syrian
Catholics, Chalcedonian Catholics, Armenian Catholics, but the Roman (Latin) rite is
evidently is the one that has excreted the most weight on the Catholic Coptic rite
(Meinardus 2006: 86).
Back in Cairo, it is not difficult to find Egyptian Catholics who have no
objection in detaching from their Coptic heritage and adhering to a Latin one.
Without minimizing the complexities behind processes of conversion, Armanious
(2011) suggests that some Copts in nineteenth century Egypt opened themselves
through conversion to Catholicism to an important network that included European
and Near Eastern Catholics that allowed them to receive benefits such as advanced
education and trade connections (2011: 122). Bruce Masters (2011) also shows that
eighteenth century conversions to Catholicism were facilitated by the influence of
European merchants and French consuls (Masters 2001: 69). Educated and
upwardly mobile Christians had become disillusioned with traditional Orthodox
hierarchies so they were more easily identified with the Catholic Church (2011: 123).
Ironically, while in the West Catholicism has been identified as a reactionary
and backward force (Douthat 2016), the benefits of associating with a foreign,
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progressive and liberal church (at least more liberal than the local options) are still
valid in contemporary Egypt. This is particularly perceivable back in Cairo in the cocathedral of Notre-Dame of Heliopolis (El Basilique), for instance,

where better off

Latin Egyptian Catholics who studied in Le Collège du Sacre Coure and speak
French zay les oiseaux ("like birds") will gather on Sundays to listen to the preaching
of Sayedna Adel (the current Latin bishop) and then socialize in the Patronage (the
club of the Patriarchate). This was even true in Minya for Baher, (the volunteer who I
had introduced earlier) who, although he was loyal to his affiliation as a Copt, he
explained his conversion to Catholicism as he was attracted to what he called "the
openness of the Church".
Nevertheless, back in Minya, the attachment to their Coptic heritage (rather
than a Latin one) is more common among Catholic Copts. When asked about the
Arabic version of the Latin Mass, a Jesuit priest at the JBAD nationalistically
protested:
“Foreigners in Egypt celebrate in their languages. You
can go to areas of Cairo with many foreigners like Maadi or
Zamalek and find that they celebrate their liturgy speaking
English, French, Italian, Spanish, Korean, Sudanese and
Tagalog. I understand they need to worship in a language they
understand but I completely oppose to the celebration of the
Latin rite in Arabic. Why? We already have a rite that is ours!
We have a Coptic rite, like the Mass of St. Basil, which is the
same as that of our Orthodox brothers but shorter. We have a
rite that was made Catholic for Egyptians. What is the need of a
Latin Arabic rite in Egypt when we are Copts?"
Abouna's nationalistic sentiment is understandable when we recall several
challenges that appeared historically between Latin missionaries and Copts that
converted to Catholicism. Since the 19th century, the aim of both Protestants and
Catholic missionaries became to reform Coptic Christianity as they were both
drawing from the same pool of misinformation that Europeans had accumulated over
centuries (Sharkey 2013: 30). Circumcision and female seclusion were regarded as
proof of Coptic backwardness which created cultural gaps between missionaries and
converts (Sharkey 2011: 31). As for early converts, Catholic Copts had to worship in
the Franciscan churches until the creation of the patriarchate in 1824, and most of
them were uncomfortable in this foreign environment. Armanious (2011) points out
how Coptic Catholicism appealed to these groups of converts by maintaining familiar
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religious practices (Armanios: 120). Alistair Hamilton further suggests that for the
Copts converting to Catholicism "abandoning a millennium of traditions was simply
too much to bear" (Hamilton: 56). That Catholicism could offer a selective
appropriation of foreign ideas while keeping ritual elements of the Coptic religious
establishment was the merit that Coptic Catholicism –as a Uniate church- could
claim.
On the other hand, attachment to Coptic identity is complicated by the fact
that Coptiness has been constructed without Catholic Copts. Although they feel a
strong sense of community and belonging based on a common religious background
and even count with an incipient diaspora,91 Catholic Copts are not part of the same
“imagined community” (Anderson: 22) that has been defined by mainstream
discourses as "Coptic". Coptic Catholic Nationalism is not exactly a choice to which
they have entry to leading to the creation of an independent imagined community
that is ambivalent in its identification with Coptic and Catholic heritage.
Ultimately, the trips narrated in this section have also illustrated Van DoornHarde and Vogt's assertion that the collective memory and history of the Coptic
community is tied both to their religious practice and to the territory of Egypt
(Van Doorn-Harde 1997: 127).

Looking back at the monk's praise of a Coptic-

pharaonic past or his elevation of the monastery to a level of holiness resembling the
Holy Land speaks of the great and a great sense of pride, belonging and the
coherence between being Christian and being Egyptian. The trips have illustrated
how the national, the religious and personal identity are constructed and intertwined,
and how pilgrimages provide a mode for simultaneously practicing being Coptic and
practicing being Egyptian. The practice of pilgrimages and storytelling consequently
places Coptic Christianity in a privileged position within the national territory.
Pilgrimages recreate and reconstruct the national, Egyptian geography as Christian.
Structural signs, such as buildings and tombs, and natural signs, such as trees,
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Their diaspora includes the churches of: St. Mary Coptic Catholic Church (Los
Angeles, CA), Resurrection Coptic Catholic Chapel (Brooklyn, NY), Coptic Catholic
Community of Nashville (Nashville, TN), Coptic Catholic Community of Boston (Boston, MA)
See Roberson, Ronald (2013). "The Coptic Catholic Church. CNEWA, Available at:
http://www.cnewa.org/default.aspx?ID=63&pagetypeID=9&sitecode=hq&pageno=1
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rocks, cave and mountains are not only physical but also have been ascribed sacred
meaning.
As a result, to remember sainthood and martyrdom is not only to identify as
Christians but also to identify as Egyptians. This is relevant to Catholic Copts in
particular, and all Egyptians in general as Coptiness can be constructed irrespective
of which church one takes communion in or the church which they support
financially. Regardless of the rite, at the end of the day, there are more
encompassing categories than denomination to classify Egyptians such as class.
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6. "Egypt is Islamic"?

Early in 2015 and a few weeks after leaving the JBA to concentrate on editing
this study in Cairo, I received a phone call from Ibrahim (my Catholic convert host
who I introduced in the last chapter) who was in town and wanted to catch up and
meet in the Church of St. Mark early that Friday. This cathedral of el Morcosiyya in
the central neighbourhood of El Azbakiyya had been replaced in 1971 by the
cathedral in Abbasiyya as the patriarchal see for the Coptic Orthodox Church (Kamal
2002:16) but it still continues to draw large crowds for other reasons which I was
soon to learn.
He also warned me in his phone call that he had not travelled alone.
Ibrahim's companions were three members of a Muslim family which had been
beneficiaries of the Literacy Program at the JBAD. Mr. Hassan and his wife, Hoda
had travelled from Minya with their daughter, Basma, who had been trained as an
adult literacy teacher and had recently gotten engaged to one of her cousins. As
Ibrahim explained to me, her engagement was endangered by the appearance of a
man who claimed to love Basmaa and in his fits of jealousy, he would beat and cut
her. As Mrs. Hoda explained to me (her eyes on the ground), he would also threaten
her family members, lock her in rooms so her family could not help her, provoke
seizures, move her body and modulate her voice in ways that were unrecognizable
by her family. The family had sought the help of sheikhs and imams but in their
desperate attempt to get rid of this so-called jin (demon), they resorted to the wellreputed help of Abouna Makary Younan and troubled by his friends’ affliction,
Ibrahim accepted to escort them.
As in a normal Orthodox service, all males sat right to the altar and women on
the left while Abouna would saunter through the aisles. From my location in the
female section it was hard to discern the healings and exorcisms on the males' wing
that the celebratory zhaghareet (ululations) would announce. Yet the grimaces,
contortions and screams of patients in the female section (most of them who were
sat near the aisle so the priest could see them easily) were soon addressed. Hoda
and her daughter hurried but failed to reach a seat inside the church so they decided
to go to the church's External Affairs Office and seek a private meeting with Abouna
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hoping for his mercy and favour as they had travelled from outside of town. I decided
to stay inside the church and continue witnessing the scene.
After sprinkling Holy Water on crowds of women who'd reach out their hands,
Abouna Makary and the cameraman from El Karama TV who was following him
around the church stopped at a veiled woman who was shouting, growling and
whipping. "What is wrong with her?" Abouna Makary would ask as the woman
elevated the volume of her growls. "Shhhh, listen, this body will be freed in the name
of Jesus Christ! Christ orders you to leave her! Amen!" The priest spat on the lady's
face: "Christ orders you, leave her body, by the order of Christ, get out of her!" He
shook his wooden cross bathed Holy Water, raised his voice and then spat on her
face again. "Satan loses, in the name of Jesus Christ! Khalas! ("enough!") Stand
up! Satan left you!" The lady gave a loud shout and another lady accompanying her
embraced her. More zaghareet filled the main hall again and Abouna kept on cutting
through the crowds of Christian and Muslim women that had come to the Morcosiyya
searching for healing.
Among the all the displays of Muslim-Christian cooperation I saw during my
fieldwork, I believe this exemplified best the degree to which Egyptian Muslim may
access Christian services even when they push the limits of spirituality and creed.
Back in the JBAD, my host, Abouna Hany, seemed moved by the surprise that
seeing such a large Muslim crowd in a Coptic exorcism session caused in me:
"Egyptian Islam is like no other in that it shares a deep connection with and common
life with Christianity. Saudis, Moroccans, no Muslims understand Christians as
Egyptian Muslims", he told me in a reassuring tone.
Abouna was also proud to point out that the spirituality of many Egyptian
miracles is so "powerful" that it knows not of sectarian boundaries. While the
veneration of the uncorrupted saints' bodies is "a miracle that only Christians
understand", Abouna claims that the love of the Virgin Mary is common for
Egyptians-both Christian and Muslim alike92. According to Christian tradition, the
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Mary is revered by both Muslims and Christians. For Christians, Mary is the Mother
of God and, she was, and remains, totally united to the plan of redemption. Likewise,
Muslims revere her, but not as the Mother of God. Mary is mentioned more than any other
woman in the Koran, and she is one of a handful of people who have a chapter named after
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Holy Family escaped from the prosecution of Herod to murder infant Jesus in
Jerusalem (Mat 2:13-14) nearly twenty centuries ago and fled into Egypt during
the Massacre of the Innocents where the Virgin is reputed to have rested several
days under a large sycamore tree that stands a few miles from the neighbourhood of
Zeitoun, in Cairo (Nickell: 185). Despite the urban sprawl, the tree, abouna explains,
is considered sacred, and, adding to non-conventional Christian healing methods
sought by Muslims "many Egyptian women, Muslim and Christian, who are unable to
bear children make pilgrimage to it and place offerings on the branches, hoping to
become fertile".
The recollection, however, that brings a bigger smile to abouna's tanned face
relates to events he used watch on TV when we was a child:
"St. Mary herself blessed Egypt with daily appearances
in her church in Zeitoun to express her love to the country. The
first apparition of the Virgin of Zeitoun happened precisely to
a Muslim mechanic who worked across the street from the
church. He thought he saw a woman attempting suicide and
then they called the police. The police couldn't find any
explanation for the phenomenon so the Egyptian government
accepted the apparitions as true…even President Nasser said
so”.
Scholars such as Dr. Cynthia Nelson suggested that the so-called apparitions
of the Lady of Zeitoun must be considered in context. The appearances came at a
period of crisis in Egyptian history and, according to this view, served as a beacon of
peace and unity to Egyptians of every creed. 93 Indeed, in the minds of Egyptians like
Abouna Hany, the apparition is connected to the Six-Day War of June, 1967, in
which Egypt suffered a military defeat that left the country in despair. The influx of
Russians with SAM missiles; the death of Nasser in September 1970; the

them (Surat Maryam, 19). She is held in esteem as an example of submission to Allah and
as one who accepts truth, who has faith, is purified, is chosen, and who fasts. Muslims also
derive certain prayer postures, such as prostration, from Mary. Unlike several Protestant
sects, Muslims still believe in the virginal birth of Jesus and that Mary was immaculately
conceived. See Esposito, John (2002: 31-33).
93

Cynthia Nelson, professor of anthropology at The American University in Cairo and
the founding director of the Institute of Gender and Women's Studies, visited the church site
on several occasions between April 15 and June 1, 1968., Dr. Nelson documents seeing
nothing other than a few “intermittent flashes of light’'. See Nelson, Cynthia (1973).
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emergence of Sadat and abortive coups; Black September and student riots; the
Tripoli pact and the prospects of a new state with Libya; the renaissance of sectarian
rifts between Copts and Muslims and the ever-present threat of another outbreak of
the Middle East war; all had Egyptians waiting for a collective symbol to restore faith
and perhaps even to lead the Egyptians to victory over the modem-day Herods.
Abouna points out that Mary's coming also coincided with the return of veiling, the
sprouting of beards, and the other signs of the Islamist renaissance. Thus, she
helped to cement the advent of spiritual over secularist politics.
Despite spiritual or sectarian politics, these examples (Christian exorcisms
and the apparition of the Virgin of Zeitoun) demonstrate that it is particularly the
flexibility of spiritual capital that has been key to the survival of Christian charity and
activism in a Muslim-majority environment. To close our analysis of Catholic Coptic
activism through the lense of religious capital (the kick-off of Bourdieu’s social capital
theory first presented in Chapter 3.2), the third and outermost sphere of religious
capital is precisely defined by aspects of spirituality in a given community (Carkoglu,
2008:113). Wortham (2007:449) notes that while “spirituality is an aspect of the
‘good life’, the accumulation of spiritual capital can impact the ‘good life’ and the
‘good society’.” Thus, this aim for a social good is the sphere where Catholic
institutions have been allowed to operate through raising the normative
consciousness among its various actors for the success of its developmental goals.
In consequence, in this chapter, I seek to explore the ways in which Catholic
missionary activity and its modern (Catholic Copitic) hiers have interacted and even
affected Egyptian Islam in Minya and viceversa. The transition from Catholic
missionary work to Catholic Coptic-led activism means that Catholic-sponsored
services regardless of sectarian lines have successfully interacted with Minyan Islam
for a couple of centuries. Nevertheless, the operation of the JBAD today puts in
question whether or not the JBAD can be classified as an FBO.
Ultimately, this chapter intends to highlight that the delivery of Catholic charity/
developmental services has not come without its trials. Muslims in Minya began
reading the works of political Islamists such as Ibn Taymiyyah, Abu al-'Ala alMawdudi, Sayyed Qutb, Sayyedd Sabiq, among others, since in the mid-1970s
which lead to the eventual spring of al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya (Malthaner 2010: 64).
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Since then, Minya has been known to have stronghold Islamic militants (Abdo 2000:
Chapter 5/ no page number). Over the last four decades the governorate had been
part of a corridor extending south to Assyut for militant activities and gave birth to
some of the most notable militant leaders94.
The strong presence of militant Islamic groups have made of this governorate
–which shelters the second largest Christian population in the country (Mohamoud
2013)- a brooder of sectarian clashes and violence. This targeting of Christians as
“enemies of Islam“(Gaffney 1997: 276) was particularly costly for the JBAD during
the 2013 coup. As Islamist and terrorist know not of internal Christian separations,
regardless of whether they stood by the 2013 Coup or not, the monopoly of
representation that the Coptic Orthodox patriarch has held on to meant that all
Christians, even those benefiting a mainly Muslim pool of beneficiaries, had to pay
for supporting the 2013 coup.

6.1

The crusade for Muslim beneficiaries: sectarian dynamics between
missionaries and Islam.

When one walks into the building of the headquarters of the JBAD, one can’t
help but notice the particularly wide bathrooms, dining room, lounge, elevator, and
the fact that each cubicle is somehow improvised by wood. The headquarters of the
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A handful of key Muslim extremists, among them the second-in-command of the
Gama'a al-IsIamiyya, operated from Minya. Khalid Islambouli, the lead gunman in Sadat's
assassination, came from Milawi, a town in Minya province.
Also of major influence on the group in Minya was Sheikh Ahmad Ismail, whose
sermons give some indication about the direction of al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya’s militant fervor
during its formative years. The Sheikh emphasized norms of moral conduct, condemned
foreign cultural influences, and castigated the ruler who refused to obey God's
commandments (Gaffney 1997:271-280).
Citing Sayyed Qutb, Sheikh Ahmad argued that Muslim society was in an age of
jahiliyya (ignorance), implying that president Sadat was an unbeliever (kafr) (Gaffney 1997:
280). He also adopted from the writings of Ibn Tamiyyah, who argued that under certain
conditions every individual has the right to intervene to apply hisba without the authorization
of the state, transforming Islam into an activist "programme of changing evil by force" (Ibid:
194).
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JBAD were not meant to be offices but are a recycled space from a previous
program.
Inspired by other programs that catered to the villages around, social workers
at the JBAD saw the need for an initiative that would help children and adults with
disabilities, and, with some foreign funding and a lot of local work, the four-story
building in front of the old monastery was adapted to receive 20 young men and 20
young women over the age of 18 that did not know how to read nor write. The two
year stay-in program was designed to empower physically handicapped young
adults. The fact that the beneficiaries are absent and in their place there is a cluster
of desks, copy machines and stacks of paper, is ironically a sign of success. In 2009,
particularly due to the availability of immunities for younger generations and the
satisfaction of their population, the program reached an end and then shifted to other
community needs of the community.
Along with this project and the Heba Project95, one of the projects that has
benefitted both urban and rural Minyians the most is the Literacy Program. More
than ten years ago, the JBAD started preparing adult volunteers and teachers from
governmental schools to participate as agents of education and change in their
villages. Although men are not excluded (in the trainings I attended there were 2
men and 32 women), one of the additional goals of the program is to empower local
women and improving their skills for enabling them to participate effectively in
societal development.
The gender gap in beneficiaries is of no surprise here but rather how
sectarian lines are negotiated.

Considering that Minya has the second largest

Christian community of any of Egypt's governorates (at 35 percent of Minya's 4
million people: Mohamoud 2013); that Minya was the epicenter of an Islamic militant
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Heba, whose family considered the fact that she was born without a limb as a gift,
was their first beneficiary and thus, the symbolism behind naming the project after her. The
Heba program is one of the Association’s most successful, recent programs offering day
classes for mentally handicapped, unemployed young adults. Its main goal is to empower
the handicapped by developing their capabilities and skills to become economically active
and participate effectively in the development of their society. With seven groups of eight
students, the program was open to young adults from neighboring villages, regardless of
their religious orientation nor gender. It focused on skills that ranged from wood-work and
carpentry to computer literacy.
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insurgency against the rule of Hosni Mubarak in the 1980s and 1990s (Gaffney
1997: 272); and that it remains a stronghold of Islamists (including the extremist
Gamaa Islamiyya group, Afify 2016); one would be tempted to imagine that a training
held with the Jesuits would cater to a largely Christian audience. A simple glance at
the 17 veiled and 11 face-veiled (munaqqabat) trainees out of the 32 female
participants suggest that sectarian dynamics at JBAD are not politicized when it
comes to beneficiaries.

Only four participants were Christian and the pattern

repeated constantly in all its activities.
Minya governorate often hits the headlines as a hotspot of sectarian violence
with news of burning churches,96 ransacked and torched of Christian homes and
public humiliations of Christians,97 but arguably, the most controversial issue that
affects Muslim—Christian communal tensions in Minya is conversion. Egyptians who
wish to convert to Islam can file a paper to reflect the change of religion in their legal
and personal documents, such as the compulsory ID card. There is no such process
available for Muslims who wish to convert to another faith (el-Tahawy 2015).
Apostasy from Islam is not officially typified as a crime in Egypt, but both legal
and cultural pressures have prevented any facilitation of this process (el-Tahawy
2015). Throughout the country, rumours of conversion to and from Islam are
particularly volatile when tangled with a sexual component such as courting98,
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Based on public reports, the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy published
an interactive map monitoring sectarian violence across the country following the bloody
dispersal of the protest camps. The map recorded 88 cases of attacks on churches during
the month of August 2013 alone while real-time statistics are updated on their map. Minya
and Assiut are the sites of the majority of these sectarian attacks, followed by Suez, North
Sinai, Sohag, Cairo and Giza. Available at "Sectarian Attack in Egypt"
http://eshhad.timep.org/
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Among the most controversial, in May 2016, a 70-year-old Christian woman was
stripped publicly by a mob from Karm village in Minya. The violence erupted after a rumor
circulated of a romance between her son, a Christian man, and a Muslim woman. Her son
fled the village after received a number of threats and the following day, 300 armed men
attacked the homes of seven Coptic families and stripped, dragged and beat his mother,
according statements of the local archbishopric clerics. See AlAhram May 2016
98

In their analysis of incidents of sectarian strife in Egypt, political critic Ibrahim Eissa
and Marize Tadros (2013) note that most of the incidents are caused by interreligious
romances or something to do with relations between the opposite sexes . Legally, a Muslim
man can marry a Christian woman but a Muslim woman cannot marry a Christian man.
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marriage or divorce.99 In the recent past, there have been two high-profile cases of
Muslim converts, Mohamed al-Hegazy and Maher al-Gowhary, who have attempted
to challenge the courts in order to obtain the right to be issued with ID cards
reflecting the change of their religion from Islam to Christianity (el-Tahawy 2015).
Both cases were unsuccessful and, as the case of Abdu- a young Muslim convert to
Catholicism that I met when he had run away from Alexandria to hide in a village in
Minya- both plaintiffs had to go into hiding after receiving deaths threats for leaving
Islam.
Although proselytism is not explicitly illegal in Egypt (el-Tahawy 2015), given
these restrictions to conversion, it is not hard to understand why institutions of
Catholic missionary heritage could seem dubious in nature. Indeed, Catholic
endeavours to displace Islam and settle in Egypt go back to the thirteenth century
when St. Francis stopped on his way to the Holy Land in Egypt. 100 Despite the fact
that their intention to displace Islam was unfruitful, the Franciscans managed to
establish a Uniate/ Eastern Catholic church (q.v. Chapter 2.1.2) and the first Catholic
schools were set up by Franciscan monks in the 1730s in Cairo (Meinardus 2010:
117).
In contrast, a second generation of Catholic missionary schools that were
founded in the second half of, and particularly towards the end of, the nineteenth
century, had less proselytizing-oriented models. As part of Mohamed Ali’s
modernizing project, Azhar’s kuttabs (small schools where children learned the

There are no social prohibitions for Muslims to marry Christian women in particular since the
latter convert to Islam upon marriage. However, these women’s families normally reject such
marriages and believe they bring dishonour upon them and upon the wider Christian
community. What causes sectarian strife is often when Christian women disappear and their
families discover that they have converted and married Muslim men, but they have no way of
finding out whether they did so voluntarily or under pressure. See Tadros 2013.
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Q.v. Chapter 4.4.3, note 74 regarding the Shahata Affair and Wafa Costantine.
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In 1219, an encounter between St. Francis of Assisi and Sultan Al-Kamil in Egypt
in Damietta is well documented. In the midst of the Fifth Crusade, St. Francis crossed into
the Muslim camp with his companion, Brother Illuminato, in the hopes of converting the ruler
of Egypt to Christianity. St. Francis did not succeed, but he was deeply affected by the
encounter, so much so that his later teachings called for Christians to live harmoniously with
Muslims. See Moses, Paul (2009). The Saint and the Sultan: The Crusades, Islam, and
Francis of Assisi’s Mission of Peace.
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Quran and Arabic) gradually went out of fashion and were replaced by a range of
public schools, including private Catholic schools for the elite. Religious orders such
as the Jesuits, Lazarists, and Franciscans ran schools according to European
models in the major Egyptian cities as well as in Upper Egypt (Boulous 2016: 30).
Catholic schools generally had a very good reputation until an outburst of antimissionary sentiment and activism occurred in the late 1920s and early 1930s and
again during the Suez Crisis in the 1950s (Boulous 2016: 42).
Most scholars acknowledge that Christian missionaries were not usually a
tool of the political powers—often they opposed colonial authorities and defended
the rights of converts even against imperial interests— yet they still see a close
relation between mission and empire or colonial power (Boulous 2016, Sedra 1999,
Sharkey 2013). An influential position was developed by the anthropologists Jean
and John Comaroff, who argue, (using anthropological and historical analysis of the
early missionary work among the Tswana in Botswana), that mission was a form of
cultural imperialism manifested in what they call a “colonisation of consciousness”
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2000: 506). Paul Sedra's From Mission to Modernity:
Evangelicals,

Reformers

and

Education

in

Nineteenth-Century

Egypt

(2011) continues on the same line by arguing that missionaries served as means of
reformation and “cultural conversion” (Sedra 2011:11). They consider the missionary
institutions, medical work, churches, schools, and the like, to have been agencies
that deeply affected and transformed the daily life, family system, economic ethos,
morality, and world view of native people who came into contact with them without
needing to convert to Christianity (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000: 507).
However, the notion of "cultural imperialism" is problematic as an analytical
concept for understanding cultural encounters or interactions within a missionary
context (Boulous 2016: 45). Ryan Dunch, for in-stance, detects two chief defects in
the concept of "cultural imperialism": it is inseparable from essentializing discourses
of national or cultural authenticity, and it reduces complex interactions to a
dichotomy between actor and acted upon, "leaving too little place for the agency of
the latter" (Dunch 2002: 303).
This was the case of Egyptian nationalists in the 1930s and 1950s and Islamic
movements of the 1970s who campaigned indiscriminately and considered all
132

institutions with some kind of missionary heritage under a single label of an imperial
project (Sharkey 2013). Not only were missionary schools forced to abandon an
essential religious objective (teaching Christian faith to all the students) but major
newspapers would campaign against missionaries, and, in the aftermath of the Suez
Crisis, British and French citizens were expelled and their companies as well as their
schools were nationalised by the Egyptian government (Boulous 2016:44).
In addition to the political circumstances and developments during the first
decade of Egypt's formal independence and the Suez Crisis, the broadness and
fierceness anti-missionary activism was particularly fuelled by a number of incidents
involving Protestant missionaries that caused public outrage and had received wide
publicity at the time. In 1928, Samuel M. Zwemer (a well-known American
missionary and a committed evangelist among Muslims), caused an uproar in El
Azhar University for distributing controversial Christian texts within the courtyard of
the millennial institution (Boulous 2016:46). Yet a second case that involved a
fifteen-year-old

Muslim

orphan

girl

at

the

Swedish

Salaam

School

(a

nondenominational Protestant missionary school in Port Said) stood in the centre of
public attention and fanned the flames of anti-missionary activism.
On June 11, 1933, a scandal broke out when Turkiyya Hassan denounced
that her teacher had tried to convert her to Christianity by force after receiving a
beating of by her Swiss teacher for not following classroom protocol and standing up
to receive an elder (Baron 2014:9). Hassan soon became a cause célèbre to rally
popular anti-missionary sentiment in the still-budding Muslim Brotherhood (Sharkey
2013:89).
Although it was a case-based argument that did not concern the different
missionary projects in Egypt, the “orphan scandal” came to represent the frontline in
the war between Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and all
missionaries (Baron: 85). That missionaries had won few converts (both Muslim and
Orthodox) was immaterial to Egyptian observers. Suspicion of missionary schools,
hospitals, and homes increased, and a vehement anti-missionary movement swept
the country (Boulous 2016:47). Turkiyya was the incarnated proof that Christian
missionaries had not come to Egypt to convert and provide social services for
children, but to threaten Muslims and Islam. Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim
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Brotherhood, criticized the duplicitous nature of Christian service, warning that
“under the guise of practicing medicine, teaching embroidery, and sheltering boys
and girls,” missionaries were seeking to pull Muslims from their faith (Baron
2014:119).
Despite the rarity of their conversions, Hasan al-Banna and his comrades
considered Christian missionaries a serious threat since they attracted both
Christians and Muslims (Boulous 2016:48). However, this opposition did not prevent
them from learning from the enemy, as long as the model institutions and methods
were suitable for their own purposes (Sharkey 2013:90). The Brotherhood had been
established with pronounced Sufi elements and, hence drew from a longstanding
Islamic welfare tradition. Yet, it also aimed to tackle missionary endeavours not by
means of violence, but rather by emulating the methods of missionaries to spread
their ideology. Competing with their welfare and educational services (religious
instructions, activities within the mosque, welfare work traveling to towns and villages
to spread the call or da’wa), the Brotherhood launched their own efforts to save
Muslim children and provide for the orphaned, abandoned, the weak and the poor
(Baron 2014: 87).
Missionaries also faced opposition from the Coptic Orthodox clergy who
competed with their own provision of services (Boulous 2016: 56).

In contrast,

today, not 50 km South from the JBAD, in the city of Mallawi, the Coptic Orthodox
Deir Barsha has been directly feeding from trainings and technical assistance from
the Heba project of the Jesuits. Abouna Hany is proud to point out that the
competition for souls triggered by missionaries was beneficial in that it forced
Muslims and Orthodox Copts to cater to the most vulnerable, and decades
afterwards, this is translated in inter-sectarian cooperation.
The orphan scandal ultimately spurred the Egyptian state in the 1930s to take
greater control of education, health, and social services that ultimately led to "the
creation of a welfare state" (Sharkey 2013: 129). On the other hand, in battling for
Egypt's children, Beth Baron In The Orphan Scandal claims that Christian
missionaries indirectly contributed to the rise of Islamic groups in Egypt as a
reactionary force to missionary work and the success of what became "the most
influential Islamist organisation In Egypt" (Baron 2014:59).
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In the aftermath of this imbroglio, quietly, most Protestant missionaries were
beginning to move toward an understanding of mission that utterly rejected
proselytizing and emphasized social service (or what some called a "gospel of love")
as a mode of Christian witness (Sharkey 2013: 127). However, for Protestant
missions, the Egyptian nationalists were attacking what was the core interest of their
work, namely, the teaching and spreading of Christian religion in schools and other
welfare institutions (Boulous 2016:60). Today, proseltysm is an un-abandoned,
however unmanageable, aspiration for many Egyptian Protestants. Protestants have
four TV channels in Egypt (Ruane 2014) and in their insistence to preach, they
occasionally continue to draw unrequited attention which affects all Christians in
Egyptians in Egypt.101
Conversely, Catholic missions have tried to distance themselves from such
scandals102 and have had a more discrete approach which is informed by an older
tradition and history in Egypt (including more successful ecumenical efforts with the
Coptic Orthodox Church), its own theological developments in addition to the
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In Ramadan 2015, three Evangelical Egyptians were arrested for handing out
bags of dried dates for people to break their fast with copies of the Sermon on the Mount, a
statement about God’s love and His omniscient nature and the name of an Arabic-language
website about Jesus and the Christian faith. The outreach offended a Muslim who forcibly
detained one of the three Christians and took him to a police station. In Egypt there is no
such crime as evangelism and, although Article 98F of the Penal Code prohibits acts that
show disdain or contempt for “any of the heavenly religions or the sects”, it was not a
blasphemy case either. All three were released on a 10,000 Egyptian pound bond after three
days of arrest. Despite being an illegal arrest and the outrage it sparked among Christians in
the media, in an interview I managed to arrange with the best friend of one of the detainees,
he explained to me that their intentions might not have been as passive as they are willing to
accept publicly. As he explained "the annunciation of the 'Good News' [The Gospel] is a duty
that all Christians have. Even if they [Muslims] won't listen, we must continue to make an
effort…He [one of the detainees] was only being a 'good Christian'".
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Sharkey (2013) narrates how, though the Suez Crisis would momently bring
Catholic and Protestant Missions together to protect themselves from their common
xenophobic enemy, the Catholic Church has traditionally kept a low profile to provide social
services and has preferred to distance itself from the different Protestant churches in Egypt.
For instance, after the Orphan Scandal, as the (Protestant) Inter-Mission Council prepared
its statement on religious liberty to advocate against new legislation requiring missionaries to
include religion for their Muslim students in their curricula, the Diocieses of Alexandria
refused sign on to the effort as they felt that those events "do not concern them" (Sharkey
2013:147).
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receptive attitudes of Muslim beneficiaries, which we will address in the following
sections.

6.1.1 Post-modern

Catholic

transitions:

Social

justice

and

Jesuit

Humanism

By an agreement made between the Jesuits and the Ottoman Empire some
two hundred years ago, the Roman Catholic Church does not seek to evangelize the
Muslim population, but confines her efforts in evangelization to work among
Christians (Sharkey 2015: 34). Additionally, the Catholic Church assured the Coptic
Orthodox that it would carry out its pastoral activities within the framework of already
existing structures and institutions, and that she does not consider them as objects
of mission.103 Considering the appearance of new educational offers (international
and language schools) and increased state involvement in service provision since
the nationalist movement of the 50s, a question I frequently came across during my
research from people who were surprised by the mere existence of Catholic
missionary institutions in modern day Egypt was: if they are not here to convert,
what are missionaries and their institutions still doing in Egypt?
The answer to this question is much more complicated than statistics on
conversions as it assumes that missions operate within the framework of direct
material trade. It also assumes that missionary or religious NGOs are a remnant of
western colonial and imperial efforts whose primary goals is economic and political
exploitation through manipulating attempts of conversion of faith. Closer attention to
the developments in both Catholic theology and Jesuit theology that emerged during
the second half last century allows us to understand one of the pillars under which
institutions such as the JBAD operate: social justice activism as a form of religious
experience.
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Due to the expansion of the Catholic Church at the expense of the Orthodox, the
Coptic Orthodox Church formulated a suggestion during the Pro Oriente talks which stated
that the Catholic Church carry out its pastoral activities within the framework of already
existing structures and institutions, and that any changes be determined uniquely by the
needs of its own faithful (Attia: 173).
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The first phase of this story has to do with changes in Catholicism. One of the
religious responses to the new forms of poverty caused by the transformation from
agrarian society to industrial capitalism, and intensified under the change from
industrialization to globalization, was a phenomenon that observers call “engaged
religion” (Neusner 2003: 44). Inside the Church, this is translated in the form of social
Catholicism and its official contemporary inauguration is usually marked with Leo
XIII’s letter Rerum novarum, “On the Condition of the Working Classes” (Molony
2006:36). It was also the beginning of a new openness of the papacy to the modern
world as the predominantly reactionary Catholic Church was taking the side of the
working classes.
After World War II came the Second Vatican Council (1962-5). Vatican II,
renewed the Catholic Church, bring it “up to date” with the modern world and
changing Catholicism’s attitude toward itself and other religions (Hehir 1987: 12).
This called for a more comprehensive understanding of “mission”. Until then, the
term “mission” referred to “the missions” or “missionary work”, which meant bringing
Christianity to where it was not; that is, converting people to Christianity (Hehir 1987:
19). The concept of mission for the salvation of souls shifted to the vocation of the
betterment of people’s temporal lives irrespective of location or creed. Congregations
such as the Jesuits used the term in a new way, to refer to all their different work or
ministries in one comprehensive concept, “the mission of the Society” or “Jesuit
mission” (Bisson 2011).
The aftermath of Vatican II was an exciting time for Catholicism: liberation
theology in Latin America was being articulated in systematic ways, and Catholic
leaders throughout the Third World were expressing concern for social justice in
more and more acute ways. The transitions of Vatican II had inevitable impact in the
Society of Jesus as well. In 1975, the 32nd General Congregation (GC) was called to
evaluate and renew the Society’s overall commitments in light of the unfolding
effects of Vatican II (Bisson 2011). Although, over the centuries, the Jesuits have
been known for their work in missions, education and in the humanities and
sciences,104 the GC 32 made a decision that the promotion of justice would no longer
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They are known as an active religious order, and their spirituality is geared to
action and to engagement in “the world”. They have a well-articulated, flexible hierarchical
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be one ministry among others, but a dimension of the entirety of Jesuit mission,
transforming themselves into a religious corporate agent of social justice, or at least
trying to.105 In the Egyptian Jesuit front, this resonated with personalities such as
Henri Boulad, an Egyptian Jesuit, who, through his literature, is an advocate form
“Christian humanism” to counter sectarian differentiation.106
The new religious identity and agency constructed in GC 32 did not depend
on a dialectical relationship with a religious “other”, whether that other is the secular
or another religion. Identity and agency seem to come from within, to be proactive
instead of reactive. The post- GC 32 “Servants of Christ’s Mission” is concerned
about, mission, is not construed as a response to the absence of God and as the
filling of an empty space with what was not there before (IJC 1977). Instead, mission
is construed as a response to the presence of God already there, as a discovery
(Bisson 2011). The ubiquity of the presence and activity of God changes the nature
and role of religious boundaries and therefore the behaviour and exercise of identity.
“Servants of Christ’s Mission” brought social justice and the secular into the
primary religious level of interaction with God, but this time through experience
instead of through explanation or proselytism as media of significant, even
transformative religious experience (IJC 1977). GC 32’s translation of social justice
from a secular or derivatively religious level to a primary religious level and its
construal of social justice advocacy as religious experience effectively dissolve the

structure organized in communities whose work and life depend on familiar and frank
communication between superior and subject and within the communities. Their personal
and corporate spiritual practices use imagination and reflection to cultivate self-awareness
and disinterested service oriented toward whatever might be the greater common good, or at
least that is the intention. These practices are rooted in two founding documents, The
Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola, and the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus, both
composed by Ignatius of Loyola, whose distinguishing feature is the cultivation of selfawareness and self-appropriation through careful attention to the quality of one’s
involvement in one’s own religious experience and practice (Bisson 2011).
105

“Jesuits Today”, 32nd General Congregation of the Society of Jesus, Decree 2, n.
9. GC 34’s “Servants of Christ’s Mission” twenty years later called it an “integrating
principle”.
106

Fr. Henri Boulad has published nearly 30 books in French and Arabic, mostly on
the subject of Christian spirituality and theology, several of which have been translated in up
to 15
languages.
References
to
his
publications are
available
at:
http://www.henriboulad.com/index.htm
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boundary that separated the religious from the secular throughout the period of
modernity, and indeed helped define the modern period (Bisson 2011).

It put

together terms that in the modern context of religion belonged to two different worlds
of discourse: faith belonged to the religious world, and justice belongs to the political
and secular world. It turned modern Western understandings of religion inside out,
made social justice religious and religious faith social, and yielded the “traditional”
heavily policed (on both sides) boundary between religious and secular that had
defined religious identity since the Enlightenment irrelevant.
This strongly suggests that a distinctively post-modern form and practice of
religion was emerging. In a context such as Egypt, nevertheless, where sectarian
boundaries are still legally and socially secured, this further raises a conundrum:
without this boundary, how have religious identities remained distinctive and strong?
And how are actors external to the Church’s understanding interacting with these
boundaries?

6.1.2 “Their souls for a piece of bread”: Social cohesion as a tool for
development

The legacy of Jesuit Humanism in Minya speaks for itself: the promotion of
social justice in direct ministry with the poor has been integrated into social centers
as the JBAD and several of the more than hundred schools founded by the The
Association of Upper Egypt for Education and Development (AUEED) that have
provided free-of-tuition education long before the government (q.v. Chapter 3.1). In
the same site where all the activities JBAD take place, there is a primary and
preparatory school that was founded in 1889. The 800-pupil school is one of the best
reputed in the district even though it primarily serves the poorer children of the area.
The population of this school (which also feeds a lot of the programs of the JBAD) is,
as a general average provided by my informant, 60% Muslim and 40% Christian, out
of which only 20 % of the 40% are Catholic.
Without implying that all Catholic Coptic beneficiaries at the JBAD are
necessarily informed by the attitudes of the Church and the Jesuits towards social
139

justice as a religious experience (most of my Catholic interviewees simply adopted
the vision of the congregation by influence of community leaders), the fact that the
JBAD welcomes and serves a predominantly Non-Catholic audience without social
or religious distinctions means that the input of external (non-Catholic) actors is
equally crucial for the success of their activities.
Here, it is important to recall another development brought by Vatican II: that
religious activity that would characterize new missions would be within the
boundaries of dialogue (q.v. Chapter 3.3). Dialogue here presupposes that both
sides will be transformed somehow by the exchange. While there is no reciprocity
(as far as my informants claimed) in Muslims organizations in Egypt targeting or
accepting Christians in their social work, the proliferation of Muslim charity work
during the second hand of the 20th Century is symptomatic of the effect that Catholic
missions had an a corporate level in Islam.
In return, the internal ecumenical and interreligious composition of Jesuit
NGO’s is a further expression of this partnering and dialogue that can be explained
through the lens of social cohesion. I borrow Marc et al. (2013)’s approach to social
cohesion who described it as "a convergence across groups in society that provides
a framework within which groups can, at a minimum coexist peacefully" (Marc et al.
2013: 2). The main proposition that: "when groups see their interests as converging
with those of others, they become more connected to other groups and ultimately
have more incentive to collaborate"(Marc et al. 2013:3). Convergence thus serves as
an essential element for collective action and JBAD volunteers such as Basma, (a
Muslim girl in her early 20s who I introduced at the beginning of this chapter)
explaining their participation with the JBAD as a tool of common survival echo Marc:
“Coming to the Association is not against my religion.
Islam also encourages Muslims to help the poor and less
fortunate in society and pay ‘zakah’. The projects benefit many
different people and their goal is only to improve the lives of
those around us. We even have a project providing WASH
[water, sanitation and hygiene] services among Nubians that
was so important for them that they asked us [Jesuits] to come
back and open ‘Nasr El Nuba’ Office in Aswan. My grandmother
brought my mother, my mother brought me. It became a safety
net, a family to help us in our common need. Muslims and
Christians…we all have common needs.”
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Without regard to “common needs”, the fact that Muslims engage in common
action with Jesuits is not tantamount to deeper motives for cooperation beyond an
immediate gratification. Chan, J et al. (2006) argue that social cohesion requires only
people’s participation, cooperation and mutual help.

As such, “it does not

presuppose values like tolerance or respect for diversity, or vice versa” (2006: 284).
This kind of understanding of social cohesion when using proxies such as
participation without looking at power relations says nothing of the quality of social
relations existing between those co-operating and therefore says nothing about
whether a society is cohesive or not.

Hossam, a Muslim teacher that was

responsible for a cartoon workshop, counters such understanding of social cohesion
in the context of the JBAD:
“Islam tells us that out of Ahl El Kitab [people of the
Book], the closest to us are Christians. And yes, it tells that that
'to you be your religion, and to me be mine' but our relationship
is much closer. They share our work, our sadness and our
celebrations. In Ramdan we break the fast with them; in
Christmas we greet them. We are like brothers.”
However, walking away from religion, Hossam finds that art is a more neutral
tool to bring people together:
“Conflicts are definitely present, but they mostly occur in
the villages. Art always brings people together. Our children and
youth are here to participate in activities together and enjoy
them together, not to promote differences.”
In the same line, Shady, the director of the contemporary dance workshop at
the JBAD, prefers to concentrate on art as a bonding and revolutionary tool among
JBAD beneficiaries:
“The community of Upper Egypt is known to be very
conservative and polarized so for some people it is
unimaginable how popular our classes are but it is possible to
change the way people think through art.”
The news that reaches us from Minya governorate points to a completely
different set of dynamics from what we see in Shady’s classroom. Compared to the
Cairo-based, western-educated girls at AUC’s folkloric dance troupe (at least those
who I got to see rehearse) that wear baggy clothes in their rehearsals, are shy at
approximating male dance partners and scandalize at the thought of not covering
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their rears with a sweater tied around their hips during rehearsals, the contemporary
dance troupe at the JBAD may seem open-minded or even radical considering the
liberty and devotion for art that is lived in this social bubble. The eight person troupe
(5 males and 3 females between 14 and 20 years old of different religious
backgrounds) engage professionally in their rehearsals and even tours around the
country. Shady elaborates on how this came to be:
“Cultural life in Minya is much more dynamic than those
outside the governorate think. People are interested in artistic
activities, they participate, they talk about it. It is a very
receptive community. At the beginning, some people looked
dance with scepticism. There are people who make fun of art,
those who consider it a waste of time, those who feel that since
it does not bring in financial rewards it is useless, and those
who find some sort of immorality in it, a vice. But there are also
those who value and enjoy the practice. Also, the Jesuits, have
been historically one of the most renowned cultural players in
the region so people that know who we are, trust us”.
Besides using culture as a soft power and common social challenges to
construe a collective identity, another factor that has been key to the JBAD's ability
to adapt and survive has been their staff. The Jesuits have become known globally
for work in social justice in what they call “social centres” -offices or organizations
that work in social justice through analysis, activism, education and other mean
(Bisson 2011). As in the other Jesuit social centers,107 the JBAD is staffed by a
variety of like-minded individuals of various faith traditions who think in terms of
culture and development and not sectarianism. Since 1960s, clergy have stepped
aside from the administration and operation of day-to-day activities of Egyptian
Jesuit NGOs such as the AUEED and the JBAD, allowing the scope and reach of
their services to widen.
Although the executive director and most managerial positions are held by
Christians of different denominations, the overwhelming majority of staff are Muslim.
Several Christian staff members pointed out that the JBAD would not be the same
without its Muslim beneficiaries, staff and volunteers. Not only because most of
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Today there are about 125, with particular concentrations in South Asia and Latin
America; See Bisson 2011.
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project beneficiaries are Muslim, but because many trainers and instructors,
especially those coming from bigger cities such as Cairo or Alexandria, are uniquely
qualified for many of the services provided by the JBAD.
From an outsider's perspective, the participation of a largely Muslim workforce
would give the impression that they act as local allies, intermediaries or even watch
dogs for the Muslim majority. However, particularly staff members are eager to blur
the boundaries of religious identity. Characters such as Ahmed "El Mesihy" (Ahmed
"The Christian")108 insist:
"Differences in religion don't exist among us. Keeping
unity between us is essential and one of the best ways to
confront sectarianism is helping one another. We work in a lot
of villages and poor neighbourhoods and we are always very
sensitive to avoid discussion of religion. When we know religion
might come up, like when we work on reproductive health
promotion, we use Muslim workers if the target audience is
largely Muslim, but we mostly concentrate in subjects that are
not controversial like education or the alleviation of poverty so
there is not much room for religious debate".
Along the same line, Dina, a Catholic Coptic social worker agrees that there is
no place for religion in developmental services:
"Christians are glad to receive our help and most Muslim
beneficiaries cannot even differentiate between different kinds
of Christian denominations so the provision of services is where
we become the most equal. Christians in the Middle East do
not, and perhaps should not, press this matter. ..for the sake of
living in harmony with the religious majority and the authorities.”
By avoiding religious and even political debates, Catholic institutions such as
the JBAD have striven to survive. Disassociating the promotion of justice from the
promotion of faith has not only been a top-to-bottom attitude from social Catholic
thinking but it is also supported from the ground as a survival mechanism.
Thus, the JBAD does not have very distinctive characteristics with respect to
their goals, values, organizational characteristics, audience and activities, compared
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For protection of my informants, it is important to remind my reader that I have
used a pseudonym for this subject's name that respects my informant's identity while still
keeping the same spirit of the nickname the community has given him.(Q.v. Chapter 2.4
Methodology).
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to secular NGOs. The blurring of lines, the overlapping of identities between
institutionally separate actors, the dissolving of distinctions between the categories of
religious and non-religious and the effort of Christian actors to avoid explicit religious
connections (and avoid barriers to cooperation), suggest that the dichotomy between
secular and faith-based organizations is inefficient to describe the dynamics in which
religious identities are negotiated or eschewed inside the JBAD. Indeed, the
literature on religious insists that there are no clear theoretical guidelines for
distinguishing between these two types of NGOs (Musick & Wilson, 2003).
More than a determining or classifying aspect of the JBAD, faith, in this
context, should be seen as a social phenomenon that can generate a sensibility (no
matter what sources each particular religion has) for social justice (Bisson 2011). In
a context such as Egypt where social actors maybe be stanch in a category
politically or culturally without being necessarily observant, the role of faith here
should be valuated through its ability to mobilize community for common action.
Combining secular community solutions yet keeping their faith-based identity, the
JBAD has the ability to develop deeper relationships with communities, as Abouna
Hany would argue:
“No other organizations are more firmly rooted or have
better networks in poor communities than the religious ones.
We have an intimate relationship with our parishioners and
even those stakeholders who do not share our religious views
accept us with respect as we have a common ground.
Perhaps there were some hostile gestures towards our
work at the beginning but after three generations, we are wellpositioned in the area. Still, services connected directly to
churches or those arriving to new communities tend to hear
radical preaches blaming humble women and men for seeking
our help and telling them that we would want to convert them to
Christianity. This is not just an absurd thought but also
impossible because Muslims are not allowed to convert by law
and there are also the dangers faced by all aid workers,
whether or not they are Christian."
While secular organizations are erroneously considered as "neutral" as they
are themselves are guided by values and ideologies (Musick & Wilson, 2003), this
ability of FBOs to foster deep connections in communities comes with a price.
Despite the cessation of proselytization in favor of corporeal works of mercy, and the
secularization of missionary societies and movements into development agencies
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which downplay their religious origins, conspiracy theories where the delivery of
community services is conditioned to conversion are not absent. However, as
Abouna elaborates:
"Some people shape their relationship with the JBAD
through secular ideas and practices of solidarity and justice,
others are rooted in religiosity that coincidently is linked to
Catholic social teaching but none of them are here to convert
nor are we here to ask them for that. People are here because
they seek help. They are in need but that doesn’t mean that
they are willing to sell their souls for a piece of bread."

6.2 The Catholic casualties of Raba El Adaweya

The morning of August 14, 2013, while the world had its eyes in Northern
Cairo, violence also flooded the streets of Minya’s capital. Driving around the
corniche to downtown Minya, one can’t help but notice the multiple monuments to
sectarian violence that still, four years after, stand as witnesses and reminders of
that day. As in other Christian properties and religious institutions in the
governorates of Minya, Asyut, Fayum, Giza, Suez, Sohag, Beni Suef, and North
Sinai, following the violent dispersal of the Muslim Brotherhood sit-ins in Cairo on
August 14, crowds of men attacked at least 60 churches including churches like
those of Mar Mina el Aswuad ("St. Mina the Black" which is now honors its name due
to its ashes), orphanages, social centers, and Christians shops and homes
throughout the country.
By the same token, on that same morning, the headquarters of the JBAD
were attacked by a gang of unknown perpetrators in a sectarian assault. Around
11:00 am, as they attacked other Christian businesses on the way, they began to
attack the Centre from the side of the monastery and threw stones and Molotov
cocktails at the door. When the attackers failed to enter the complex, they left and
returned a couple of hours later to continue the attack from another flank. They
jumped over the tall fence that protects the circuit carrying weapons and shot the
lock from the inside to allow the others to enter.
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From this front, one of the best-equipped theatres in Upper Egypt (that had
been built over 20 years ago with the help of Dutch funding), was exposed to the
attackers. The theatre played a crucial community role on a national and local level.
It searched to alter the education pattern using the arts generally, and specifically
theatre, as an educative process. Ironically to its fate, the most recent project that
was to take place in this theatre, “Contact”, intended to use interactive theatre to
discuss issues related to sectarian tension and gender discrimination. It was
supposed to be implemented in villages that face these kinds of problems and to
involve 25 young people in each village. By playing, recreating and being confronted
with their own attitude towards these issues, theatre would become a tool for social
critique and reformation. Simultaneously, one the goals of this theatre was the
intention to change the image of the arts in the area, where there was a negative
image of the arts as haram (sinful). This project would reach a diversity of audiences
and elevate the reputation for art in the community. Nonetheless, projects like this
burned to ashes that day while the attackers forced their way into the complex.
About 400 people entered the complex that day stealing equipment like
computers and cameras and then burned down the building which included the
theatre and a care center for disabled children. They guarded the fire that consumed
the assessts with their weapons so no one could extinguish it. Although there is
always a police man outside the church (whether for protection or surveillance), the
security forces were conveniently absent that morning and even their phone lines
were unavailable. Even if the police also claimed to have come under attack in the
violence of August 14, residents suggested the police had been complicit, at least
through a failure to respond.
Nonetheless, the lack of their support has not prevented the community to
arrive to their own conclusions. The nature of the attackers is something that is now
clear to the victims both by their physical traits but also by their modus operandi. At
the time of the attack, two disabled people were studying in one of the buildings. The
attackers asked them to leave, but destroyed their wheelchairs. Though otherwise
unharmed, the disabled pair was forced to vacate the premises using only their
crutches.
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These sectarian attacks against the organization were harder to comprehend,
at first, when one considers that two thirds of students in the school are Muslim and
the benefits that the association provides for its community indiscriminately. Yet the
rage and anger in the attackers’ faces, "as if they wanted revenge", Abouna tells me,
was a first symptom that the attackers were collected from outside the community.
The fact that the accomplices carried off with thousands of dollars' worth in
computer, video and audio equipment, as well as air-conditioning units, before
setting the church on fire and did not kill anyone, according to my informant, shows
that their sole interest was material destruction and looting. Thus, the so-called
Islamists worked in coordination with dozens of “thugs” who arrived in pickup trucks
and didn’t look like Islamists themselves but merely paid perpetrators from
neighboring communities.
Whether the lack of response from the security forces was a political strategy
to show the brutality of Islamist groups and lend legitimacy to the military-backed
government’s claims that it was fighting a war against terrorism, or mere
incompetence of local authorities, the attacks per se are something that seemed
unthinkable and still today shock members of the Association. Accustomed to
growing tensions between Christians and Muslims in the region, the destruction of a
community resource which served everyone in the area irrespective of religion is still
inconceivable in the community of the JBAD.
Indeed, feelings are hurt and the situation has become very polarized. As my
informant explains, Muslims and Christians who know each other are friends. But
among strangers, there is no brotherly feeling. Nonetheless, as a phoenix, the JBAD
is determined raise from its ashes and continue with its mission. Muslim-Christian
relations in the neighborhood do not appear to have dissolved due to this
polarization. On the contrary, even a local man from a Muslim organization offered
the Centre EGP 10,000 from his own pocket in order to help them to rebuild and the
Centre seems to enjoy a degree of continued support.
While listening to this account by my informant, sorrow flooding his eyes, I
can’t help but remember his completely opposite attitude towards sectarian violence
outside of this context. When I first met my informant (while I was cleaning a table
after breakfast in a youth service in a village near Sohag the summer of 2014), as a
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souvenir of his proposal to study the JBAD, he handed me a memorial bookmark
with the picture of Fr. Franz van der Lugt. "Pater Franz", as the community he served
called him, had been shot twice in the head just four months before by extremist in
Homs, Syria, but Abouna was confident to reassure that "Thanks to God, we
[Egyptians] are not like them [Syrians]". The dissonance between his pride of the
success of peaceful cohabitation between religious groups in Minya (in contrast to
Syria) the day I met him and the shy tears that filled his perplexed eyes when
narrating the 2013 attack to the NGO he called home, are a secondary effect of the
larger survival strategy deployed by the Coptic Orthodox Church and, by extension,
which other Egyptian Christians adhere to.
Denial is not just a river but also a co-existence and survival tool in Egypt.
Mark Twain's pun aside, the subject is uncomfortable and it creates a variety of
reactions. To some Muslim social workers I spoke outside the community, like
Mohamed, a 26 year-old lawyer from el Qalubiyya, the victims of sectarian violence
are not Christians themselves but Egypt as a whole:
"Those are exaggerations, we have Christian neighbors
in my city and everything is peaceful. They are things in
Western media that want to show that Egypt is a mess."

Comments from outsiders from the JBAD like Mohamed are not surprising
when considering that the historical narrative of the Coptic Church itself is known to
be "selective, interpretative, and pertains to the needs of the present" (Haddad 2013:
209). On one hand, the Coptic Church sees itself as a historically persecuted church.
It conjures stories which emphasize Coptic solidarity and survival to reinforce the
importance of loyalty within the community and to the Church because it is this that
has enabled the community to survive (Walkin 2001:31). Despite Byzantine
persecution109, despite the schism with the wider Church and, more recently, despite
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For Copts, the most significant period of early persecution was under Roman
authority and took place around 284 during the rule of Diocletian. This period is known to
Copts as the ‘age of the martyrs’ and Copts start their calendar (which is based on the
ancient Egyptian solar calendar) from the day Diocletian came to power -29 August 284 A.C.
This period also marks the beginning of the emergence of an Egyptian church as distinct
from the official Byzantine church (Watson. 2000: 24-33).
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its being subjugated since the Muslim conquest of Egypt, Coptic collective memory is
inscribed in the geography (Halbwach 1992) of the Nile and it is revived and
celebrated in pilgrimages to sacred locations and the retelling of stories about saints
and martyrs.
To tell minority experiences through the stories about saints and martyrs is
not unique to Orthodox Copts but rather part of the collective Coptic consciousness
of which Catholic Copts also partake. Jackson emphasizes that storytelling is not
only a product of a narrative activity but a social process and that embedded to it is
an aspect of agency (Jackson 2002, 18). In that sense, a Coptic Catholic nun's
account of the martyrization of St. Mina –whose head was cut off after confessing his
faith and his body remained unharmed in the fire for three days and three nights-,
Abouna Hany's pain for Pater Franz's slaughter in Syria, the honouring of Jesuit
martyrs in Maspero that Jesuits in Cairo would share with me and the solidarity for
the brutal slaying of 21 Copts in Libya by the ISIL in February 2015 that members at
the JBAD would display in conversations and Facebook posts; are also a source of
agency for Catholic Copts.
Stories about saints and martyrs are both an articulation of what it means to
be a minority in Egyptian society today and at the same time a negotiation of this
reality. Martyrdom constructs individual suffering as universal, as the struggle
against inhuman violence and hence against inhumanity, rather than the struggle
against a specific historical sovereign. With that, saint and martyr stories offer Copts
–Orthodox or not (Q.v. Chapter 5.2) - a role as acting subjects. Not resisting to
violence may seem like an expression of passivity and acceptance of being acted
upon. But the Christians conception of martyrdom rather transforms passivity into
honourable action, offering all Copts a way out of their marginal position as a
minority.
On the other hand, the Orthodox Church has assumed a role as a meaningful
political actor. Not so paradoxically, Pope Shenouda's renewal movement allowed
the church to replace the state before Egyptian Christians, arguing that the church
had the right to provide social services to Copts in the place of the state. In other
words, the church was asserting its right to take over presumably state functions "in
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return for recognition of the Church as spokesman for the community” (Shatzmiller
2005: 57), Orthodox or not.
Even though this tactical alliance infuriated many Copts, particularly Coptic
diaspora who had given voice to an Islamophobic rhetoric (Sedra 1999), church
dominance was accepted as the price for protection from Muslim-incited violence
that Christians have faced since the Sadat regime and for the articulation of
community grievances (Iskander 2012: 27). The entrance of the church into such a
relationship with the regime has led to a number of concessions on issues that had
been deemed prejudicial: difficulties in gaining permission to build new churches
have been alleviated,110 and monies taken in the absorption of Coptic endowments
by the state in the mid-1950s have been returned to the church (Tadros 2013:67).
In spite of that, the graces of this pact are not common to all of those exposed
to sectarian violence. Outside the Coptic Orthodox Church, there are no strong rivals
to Christian leadership so the Church is essentially the sole political voice of
Egyptian Christianity (Rowe 2007: 337). But the Church speaks for herself
(Shatzmiller 2005: 56), and for those Egyptian Christians outside of the millet pact
who are not protected nor represented by the Coptic Orthodox Church, incidents of
violence lessened but did not cease.
On October 9, 2011, peaceful protestors, many of whom were Copts,
gathered at the site of previous sit-ins at Cairo’s Maspero television building to
demonstrate against attacks on churches. Before the march reached the building,
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More than 160 years ago, the Ottoman Caliphate ordered that anyone who
wanted to build a Christian church get the approval of the country’s ruler; then a sultan, now
a president. At the time, it represented progress since for centuries building a church—not
permitted under Islamic Sharia—was a rare occurrence.
Later administrative regulations had placed even more church building restrictions
including to gaining the approval of local Muslims and to make sure the proposed church
was at least 100 m from the nearest mosque. Much of the frustration at these decisions
stems from a sense of discrimination because mosques do not require construction permits
and there are actually incentives that encourage the building of new mosques (Rowe 2007:
339). In fact, church construction is one of the key issues that have incited violence against
Copts in recent years (Tadros 2013).
As this thesis is being drafted, a landmark law aiming to relieve the nearly
insurmountable requirements to build and restore churches is being negotiated. However, it
is being met with resistance and has been sharply attacked –by both the ultraconservative
Salafist Nour Party and Coptic MPs- as “a political farce” and an imposition on Christians.
See El Din 2016.
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the army used violence against the protestors, killing 27 of them including Muslims
and even a couple of Cairo-based Coptic Jesuits (Youssef 2013: 61). Within the long
genealogy of sectarianism and church burning in Egypt, Coptic scholars such as
Paul Sedra argue that the Maspero protests and massacre served as a moment in
rupture in the relationship between the Coptic Orthodox Church hierarchy and the
Egyptian state (Sedra 2012).
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to believe that no one was brought to
account three years ago when the Egyptian military ran over more Copts in Maspero
(Sedra 2012)., without understanding the complicated marriage between this couple.
The ultra-nationalist discourses that appear from time to time in local media make it
is easy to understand how the Egyptian State has gotten away with a long-standing
policy of refusing the acknowledgment of sectarian divisions within Egyptian society.
The Egyptian government has repeatedly and forcefully denied the existence of
sectarianism on Egyptian soil for decades with the convenient support of the Coptic
Orthodox Church (Sedra 2014).
Once the Brotherhood was gone and Sisi elected, the Coptic community
returned to its pre-Maspero loyalty and rallied behind the president, and adopted the
nationalist discourse of an existential struggle for the survival of the state and
national institutions (Sedra 2016). It is evident from the indiscriminate backlash
against all Christians that having the Coptic Orthodox Pope next to the then General
Abdel Fatah El Sisi when the former President Morsi was deposed would have
indiscriminate results for Egyptian Christians, represented by the pope or not.
Without political representation and separated from the dominating church, in the
end, Catholic victims of sectarianism find the need to search for alternative forms of
participation and avoid confrontations when possible. As the Catholic Pope Francis
had laid out, if ecumenism is a far-standing dream, “ecumenism of the blood” is
imposed on all denominations as Christians are attacked “because they wear a cross
or have a Bible, and before killing them they don't ask if they're Anglicans,
Lutherans, Catholics or Orthodox” (Economist 2015). Like all those outside the
equation, Catholic Copts must bear the consequences of the Church and hope for
the support of the local community.
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6.3

Other micro locations of Catholic Coptic Agency

Due to its historic connection to colonial or foreign authorities, Catholic activism is
typically embedded in the minds of non-Catholic Egyptians I came across during my
research outside the JBAD in the concept of imperialism or foreign intervention.
Indeed, missionary societies generally tried to maintain good relations with foreign as
well as with Egyptian authorities to represent their interests and the Egyptian
government wished to deal with them through a recognised and accepted channel
(Boulous 2016: 274).
Nevertheless, three centuries after the founding of a local, autonomous
Catholic Coptic church and seven decades after the Montreux Convention Regarding
the Abolition of the Capitulations in Egypt, 111 Catholic activism is in Egypt is far from
being a solely religious project, let alone a foreign one . The case of Nabil, a Catholic
Coptic social entrepreneur illustrates that institutional support is not a conditio sine
qua non Catholic Copts approach activism and social justice.
Without regard to the moral and technical support provided by the Jesuits, the
most outstanding individual project that I came across in the Minya was the quest
started by this Catholic Coptic agronomist. The "Farm of Kind Hearts" (“El Qulub el
Tayyiba”) was a dream prompted by a sense of forgiveness, the need to promote
development and also provide work opportunities. Since there is a power differential
in most communities as a consequence of the Copts being a sizeable minority, Nabil
is no stranger to how non-religious small scale disputes turn into sectarian incidents
of violence:
"They are caused by the silliest reasons. I have lost
family for conflicts that started over buffalo or land. We all have
economic problems and in some cases, there have been
Muslims who have tried to defend us, but the problem extends
quickly to the community and then the mob is not only against
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The Montreux Convention Regarding the Abolition of the Capitulations in
Egypt was an international convention concluded on May 8, 1937. It led to the abolishing of
the extraterritorial legal system for foreigners in Egypt known as capitulations. The
agreement provided for the total abolition of capitulations and the placing of foreigners in
Egypt under the Egyptian legal system. See Labib (2004).
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the person involved in the dispute, but against all the Christians
in that village".
Alarmed by the great deal of sectarian antagonism beneath the surface and
the spontaneity and unpredictability of such incidents, for the last eight years, Nabil
has transformed the spiritual desert of the pain of losing three of his siblings (out of
ten) to sectarian violence, and the physical desert (situated some 40 km in the
outskirts of the capital of the governorate) into a fertile land for interreligious
cooperation and development. With the cooperation of other Muslim friends, the farm
is now an NGO that seeks for environmental, social and economic transformation:
"We wanted to create employment opportunities for the
youth of our villages so we first had to reclaim and cultivate new
pieces of desert land. Once these opportunities are created, it is
easier to implement activities that improve the quality of life of
those who work on the farms and villages of the reclaimed
areas. We want to provide complete opportunities that go
beyond peaceful cohabitation but actually foster actual peaceful
coexistence.
Also, since the farm is relatively secluded, we want the
farm to be a place for spiritual and social transformation. We
accommodated the first floor of our house to serve as a retreat
center for people with social problems. For example the Good
Shepherd Sisters that support single mothers or girls that are
being preserved from interreligious marriages have come to us
and our doors are open to those who need refuge. We have a
lot of dreams but unfortunately, we also have a lot of funding
problems like to get tractors or compost. But we can't wait for
the government or the Church to change that. The important
thing is that we are working hard to transform our villages. If we
can't change the way our own village works, we can't expect the
country to change".
Located in the periphery of the millet pact and even dissociated from the
protective umbrella of the Catholic Church, private initiative such as Nabil's evidence
that in the absence of other mediating institutions, Catholic Copts themselves also
make use of religious spheres to exercise agency as an alternative to the absence or
the failure instruments of civic representation. The nature of this resistance involves
the creation of fields of representation and defence rather than direct involvement in
any type of politics.
These underdogs of service delivery expose an alternative narrative to the
contradictions of the love-hate relationship between the supposed representatives of
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Egyptian minorities. They also expose that the vision of a dual community division is
incompatible with Egypt. In a country with such a diversity of cultures and creeds,
labelling the central cultural division as being between Orthodox Coptic and Sunni
Muslim is to create an artificial cultural binary that is then exploited for the sake of
violence and intimidation. While the thugs scrawled “Egypt is Islamic’’ on the gate of
the JBAD the afternoon of August 14, 2013, and the ruins of a burnt orphanage
some meters away replied “May God forgive you despite what you have done”, more
relevant conversations as those of the divisions of class or the actual exercise of full
citizenship and representation for all Egyptians are left out of the conversation.
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7. Coptic means "Egyptian": Conclusions and closing remarks

The evening of January 6, 2016, the Coptic tattoo on my wrist and holding
foreign passport accidently afforded me admission to witness a historic moment for
the Coptic Orthodox Church. As petals of the daisies that people had removed from
the decorations still rained from the second floor of the Cathedral of St. Mark in el
Abasiyya, for the first time in the history of the Egyptian Republic, the president
addressed the Coptic community during Christmas mass:
"Egypt for years taught civilization to the whole world. I
want to tell you that the world is now waiting from Egypt in these
circumstances…It is important that the whole world watches us:
the Egyptians. You noticed that I am not using another word
other than 'Egyptians'. It could not be anything else. We are the
Egyptians!
Nobody ask: what type of Egyptian are you? Listen,
we are saying things. We are writing to the world a meaning
and we are opening a window of real hope and light to the
people.
I am saying that Egypt taught to the world over years
civilization and humanity. Today we are present to confirm that
we are able to teach humanity and teach civilization once again.
For this reason, we cannot say but: 'we are Egyptians!' We must
be only Egyptians. Yes! Egyptians!"

Half a decade after the ousting of Mubarak, the pronouncement of these ultranationalist exhortations by the country's president would give the impression that the
ideal for national unity pledged in Tahrir is eminently materializing. Indeed, during
those 18 days, the images of demonstrators with placards showing the cross within
the crescent, or images of Christians keeping guard at the square while Muslims
were praying that were broadcasted in media from all over the world managed to
romanticize a concept of a united Egyptian nation (Tadros 2012).
Still, this illusion did not have a ripple effect; not only because the Supreme
Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) that took over forged an informal alliance with the
Muslim Brotherhood, which in return came to represent the political settlement of
organizing power in the post-Mubarak phase (Tadros 2012); or because it was
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cemented on the idea of a common oppressor (Iskander 2013: 46). Instead, this
mirage of a united nation has prevented meaningful negotiations about citizenship,
belonging and national identity, and thus, contributed to the failure of reshuffling the
configuration of power in the country.
As argued by (Marc et al. 2013), the illusion of social cohesion, in the
Egyptian case, in the form of national unity, can serve to conceal highly unequal
power relations.

The fact that the president chose to make this vow at the

headquarters of its single historically strategic partner, rather than addressing a
general call for all Egyptian minorities, suggest that little has changed in the Ottoman
mindset to deal with Egyptian minorities, one of who this thesis has tried to shed a
light on.
Consequently, due to the over-simplistic, selective and unrealistic nature of
the account of national unity, studying the ways in which Catholic Copts at the JBAD
negotiate religious identity has required the analysis of power structures at different
levels. The relationship between the Coptic Orthodox and the State, ecumenical
relationships between the Coptic Orthodox and Catholic Churches and, finally, the
individual effort to exercise agency of Catholic Copts at the JBAD cannot be
understood without considering the complex contestations and negotiations of
citizenship, ecumenism, religious identiy and national unity of the time, as detailed in
the following sections.

7.1 Re-negotiating the millet pact

Despite claims of national unity, the January 25th revolution was prone to at
least cause cracks in a partnership that can be traced to Ottoman times. Followed by
the “brotherhoodization” of the state apparatus, the demise of Egypt’s elected
Islamist government in July 2013 did not deliver a hopeful beginning for interfaith
relations (HRW 2013). The army was responsible for what has been the single
deadliest incident of sectarian violence against Christians in contemporary Egyptian
history (Youssef 2013: 62). The use of army vehicles to run over peaceful protestors
during the Maspero Massacre and the SCAF's snub to hold the perpetrators
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accountable were clear political signals of a high level of tolerance towards religiousbased discrimination and injustice (Sedra 2012).
Additionally, social cohesion had been eroding in Egypt between Muslims and
Christians in many communities for several decades, and there had been incidents
involving collective violence against the minorities living in the community. The
collapse of the heavy handed state from regulating social affairs in Egypt led to
increased agency and mobilization of citizens on a national scale. And while the
revolution did not create sectarianism, it brought to the surface the cumulative
outcome of tensions that have been simmering for years.
The reaction to this transformative period evidenced that the personal political
commitment of the president and the Pope is no longer enough to sustain an entente
of the kind that existed in the 1950s. Such crises forced the new leadership of the
Orthodox Church to renegotiate its way between loyalty to the state, represented by
SCAF after the revolution and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's office since he was elected
president in May 2014 (Sedra 2016), and an increasing number of perceivable
voices.
There are now many players visible on both sides with diverse and
revolutionary agendas beyond the will of the Pope and the President. Even inside
the Orthodox Church, Pope Shouda came across as highly unpopular at times for
supporting Mubarak Junior, directing Coptic youth not to join the 25 uprisings and
defending the church's draconian rules in personal status matters (Tadros 2013:14).
Some Copts now openly decry the pope's authority to speak on behalf of all the
Copts and are using their own power bases to mediate requests that radically
challenge the way in which the Egyptian state chooses to handle the so-called
"Coptic question" in Egypt (Smith 2013). There is also dissidence within the ranks of
the ecclesiastical order, so it has become very difficult to guarantee that the pope's
will is obeyed systematically across all bishoprics and parishes, in addition to a
significant rise in participation in parliamentary elections of Coptic candidates since
the 1995 (Tadros 2013:15).
However, as particularly during the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt has
dwelt under a cloud of insecurity and uncertainty, most Copts did not pay attention to
the events occurring on the national stage and simply implemented the patriarch
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directives to vote for the ruling party’s candidates (Lukasik 2016). The January 25th
revolution exacerbated and brought to light these two trends in the Coptic as well as
in the whole Egyptian society: While a minority of Copts fiercely criticized Pope
Shenouda’s unconditional support for the regime and became involved in the
revolutionary struggle, most of them remained behind the Church’s walls that
allegedly protected them against the Islamist threat. This trade of acceptance of
individual non-involvement or "withdrawal" from political life for church activism and
protection has allowed Pope Tawadros to revive the strong alliance with President
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (Sedra 2014) that their predecessors had kept jealously.
The expression of opposition and self-criticism inside the Church reflects that
the Revolution did indeed manage to contest the Nasserite of model silencing all
expression of sectarian specificities and to consider the Coptic patriarch as the sole
political representative of the Copts. Yet, however cracked, the alliance between the
Church and the regime did not break let alone substituted for a more comprehensive
model. Though Patriarch Tawadros has sometimes adopted a critical stance towards
the government formed after the fall of Mubarak, he nevertheless did not seem to
initiate a radical change in the Church attitude and institutional structure (Makar
2016). Until the publishing of this study, the new Patriarch has followed the same
political orientation of his predecessor (Sedra 2016), although with a more
accentuated aperture to ecumenical exchanges (Makar 2016).
The problem with this re-installed millet partnership is that it creates a vacuum
of representation not only for Orthodox Copts, but for all Egyptian minorities. From
the outset, the Coptic Orthodox Church is not a democratic or, for that matter, a
properly political institution and cannot legitimately represent the interests of all
Copts in Egypt. From the inside, it has marginalized lay leadership since the abolition
of the maglis el mili by drawing these energies into church activism (Sedra 2012).
This monopoly of representation by the Coptic pontiff also excludes those Copts for
whom faith is not central to their identity or even Coptic women who, though
essential for the life of the community, are systematically excluded from the church’s
precincts of power.
Most importantly for the community which this thesis has studied, the reinstallment of this partnership leaves little room for representation of Non-Coptic
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Orthodox minorities. The support of the coup by Coptic Orthodox Patriarch Tawadros
not only brought repercussions for the community he represents but

brought

destruction and violence to Catholic communities such as the JBAD in retaliation for
the army's massacre in Raba el Adawya. While my main informant went all around
Europe during 2016 searching for international donors who would help rebuild the
four- story building that included a theater and a rehabilitation center, the highly
bureaucratic process to obtain re-building permits is a symptom of the asymmetry in
power relationships.
In return, minimal investments such as sending lower-ranking government
officials to present state Christmas greetings (in the Catholic case, meaning
December 24th) in the Roman Catholic Basilique of Our Lady of Heliopolis are
supposed to show all the different Catholic communities their consideration in the
nation's project. If anything, the contrast shows that the Sisi administration is not
willing to give up its shares from partnering with what is by far the largest religious
minority in Egypt and the region. It shows that in Egypt under Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi,
"national unity" does not mean pluralism, but rather a sectarian logic of governance
that prevails from Ottoman times where not every Egyptian is represented but every
Egyptian is accountable.

7.2 Copticness, identity politics and "ecumenism of the blood"

In addition to the abovementioned reasons, at the core of the assumption that
the Pope represents all Christians in Egypt lies a fallacy that makes the millet
partnership utterly flawed: this concept of national unity based on the figure of the
Coptic pope assumes church unity…something that has been inexistent for more
than a millennium and a half.
In order to provide a strong institutional response to Islamization and be able
to secure the loyalty of the community to the regime, the Coptic Orthodox Church
progressively retreated on the communal level. This created a solid community
positioned and integrated into all social classes and groups in Egypt (Bishara
2012:33). Copts are the owners of a quarter of the total national wealth, with their
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valuable investments in transportation, industry, banks and agriculture (Bishara
2012:34). Four Copts are among the world's richest tycoons112, and, though highly
frustrating for the Coptic community, the percentage of representation in the fields of
judiciary, media, diplomatic missions, the army and police are somewhere around
2% (Bishara 2012:34).
Previously identified as an entrenched Egyptian community, Copts have
propelled themselves beyond the banks of the Nile through two main phenomena:
migration and mission. In migration, the Coptic Church creates identity through
physical presence (church buildings), recasting the narrative (African originality),
employing a rubric of sovereignty (agency rather than passivity) and engaging others
ecumenically (gaining Orthodox legitimacy) (Elsässer: 79). Coptic nationalism is also
spreading to Latin America and South Africa through missionary work (Ogren 2014).
As a result of this corporative and transnational identity, and in combination
with centuries of Church history, any potential marginalization of the Copts within
national unity is contested and rejected. Hence, as articulated by Sherry Ortner
(2006) with regard to the politics of dominated groups: "They have their own politics"
(2006, 46). In the case of Coptic identity politics, they are "called into being" not only
"by the situation of domination itself" (Ortner 2006, 50), but also by being understood
as a simultaneous process of insistence and resistance to state actions and
outsiders.
This politics has enabled the church to secure a central role in the
construction of Copticness . Historically, some currents have emphasized
Copticness as a racial or religious category that separates Copts from other Egyptian
citizens (Khawaga: 2). Others deny that religious affiliation has any meaning in the
public space, and prefer to describe it as a confessional identity that is (or should be)
restricted to the private sphere (q.v. 4.4.1). This study has argued for yet another
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According to the Forbes website, Egyptian business tycoon Nassef Sawiris is the
wealthiest person in Egypt, ranking 421 among the world’s richest with $4.2 billion. Six
Egyptians were in the list of the wealthiest people globally; Sawiris’ older brother Naguib
Sawiris ranked second in Egypt with $3 billion. Onsi Sawiris, the father of Nassef and
Naguib, and the youngest brother Samih Sawiris are also among Egypt’s billionaires. Their
individual
profiles
are
available
at
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?toURL=https://www.forbes.com/profile/naguibsawiris/&refURL=https://www.google.com.eg/&referrer=https://www.google.com.eg/
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complication of this category, one alone the lines of denominational divisions in
Christianity. While inside the JBAD, Coptic community and identity are experienced,
performed and continually negotiated at multiple levels, "Copt" is a meaningless
category without acknowledging that not all Copts are Orthodox.
Despite the lack of representation at a political level, the religious identity of
Catholic Copts is not a separate Copticness. Since the founding of the Coptic
Church of Alexandria by the staff of St. Mark in 50 A.D, writers, exegetes and
philosophers, such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen, or her great patriarchs,
ascetics, martyrs and saints of the Church, such as Athanasius, Cyril, Antonious or
Abanoub, have been referred to as "Copt" to mean a theological and spiritual
tradition. In the Catholic Coptic sense "Copt" refers to all those who are affiliated to
the spiritual, liturgical and theological Alexandrian Christian Tradition.
However, the conservation by Catholic Copts of this common heritage has
been commonly disregarded rendering a minority that is fabricated or foreign. This
can be easily attributed to the tensions that rose with the Coptic Orthodox Church as
the Unite project and the later missionary project established a more widespread
Catholic presence in Egypt that would hunt of its faithful. Yet, this does not excuse
the way academia has concentrated in the narrative Muallm Ghali as the founder of
the Catholic Coptic Church and that Catholicism entered Egypt as a result of his
effort. In the same line, the fact that academia has left the members of this church as
an accident of a missionary or colonial project is a far cry to a description of their
reality. If mentioned at all, Catholic Copts are presented as residual Christians from
foreign projects that are not a force relevant enough to deserve in-depth research.
Not only are such narratives over-simplified, but they also tell little about the
complexities of life and the varied relationships of Catholic Copts in today's Egypt.
Despite the schism, the proneness to enculturation of the Uniate project has
actually yielded mature fruits in Egypt. Unatism has offered Egyptians the culturallysensitive opportunity to be both Copt and Catholic. It has fostered an identity that is
close to the Copts by allowing them to follow their own doctrines and performed their
own ceremonies, but still acknowledge the authority of the Pope of Rome. The
existence of such a vibrant institution as the JBAD, the production of Coptic Jesuit
literature, theatre and cinema and even the Egyptian absorption of Liberation
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Theology by activist from el Nahda Association during Tahrir, are proof that
evangelism can indeed fulfill "the promise of native agency" (Makdisi 2007: 197).
In recognition of this agency, Vatican Second has entrusted Catholic Eastern
Churches- among them Catholic Copts- the "special duty of fostering the unity of all
Christians, in particular of Eastern Christians" (Orientalium Ecclesiarum, n. 24),
especially with the Orthodox Coptic Church. Being their closest relative, today there
are less obstacles that separate Catholics from Orthodox. The Coptic Orthodox
Church is no longer presumed to be Monophysite heretic and the developments of
the Pro Oriente give the impression that the Church is walking towards healing their
millenary rifts (q.v. Chapter 5.1.1). Although minor theological differences as the
filioque clause or the concept of purgatory may seem easy to reconcile, the political
nature of thorny issues such as papal supremacy make church unity seem like a farfetched dream.
There are good news for studies to come in ecumenology. Just 48 hours after
this thesis was defended -taking advantage of Pope Francis's historic and hectic visit
to Egypt - the Coptic Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church singed a declaration

to recognize the baptisms conducted by each other (Vatican Radio 2017).
Whether or not and how it will contribute to the reconfiguration of sectarian lines will
be an interesting subject in studies to come. However, where ecumenism has and
will continue to fail, sectarian violence has managed to push Christians together. In a
notable interview with La Stampa, Pope Francis has coined this phenomenon as
"ecumenism of the blood ":
"In some countries they kill Christians because
they wear a cross or have a Bible, and before killing them they
don't ask 'Are you Lutheran, or Orthodox, or Evangelical or
Baptist or Methodist?' The blood is mixed.
They are Christians. And that blood (of martyrdom)
unites. Today, dear brothers and sisters, we are living an
'ecumenism of blood'. This must encourage us to do what we
are doing today: to pray, to dialogue together, to shorten the
distance between us, to strengthen our bonds of brotherhood. If
the enemy unites us in death, who are we to divide ourselves in
life?" (Wooden 2015).
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Indeed, where the water of baptism continues to separate Christians, the
blood of martyrdom unites them.

7.3 Catholic Coptic activism, agency and citizenship by praxis

Albeit the power struggles and sectarian divisions that have written Catholic
Copts out of post- revolutionary literature, this study sought to analyze how those
forgotten by the millet pact or those whose voices are not politically represented
have found alternative sources of participation and activism.
Perhaps in countries of a non-democratic tradition such as Egypt (Masoud
2014) does Tully (2008)’s rendering of citizenship takes a full meaning.
Fundamentally defined by praxis or engagement in local and diverse forms of civic
practices, rather than by a legal status tied to the nation-state, becoming a citizen in
Tully's terms entails moral and political questions and practice contingent on the
particular context in which a person resides (Tully 2008: 57).

Praxis-based

citizenship is constructed out of an agent‘s active and on-going engagement with
other people; developing their own civic practices according to different social
contexts and interactions (Tully, 2008).
Although the dominant idea is that of modern liberal citizenship is that of a
universal and institutionalized form of citizenship based on constitutional law within
the nation-state- a passive and narrow connotation as merely a legal status, Tully
argues that civic activities of citizens are primary (Tully 2008: 62). That is, people do
not become citizens by virtue of a status defined by rights and guaranteed by the
institutions of the modern state and international law, but only by virtue of actual
participation in citizenship practices where they acquire the linguistic and nonlinguistic abilities, modes of conduct and interaction in relationships with others,
forms of awareness of self and other, and the use of civic equipment that are
constitutive of citizenship (Tully: 29).
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Despite the hopes that accompanied the January 25 Revolution in this regard,
and the disillusionment behind it, transcendental developments regarding citizenship
simply are not happening in post-revolutionary Egypt (Sedra 2016). What makes this
all the more remarkable is that, at nearly every previous revolutionary juncture in
Egypt’s modern history – 1882, 1919, and 1952 –there was a serious and sustained
engagement with the issue of citizenship (Masoud 2014). Indeed, one might have
thought that, not least given its Christian minority, Egypt would have been the Arab
uprising context most likely to confront the question of citizenship. Nevertheless, by
contributing to social development, not only of Catholics but of Egyptian society
indiscriminately, through their NGO's, schools, hospitals and social development
programs particularly in cities such as Minya, Cairo, Alexandria or Assiut, Coptic
Jesuits exercise praxis-based citizenship that the revolution failed to deliver.
Without being involved in collective demand-making or mainstream politics,
Catholics in Egypt- Coptic and not- are one of the longest surviving actors in
Egyptian civil society. In trying to compensate for the partial retreat and
shortcomings of the state this format has been efficient in mobilizing at the
grassroots for social development to their size, commitment to the Egyptian society’s
most vulnerable and marginalized communities, and un-partisan nature. Despite
the appearance of new service providers, the reputation that accompanies Catholic
institutions to serve development since the times of Mohamed Ali has allowed that
0.6% of the schoolchildren in Egypt are educated by Catholics today (Media Kitab
2011).
Of course, this reputation is not absolute and suspicion of proselytism has not
been absent. Yet the fact that community services are an integral part of the role of
churches in Egypt and that the Catholic church itself has changed its outlook from
mission to dialogue since Vatican II, indicate that it is willing to assume a more
porous and progressive role. Instead, Catholic institutions as the JBAD have set
religion aside and took on a more civil face as non-governmental organizations.
This does not mean that Catholic Coptic actors dissociate completely from
their religious identity. On the contrary, post Vatican II social Catholicism developed
a comprehensive understanding of mission, a global sense of priorities, and a
religiously comprehensive or global sense of social justice (Bisson 2011) that is
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compatible with secular involvement that proclaims its visibility to the Muslim
masses. Through religious engagement, which suggests a process of mutuality, one
not only seeks to change the world in a disinterested fashion, one allows oneself to
be changed in the process. In this manner, religiously motivated social justice
activism leads to a form of engaged religion, a new form of religion that has emerged
in the context of globalization.
In Sisi's Egypt, the challenges for the JBAD seem to place it next to any other
Egyptians NGO as a crackdown on civil society has taken form. Prior to and since
the 2011 Revolution, civil society in Egypt has been governed highly restrictive
laws113, but still hosted relatively large and vibrant civil society sector. Since the
2011 Revolution, the Ministry of Social Solidarity has been given enormous
discretionary powers in a way that civil society organizations are increasingly forced
to operate in a climate of fear, limitation, and uncertainty. Although the NGOs that
have been targeted include mainly pro-democracy and human rights organizations
and Catholic activism has traditionally stayed away from this thorny field, this
uncertainty has caused many donors to holding their funds waiting to see what will
happen in the future.
Aside from this challenge, the JBAD promises to continue serving Minyas as it
has done for three generations. This study has been but a morsel of a much larger
image of the different Catholic Coptic realities and the JBAD are not the only
Catholic Coptic actors in the field and I envision future research on the activities of
the Office for Social Development or other purely Catholic Coptic religion-based
activism.
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Including the Law on Associations and Community Foundations (Law 84 of 2002)
and the Implementing Regulation for Law 84 of 2002 (Ministry of Social Affairs [Now Ministry
of Social Solidarity and Justice] Decree 178 of 2002), which gave it and other governmental
agency enormous discretionary powers See Civic Freedom Monitor: Egypt, Available at:
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/egypt.html
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7.4 The Egyptian Question

A year later after el Sisi became the first Egyptian president to attend the
Coptic Christmas mass, his second speech on at the altar of St. Mark's Cathedral
was much more apologetic. Three weeks

before the tragic attack upon the

Botroseyya Church in Abbasiyya that took the lives of two dozen Coptic Christians,
mere steps away from Cairo’s Coptic Cathedral and Papal Headquarters
overshadowed the excitement for the president's visit. The Egyptian President seized
the opportunity to apologize for the churches that were torched during clashes
between supporters of ousted President Mohamed Morsi and security forces
following the dispersal of two pro-Morsi camps in August 2013; he promised that the
churches (though not private properties) would be fully restored during 2017 and
revealed his intentions to build the largest church in Egypt next to the largest
mosque in Egypt in his new capital. To prove such commitment, the church of St.
Paul was repaired before the holiday as a token of this promise.
While one would be tempted to applaud this reparatory vow, this populist
promise of is in fact a vow to erect more monuments to sectarianism. The more
glaring problem in the wake of the Botrosiyya Church attack is that insisting in
structuring political representation in this way – through sectarian institutionsinvariably intensifies sectarian political divides in contemporary Egypt. How could the
affirmation of the unified Egyptian nation be the antidote to the sectarian “sickness”
when sectarianism is nothing other than a face of nationalism?

Both were

historically produced from the same matrix of meaning relying on the logic of identity
where religion became an identity marker for the state, while identity worked as the
structuring principle governing the modes of participation in, or subjection to, the
sanctified nation-state. As revolutionary discourses and practices have not yet
created a coherent system of meaning that would replace the old one, governed by
the very logic of identity, in a country that played an integral role in the global spread
of Christianity and Islam, religion has served to fragment a society that is already
sharply split between rulers and ruled.
Consequential to the fallacy of identity politics is the existence of a so-called
"Coptic question" (Youssef 2013, Walkin 2001, Tadros 2013, Iskander 2014) as
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conflicts of citizenship and relations of power between Egyptians on the basis of
religion are not exclusive to Orthodox Copts. Although the percentage of different
religious groups in Egypt has been hotly contested (Tadros 2013), it is roughly
accepted to include 85-90% Sunni Muslim, about 10% Christian Coptic Orthodox,
less than 1% other Christian denominations - mainly Protestant and Catholic, less
than 200,000 Bahais, about 200 Jews and unquantifiable amount of atheist and
other consciences that not sanctioned by the Egyptian state (Hulsman 2012). Thus,
the different realities of those characters whom I have presented at the JBAD in
Minya are a small sample that reflect that under the logic of religious identity and
citizenship there are more questions: a "Bahai question", a "Shi'ia question", several
"Protestant (Evangelical, Presbyterian, Anglican) questions", and of course, a
"Catholic question".
Ultimately, this study has aimed to contest in a broader manner the way
Egyptian religious minorities are studied in the Post-Tahrir era. Even if the
Revolution failed to move beyond binary sectarian labels academia should be
reflexive enough to explore underlying issues. In the particular case of Catholic
Copts, this means recognition of their agency by emancipating their study from
Missionary Studies into more relevant studies of citizenship, nationalism and identity.
As for other Egyptian religious minorities, deeper analysis of power relations should
rephrase the concept of "Coptic Question" into a sincere question of pluralism or
"Egyptian question".
Unlike Sisi's exhortation in his first Christmas speech, it is necessary for
scholarship to ask "what type of Egyptian are you?"; not to promote sectarianism, but
to address asymmetries in power relations and representation that until now
revolutions, activists and scholars have failed to balance.
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